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Introduction  
The main purpose of the study is to analyse how the growing welfare gaps 
between Eastern and Western Europe have become a securitised issue that 
needs to be addressed by national, international and supranational bodies.  
 ‘Welfare gap’ as used in this study of migration refers to a real, material 
and measurable difference in the standard of living, level of social security 
(including exposure to social, ethnic or gender conflicts) and disparities in 
income between the country of origin and the migration target area. In order 
to understand migratory choices, it is also necessary to address the issue of 
social representations – how the country of origin and the country of migra-
tion are ‘imagined’ by individuals and groups.  
These social representations are important in the migratory context in at 
least two ways. On the one hand the decision to migrate is often based not 
exclusively on a rational analysis of situation in the country of origin and in 
the destination country, but also on shared and not always completely ‘cor-
rect’ representations on the destination country. On the other hand, the emi-
grants’ ability to find their place in the new country will often depend on 
how those emigrants are ‘represented’, ‘imagined’ and ‘thought of’ in their 
country of destination. Thus, in order to understand the complexity of migra-
tory choices and the social, cultural and political consequences of these 
choices, it is not enough to focus on exclusively material, measurable aspects 
of migration. Our understanding of these complex processes can be much 
deeper if we add this ‘representative’ – or discursive – dimension to the 
analysis.  
A major consequence of the very existence of real or perceived welfare 
gaps is the interest that both individuals and groups take in the overcoming 
what they see as a real or imagined hindrance to improving their lives. Of the 
many ways of solving this ‘welfare dilemma’, migration and various trans-
border activities seem among the most common choices. However, in order 
to place migration in the proper context, we will treat it here as only one of 
many possible individual and group survival strategies. Migration is a com-
plex issue, and because there are various forms of migration, we will look at 
not only the classical migration understood as permanent settlement in other 
country, but also various other migration-like choices and strategies.  
The very existence of welfare gaps is an important migratory push-factor. 
This study will examine how the economic and social transition in Eastern 
Europe – first of all in Russia and Poland, but also in the rest of what used to 
be defined as Eastern Bloc1 – has contributed to the emergence of a new set 
of push and pull factors in the region, and as a direct result, to new patterns 
of emigration. The next step will be to see how these emerging migratory 
patterns have influenced migration trends in Norway. As Norway is often 
                                                     
1 In addition to Russia and Poland, this study deals with developments in the European part of 
the former Soviet Union – Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Georgia, 
Azerbaijan, Armenia – and in Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Romania. 
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represented as the wealthiest country in Europe and a country that has suc-
cessfully pursued what is often in the Central and Eastern European dis-
course described as ‘the third way’ of development: a country that, thanks to 
its revenues from oil, has managed to build a capitalism with a human face, 
Norway has become both a potential and actual country of migration to 
many of the citizens from the former Communist Bloc.   
Thus, this study maps both the ‘push factors’ in the area of actual and po-
tential emigration in Eastern and Central Europe, as well as the most impor-
tant ‘pull factors’ in the areas of actual and potential migration, with a focus 
on Central/Eastern Europe on the one hand, and Norway on the other. In this 
context we will look at various institutional and non-institutional strategies 
of eliminating the welfare gaps perceived as a major cause of migration. As 
migration is increasingly becoming a securitised issue, I will treat the ‘wel-
fare gap/migration issue’ as a part of a new post-Cold War European secu-
rity equation.2 
Mapping the study and defining the main concepts 
This study is multi-disciplinary, in focusing on various aspects of complex 
social and political reality and seeking explanations from various disciplines 
and approaches. In order to give the reader a better understanding of the 
most central and most used concepts, we will start by delineating the concep-
tual and disciplinary borders of the study and by presenting operational defi-
nitions of the central concepts used in the analysis.  
The main general goal of the study is to see how the existing and per-
ceived welfare gaps contribute to setting a new political and social agenda in 
Europe in the post-Cold War context. We will focus on welfare gaps and on 
both individual and group strategies of solving what could be described as a 
welfare gap dilemma. While highlighting the role that migratory choices 
play in this context, we also want to place migratory strategies within a 
broader framework of survival strategies in post-Communist Europe. To this 
end, we will examine the impact the implementation of these strategies has 
had on debate on and implementation of migration policy in the receiving 
countries.  
We will focus on the post-Communist Europe and how the systemic tran-
sition in this area has helped to bring about new political and social chal-
lenges. The emergence of these challenges has, in turn, resulted in the emer-
gence of various survival strategies used by the people of the region to ad-
dress these new challenges and adapt to the new situation.  
With the relaxation of travel restrictions in the former Communist Europe 
and in the West and the opening of borders as one immediate result of the 
first phase of transition, various types of transborder activities became in-
creasingly important in those survival strategies. During the Communist pe-
riod the possibility to travel was restricted – both by Communist regimes 
fearing that their citizens could be infected with some ‘improper ideas’ when 
travelling to the West, and by Western countries fearing Communist infiltra-
                                                     
2  See also Wæver, Buzan, Kelstrup and Lemaitre 1993 and Huysmans 2000; on the concept 
of ‘securitisation’ see Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998. 
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tion and uncontrolled movement of hordes of migrants fleeing the Commu-
nist paradise on earth.  
However, the situation changed dramatically in the second half of 1989. 
On 4 June 1989, the first partly free parliamentary election took place in Po-
land. The result was the collapse of the Communist power in that country. A 
similar situation developed in Hungary. In February 1989 the Hungarian So-
cialists’ Workers Party (HSWP) opened the possibility of building a multi-
party system in the country. In May 1989, János Kádár, who more then any-
one else had personified the Soviet domination, was relieved of his power 
and duties, and negotiations between the HSWP and the opposition started. 
The immediate result was the election of the first opposition deputy to the 
Hungarian parliament on 23 July 1989. On 7 October 1989, the HSWP de-
cided to dissolve itself.  
That summer, however, the Hungarian and Polish authorities had to deal 
with a new and embarrassing problem in their relations with the most con-
servative of the Communist regimes – Honecker’s regime in the German 
Democratic Republic (GDR). After the rigged local election in the GDR on 7 
May 1989 and the lack of even a dim prospect that the system in the GDR 
could be democratised, East Germans decided to vote with their feet. In early 
summer 1989, thousands of East Germans who were officially spending their 
holidays in the other socialist countries sought refuge in the West German 
embassies in Warsaw, Prague and Budapest. By late August 1989 almost 
60,000 East Germans had decided to follow this path. This put pressure on 
relations between the GDR and the countries that refused to implement any 
harsh measures to stop this exodus. On 10 September 1989 the Hungarian 
authorities decided to open their border to Austria and let the East Germans 
– and others – to use this way if they wanted to leave for the West. This 
highly symbolic move heralded a new epoch in the history of the free 
movement of people in Europe. And then, on 9 November 1989, the most 
visible symbol of division of Europe, the Berlin Wall, was ‘dissembled’ by 
thousands of jubilant Germans. By late 1989 all Communist regimes in East-
ern and Central Europe had crumbled – some, like the Czechoslovak one, as 
a consequence of a Velvet Revolution; others, like the Romanian one, in the 
wake of bloody turmoil.  
Two more years were to pass before the collapse of the weakened Soviet 
system in the Inner Empire. Finally, on 25 December 1991, with the symbo-
lic lowering of the Soviet flag over the Kremlin, the Communist period of 
European history took an abrupt and unexpected end. A completely new po-
litical map of all Europe had to be drawn. The old bipolar system was repla-
ced by a new setting, far less predictable and clear. In the West, the agenda 
was dominated by debates on European integration; in the East, societies and 
elites had to cope with the transition from the detested but familiar Com-
munist past to an ill-defined and unknown democratic and capitalist future.  
The events of summer 1989 established a direct link between the individ-
ual choices of the East European citizens and European high politics. That 
60,000 East Germans decided to ‘go West’ and challenge their regime on the 
issue of free movement of people put the matter on the European agenda in a 
spectacular way. When we recall that this challenge contributed directly to 
the collapse of the GDR regime and, indirectly, to the radical redrawing of 
Jakub M. Godzimirski 10 
the political map of Europe, the link between  ‘individual and group survival 
strategies’ and European high politics becomes even more obvious.  
How should we define those pivotal concepts? What do we understand by 
‘welfare gap’, or by ‘individual and group survival strategies’? And how 
should we approach the issue of migration?  
Welfare gap 
We have to start by mapping the concept of welfare itself. ‘Welfare’ can be 
defined and understood in many ways. In daily usage in English, the term 
‘welfare’ can mean at least three things:3 
 
- governmental provision of economic assistance to persons in need; 
- something that aids or promotes well-being;  
- a contented state of being happy and healthy and prosperous.  
 
An older (1913 edition) version of the Webster’s Dictionary provides the fol-
lowing definition:  
 
Well-doing or well-being in any respect; the enjoyment of health and 
the common blessings of life; exemption from any evil or calamity; 
prosperity; happiness.  
 
The term ‘welfare’ is often used as a substitute for the term ‘well-being’, and 
they both have much to do with quality of life. Well-being is defined in simi-
lar way as welfare. In defining ‘quality of life’ we will follow an approach 
similar to that chosen by the authors of the study on the monitoring of qual-
ity of life in Europe prepared by European Foundation for the Improvement 
of Living and Working Conditions (EFILWC):  
 
Quality of life in a society can be defined as the overall well-being of 
those living there. Well-being then reflects not only living conditions 
and control over resources across the full spectrum of life domains, 
but also the ways in which people respond and feel about their lives 
in those domains. (Fahey, Nolan and Whelan 2003: 14) 
 
Within the political framework, the most frequent use of ‘welfare’ is ‘wel-
fare state’. The term defines a type of state in which the welfare of the citi-
zenry in matters like social security, health and education, housing and 
working conditions is the responsibility of the government. According to the 
Penguin Dictionary of Sociology, the state has the following responsibilities 
in the sphere of welfare:  
 
Welfare states typically protect people against poverty by means of 
unemployment benefits, family allowances, income supplements for 
the poorly paid, and old-age pensions; they provide comprehensive 
medical care, free education and public housing. These services are 
                                                     
3 http://www.hyperdictionary.com/dictionary/welfare 
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financed by state insurance schemes and taxation. (Abercrombie et 
al.1994: 454) 
 
In this study we will deal with most aspects of welfare as outlined in these 
definitions. We will also examine how the welfare situation – or in other 
words well-being – of the population of Central and Eastern Europe has 
changed as a consequence of the transition, and how the collapse of real so-
cialism and the waning of its specific variant of ‘welfare state’ and the emer-
gence of ‘wild capitalism’ have contributed to the formation of a new set of 
migratory push factors. We will also address the issue of how what is often 
perceived – not quite correctly – as the continued existence of the traditional 
Scandinavian model of welfare state in Norway has been an important mi-
gratory pull factor, inducing people to go to this country in search of a better 
life. We will thus deal with both the socio-psychological aspects of welfare 
and well-being in Central/Eastern Europe in the broader context of transi-
tion, and with the institutional aspects of the functioning of the welfare state 
system in Norway and how this system has tackled the migratory pressures 
from the former Soviet Bloc.  
The level of welfare – both socio-psychological, understood as the sub-
jective feeling of well-being, and institutional, understood as the level of 
‘welfare services’ provided by a given state – can be measured through vari-
ous gauging instruments. However, our study will focus not only on the ma-
terial and measurable dimension of welfare, but also on representations or 
perceptions of welfare and welfare state, and how these representations af-
fect migratory choices and movements. 
The term ‘welfare gap’ will therefore have at least two meanings in this 
study. On the one hand, we will try to identify the measurable gap between 
the level of welfare and well-being in the source country and in the destina-
tion country. On the other hand, we will examine to what extent migratory 
choices are fuelled not only by these measurable relative welfare gaps but 
also by collective and subjective representations and perceptions concerning 
the level of welfare in the source and the destination country.   
By ‘welfare gap’ we thus understand both the measurable and the repre-
sented differences in standard of living, level of social security (including 
exposure to social, ethnic or gender conflicts) and income disparities be-
tween the country of origin and the migration target area. In order to opera-
tionalise the concept of welfare gap we need to identify more specifically 
what is understood by welfare and well-being. In her interesting recent study 
on well-being and exclusion in Europe’s regions, Kitty Stewart offers an 
overview of various approaches to the question of well-being. (Stewart 2002: 
8–12). Stewart decided to focus on five dimensions of well-being – material 
well-being/consumption, health, education and literacy, participation in pro-
ductive sphere and participation in social sphere. In order to support her 
choice she presents a detailed analysis of other understandings of ‘well-
being’. This overview, summed up in Table 1, reveals a common denomina-
tor of the study of well-being and some other proposals on what should be 
measured when studying problems of welfare, well-being, social inclusion 
and social exclusion. 
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Table 1. Approaches to the question of well-being and welfare  
 
UNDP 
(1998) Hu-
man Poverty 
Index  
Swedish 
Level of Liv-
ing Surveys4 
Stewart 
(2002) 
Robinson, 
Oppenheim5 
Burchardt 
et al.6 
Material well-
being 
Material well-
being 
Material well-
being Income 
Consump-
tion 
Health Health Health Health Production 
Education and 
literacy 
Education and 
literacy 
Education and 
literacy Education 
Political en-
gagement 
Participation 
in productive 
sphere  
long-term un-
employment 
Participation 
in productive 
sphere 
Participation 
in productive 
sphere 
 
Labour market Social inter-action 
 
Participation 
in social 
sphere 
Participation 
in social 
sphere 
 Health  
 Housing   Education 
 Exposure to crime    
 Political par-ticipation    
 Leisure pur-suits    
 
Stewart presents a comprehensive approach to the problem of social exclu-
sion in European regions, but geographically this study is limited to the area 
of the current members of the European Union. Another interesting study 
with a comprehensive approach to the measurement of welfare is that of Os-
berg and Sharp (2000). Their proposal on weighting various dimensions of 
welfare/well-being is also an important source of inspiration for this analy-
sis. Their findings are summed up in Figure 1.  
 
                                                     
4 Erikson 1993. For more details on the Swedish Level of Living Survey see: 
http://www.sofi.su.se/LNU2000/ 
5 Robinson, P and C Oppenheim (1998) ‘Social Exclusion Indicators: A Submission to the 
Social Exclusion Unit’, IPPR mimeo, July 1998, taken from Stewart 2002. 
6 Burchardt, T., J Le Grand and D. Piachaud (2001). ‘Degrees of Exclusion: Developing a 
Dynamic, Multi-Dimensional Measure’, in J Hills, J Le Grand and D Piachaud (eds.), Under-
standing Social Exclusion, Oxford: Oxford University Press listed after Stewart 2002.  
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M arket Consum ption per Capita 
Governm ent Spending per Capita Consumption flow s (0.4) 
Variation in W ork Hours 
Capital Stock Per Capita 
R§D Per Capita 
Natural Resources Per Capita 
Hum an Capital 
Less: Net Foreign Debt Per Capita 
W ealth Stocks (0.1) 
Less: Social Cost of Environm ental 
Degradation 
Poverty Intensity (0.1875) Equality (0.25) 
Gini Coefficient (0.0625) 
Risk of Unem ploym ent (0.0694) 
Risk of Ilness ((0.104) 
Risk of Single Parent Poverty (0.0540) 
In
de
x 
of
 w
el
l-b
ei
ng
 
Economic Security (0.25) 
Risk of O ld Age (0.0226) 
Figure 1. Weighting of economic well-being (based on Osberg and 
Sharpe 2000) 
 
In the following, we will use Stewart’s and Osberg & Sharpe’s comprehen-
sive approach to well-being and present developments in Central and Eastern 
Europe through the same ‘conceptual prism’. Taking these proposals on the 
measurement of well-being as our point of departure, we will present the 
challenges faced by the population of the region, and the local responses to 
these challenges.  
Survival strategies  
The challenges the people of Central and Eastern Europe have been facing 
over the past decade are inseparably linked with the systemic transition un-
derway since the break-up of Communism and the collapse of the Soviet Un-
ion. In response, the people of the region have devised various survival 
strategies to address the real – or perhaps only perceived – problem of wel-
fare and well-being gaps, both within the borders of the region and between 
the region and the rest of Europe.  
These ‘survival strategies’ range from national to individual level. The 
striving for freedom of the nations of the former Soviet Bloc in the late 
1980s was to a certain extent the realisation of an unconscious national sur-
vival strategy. In the case of at least some countries – especially the Baltic 
republics of Latvia and Estonia – this link between the survival of the nation 
as a separate unit and the fight for freedom was openly expressed by the lo-
cal political elites. Elsewhere, the determination to get rid of Soviet domina-
tion was often presented as a manifestation of pursuing the nation’s own, 
specific way of development, rather than that imposed by the Soviet he-
gemon. The will to liberation from the Soviet domination was one of the 
most important driving social and political forces throughout the region. 
However, the successful realisation of this postulate resulted in the emer-
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gence of a completely new political and social situation that forced the local 
populations into often painful adaptations to the new social, political and 
economic realities.  
We begin by looking at various adaptation and survival strategies trace-
able in the whole region, and then focus on the strategies with an impact on 
migratory choices. We will present the whole scope of available survival 
strategies and indicate how they relate to migratory choices. In  talking about 
‘survival strategies’ we define them as adaptive measures taken by groups 
and individuals in response to the new challenges of the transition in Central 
and Eastern Europe. These are strategies devised and implemented in a situa-
tion when individuals and groups are faced with a deterioration of their so-
cial and economic position and are challenged to adapt to a new social and 
economic reality in order to counter the negative developments and maintain 
– if possible improve – their own position. 
After the collapse of the Communist system, the stated goal of the 
planned transformation was the establishment of democracy and the market 
economy throughout the region. Communism as a bearing ideology and pre-
scription for dealing with social, economic and political challenges was de-
clared null and void by the local political elites. The old system was to be 
transformed and the planned transition was to result in the creation of West-
ern-like societies in the whole region. One highly visible result of this policy 
choice, and one with a crucial impact on the choice of survival strategies, 
was the almost immediate transformation of the local economies – almost 
overnight, the command economy of shortage of goods so characteristic of 
the former system was replaced by a deregulated economy of abundance of 
goods and a shortage of means.7  
In some countries, the reformers embarked on a ‘shock therapy’ policy; 
in other countries, local policy-makers attempted to ease the economic tran-
sition by slowing the pace and depth of reforms. A decade after the begin-
ning of these systemic economic and political reforms, there is, however, a 
widely shared perception that these reforms often resulted in a shock without 
a therapy.  
The main challenge facing much of ‘post-Communist’ society in the 
wake of the reforms was that of economic survival. The situation was further 
complicated by the emergence of a new and previously practically unknown 
social and economic phenomenon – the shortage of labour. Successful adap-
tation to quickly changing surroundings thus became an adaptation to chang-
ing economic realities. The main problem was economic survival, so most 
survival strategies had a strong ‘economic’ component. In a situation when 
the entire surrounding social, economic and political system was undergoing 
deep transformation and everyone had to learn how to deal with new chal-
lenges, choosing migration as a strategy for coping with the new reality 
could look less dramatic than it had during the Communist period. Another 
factor facilitating the choice of either permanent or temporary migration as a 
coping strategy was the removal of almost all practical travel hindrances by 
the local authorities. The result was higher transborder mobility.  
                                                     
7 On various aspects of transition and its local results see After the Fall (1999); Gomulka 
2000; Nelson, Tilly and Walker 1997; Tomer 2002; Transition. The First Ten Years (2002); 
UNICEF 2001. 
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Migration  
How do we define migration in the context of this study? While examining 
the impact that various survival strategies have had on migratory trends be-
tween Central/Eastern Europe and Norway, we will cover not only tradi-
tional permanent or temporal migration from the region to Norway, but will 
also look at other ‘transborder activities’ that are linked with the choice of 
survival strategies and have had some impact on the Norwegian debate on 
migration from Central and Eastern Europe.  
We will use the broadest possible definition of migration: a temporary, 
seasonal or permanent movement of people from one country to another or 
from one region to another. In short, migration will be defined here as an 
important component of a survival strategy involving movement of individ-
ual or group in space. As this study focuses on international migration we 
will not deal in detail with internal migration as a response to the new chal-
lenges, but it is important to bear in mind that international migration should 
be seen as a sort of spatial and qualitative extension of domestic migration. 
The decision to leave one’s place of living as a response to an economic 
and/or social challenge, whether for a limited period or permanently, is so 
compelling and fateful for an individual that it must be seen as a dramatic 
choice, whether one is leaving for another region, or abroad. Of course, leav-
ing for another country involves extra challenges, such as the need to learn a 
new language, to learn new cultural codes, and to adapt to a new community.  
Migration is a multi-dimensional phenomenon. At least three aspects of 
migration will be addressed in this study: moving in space, moving in time, 
moving for a reason. These three aspects of migration – spatial, temporal and 
teleological – will all be touched upon in our analysis.  
Migration can involve moving within your known familiar landscape, or 
about moving to distant and unknown places. When you marry someone 
from a neighbouring village and decide to settle down with him or her, you 
migrate from your village to another one for all your life, but the distance is 
rather short.  If you live in the Polish city of Zgorzelec and have a job in the 
German city of Görlitz located on the other side of Odra River you move to 
another country every day, but only for a limited number of hours. If you 
live in the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad and make your living by smug-
gling cheap alcohol and cigarettes from Kaliningrad to Poland and some 
goods back from Poland to Kaliningrad you may cross the Polish–Russian 
border many times a day in order not to violate the custom rules and to earn 
the money you need in order to survive. If, however, you live in the Ukrain-
ian city of Lviv and decide to go to Canada, where you perhaps have some 
relatives, to seek better opportunities there, this probably means leaving for 
many years and being far from your home place – although you may survive 
without learning the new language or new codes if you remain within your 
own ethnically homogeneous local small community abroad. 
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Figure 2. Axes and patterns of migration 
 
 
When it comes to the spatial scope of migration, we will concentrate on 
transborder activities within the European framework. In identifying survival 
strategies we will focus on these strategies that have had the greatest impact 
on the emergence of a new pattern of migration between Central/Eastern 
Europe and Scandinavia, first of all Norway. Concerning the temporal di-
mension of migration we plan to cover the whole spectrum, as migration 
from Central and Eastern Europe to Scandinavia has been of both a perma-
nent and a non-permanent character. When it comes to the ‘teleological as-
pect’ of migration, i.e. why people migrate, we will analyse migration pat-
terns as an implementation of various individual and group survival strate-
gies with a strong ‘migratory component’. 
Our overall approach to migration will be based on a modified concept of 
migratory push and pull factors.8 By push factors we understand the negative 
factors that make people leave their homeplace in search of better economic, 
social and other opportunities. Pull factors can be defined as the positive fac-
tors that induce people to choose a country or region of destination. Push and 
pull factors should be seen as two sides of the same coin – ‘twin phenomena’ 
in that sense that the impact of the negative push factors on the decision to 
migrate can be drastically strengthened by the presence of positive pull fac-
tors in the chosen area of migration. Push and pull factors relate directly to 
each other – the most crucial is perhaps not the presence of push and pull 
factors alone, but their coexistence in the minds of those mulling the deci-
sion to migrate.  It is not enough that you perceive your current situation as 
very difficult, that you are ‘pushed’ from your place by ‘push factors’ such 
                                                     
8 Two interesting studies on reasons why people move are Cieslinska 1992; Schoorl et al. 
2000. Also IOM 1998. and  Pirozhkov, O. and Khomra 2003. give interesting insights into 
why people in Central and Eastern Europe may consider moving.  
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as poverty, lack of opportunities, hunger, war or persecution – you will 
probably not decide to move unless you can see a real alternative, unless you 
are attracted by some ‘pull factors’ in the area you consider moving to. Or 
you may be pushed by the ‘push factors’ without having a perspective and 
then become a forced migrant, a person forced to leave without having any 
positive alternative. 
In discussing migratory push and pull factors we have to be aware that 
these factors do have not only – and perhaps not even primarily – an eco-
nomic and material character. The whole ‘push and pull factor’ theory was 
originally deeply rooted in rational choice theory. People were seen as mak-
ing the individual decision to migrate after having rationally considered their 
situation and looking at the various alternatives. Their decision to migrate 
was to be based, according to this theory, on a rational calculation of pros 
and contras – a kind of rational cost and benefit analysis. The most important 
single motive behind the decision to migrate was seen as the relative dis-
tance between the actual ‘loss’ caused by push factors and the potential 
‘gain’ resulting from the beneficial impact of pull factors. For instance, if 
you have a job, even if it is a relatively poorly paid one, you will be more 
reluctant to migrate even if you know that there are many better-paid jobs 
available across the border.  If, however, you are unemployed, see no chance 
of getting a job in your place of residence and know that there are plenty of 
well-paid jobs across the border, then it is more likely, according to the the-
ory, that you will decide to migrate.  
In this pull- and push-factor equation that, according to neo-classical mi-
gration theory, is seen as the main driving force behind migratory choices, 
the crucial element is information. A rational decision can be made only if 
based on correct and relevant information. However, as we all know in real 
life, individual decision-makers tend to make most decisions without having 
full information. In addition, their decisions are often based not so much on 
the unbiased information as on their individual and collective representations 
of the world ‘out there’.  In this ‘information context’, the crucial push and 
pull factors are not so much objective and quantifiable economic, social and 
political indicators, but rather individual and collective representations and 
perceptions of reality, in the homeland and in the target country. The push/ 
pull factor equation is thus better described not as an equation with all 
known elements, but as an equation with not only missing, but also incorrect 
information. This is also why the migratory decisions that get taken are not 
always the best ones.  
Migration, as a complex issue, should be analysed within the framework 
of a multi-disciplinary approach. Castles and Miller rightly claim that ‘the 
basic principle is that any migratory movement can be seen as the result of 
the interacting macro- and micro-structures’(Castles and Miller 2003:27). 
They list large-scale institutional factors as belonging to the macro-level, and 
networks, practices and beliefs of the migrants themselves as belonging to 
the micro-level. This interdisciplinary approach advocated by Castles and 
Miller as the most fruitful one for studying migration will be also clearly 
visible in this study. 
To understand recent developments and get insight into what lies behind 
the new emerging patterns in migratory flows between the post-Communist 
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and Western/Northern Europe, we have to look at how the large-scale insti-
tutional factors – in this case, especially the collapse of the Communist sys-
tem and the process of the European integration – have contributed to the 
emergence of the new social and economic challenges (or a new set of eco-
nomic, social and political push/pull factors) and how these new challenges 
are addressed on the micro-level by a new set of social practices – survival 
strategies – that are largely a result of the new way of functioning of social 
networks and the redrawing of the existing ‘belief system’. 
Part 1. Welfare Gaps: Mapping the 
Phenomenon 
Welfare gaps are often seen as a central migratory push factor. To under-
stand their impact on migratory choices in a given geographical setting, we 
need to start by mapping the problem and then look at what impact welfare 
gaps may have on various migratory choices. 
In this study we will use various measurements of welfare and welfare 
gaps. In order to draw a global map of the problem and then see how it is 
‘represented’ on the continental, European, and regional and sub-regional 
level it is important, however, to have a set of clear cut and preferably easily 
measurable data.  
One widely recognised indicator for measuring the level of social and 
economic welfare – and therefore a useful tool in mapping welfare gaps – is 
the UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI).9 This is as a summary 
measure of human development in three fields that together can give a clear 
picture of the human development situation in a given country. These three 
areas used to measure HDI are:  
 
- longevity – and to a degree the quality of life – measured by 
life expectancy at birth 
- access to knowledge, measured by the adult literacy rate 
(with two-thirds weight) and the combined primary, secon-
dary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio (with one-third 
weight)  
- standard of living, measured by Gross Domestic Product per 
capita (GDP/ cap) measured in Purchasing Power Parity in 
US$ (PPP US$). 
 
Global human development reports published since 1990 provide a good 
overview of the situation in the field of human development.10 The UNDP 
has also commissioned a number of regional reports on human development 
and assisted many countries in preparing national and regional human devel-
opment reports. Six reports on human development have mapped the situa-
tion in the transition countries, with a focus on Central/Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union. The first of these reports was published in 1995 
and concerned gender and development in the region (UNDP 1995). The 
                                                     
9 This brief presentation of the HDI is based largely on the first chapter of the Human Devel-
opment Report 2001, where various aspects of measuring of human development and welfare 
are discussed.  
10 An overview of all these reports with direct access to some of them is available at UNDP’s 
home page at: http://hdr.undp.org/hd/default.cfm. For more information on region-focused 
activities of UNDP see information provided by Regional Bureau for Europe and the Com-
monwealth of Independent States (RBEC)at: http://rbec.undp.org/ and http://www.undp.org/r 
bec/publications/. 
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second11 was published in 1996 and analysed the situation of human settle-
ments in the region from a human development perspective. In 1997, UNDP 
published its third detailed report on developments in Central/Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union under the telling title The Shrinking 
State: Governance and Sustainable Human Development. The next regional 
report, Poverty in Transition, provided an in-depth analysis of such issues as 
poverty and income distribution, a balance between liberalisation and a state 
authority, poverty, education and white collar trends, the role of building 
small and medium-sized enterprises and micro-finance development in the 
whole region. In 1999, to mark the tenth anniversary of the beginning of the 
transition, the UNDP published Regional Transition 1999: The Human Cost 
of Transition. Human Security in South East Europe.12 The latest report 
(2003) concerns the situation of the most exposed social and ethnic minority 
in the region, the East European Roma people. This is Avoiding the Depend-
ency Trap: The Roma Human Development Report.13 The main goal of the 
authors was to foster debate on the fate and contribute to increase human de-
velopment opportunities for the most marginalised community of the region 
by giving policy- and decision-makers a better understanding of the chal-
lenges faced by this group. 
In addition to these regional reports addressing issues of importance for 
regional developments, the various UNDP country offices have published 
country human development reports. To date there have been seven country 
reports on human development in Armenia, seven national reports on the 
situation in Azerbaijan, seven on Belarus, six reports on the situation in 
Moldova, six on the situation in Ukraine, seven on the situation in Estonia, 
seven on the situation in Latvia, eight on the situation in Lithuania, four re-
ports on developments in the Czech Republic, four on the situation in Hun-
gary, seven on the transition in Poland, nine reports on developments in Bul-
garia and seven on the situation in Romania.14 
All these reports give good insight into regional developments and help 
place the region in a broader global and European human development con-
text. They have also been very useful to our work of mapping both global 
and regional welfare gaps.   
We will start our analysis by presenting some proposals and findings of 
the UNDP. Then we propose a special approach to the region that will make 
it possible to take into account not only economic and social but also other 
developments and their impact.  
After having measured human development over the past decade, the 
UNDP decided to divide all the countries of the world into four groups. The 
first group – countries with high human development (HDI over 0.800)  – 
consists of 55 countries. Norway is currently ranked as number 1, whereas 
Mexico ranks as number 55, at the bottom of this group. The second group –
countries with medium human development (HDI between 0.500 and 0.799) 
                                                     
11 Human Settlements under Transition. The Case of Eastern Europe and the CIS UNDP 
1996.  
12 Regional Transition 1999: The Human Cost of Transition Human Security in South East 
Europe 
13 The text of the report is available on line at http://roma.undp.sk/ 
14 More detailed information these reports is available at: http://hdr.undp.org/reports/ 
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– is made up of 89 countries. Antigua and Barbuda opens the list and Togo 
occupies the last position. The third group – low human development – con-
sists of 34 countries, 30 of which are in Africa. In addition, there were 20 
countries and territories where, for various reasons, employing the human 
development index was impossible; these are not to be found on the human 
development index.15 
Another classification used widely by both the UNDP and the World 
Bank for measuring economic welfare is based on income per capita. Ac-
cording to measure, in 2003 there were 39 countries with high income per 
capita (above $9,206), 86 countries with middle income (between $746 and 
$9,206), whereas 66 countries were classified as low income countries (in-
come per capita less than $745).  
There are also other ways of measuring welfare and welfare gap. The 
most comprehensive and most recent overview of other indicators used by 
the UNDP can be found in the first chapter of 2001 global Human Develop-
ment Report. In addition to the general human development index, it de-
scribes also other indexes and ways they are prepared. The Human Poverty 
Index 1 (HPI-1) measures The HPI-1 poverty in developing countries by fo-
cusing on deprivations along three dimensions: longevity, knowledge and 
overall economic provisioning measured by the percentage of the population 
not using improved water sources and the percentage of children under five 
who are underweight. The Human Poverty Index-2 (HPI-2) measures the 
same dimensions as HPI-1, but also takes into account ‘social exclusion’ as 
shown by the percentage  living on incomes below the poverty line (with 
disposable household income less than 50% of the median) and the long-
term unemployment rate (12 months or more). In addition to these two pov-
erty-related indexes, the UNDP employs two gender-related indexes – the 
Gender-related Development Index and Gender Empowerment Measure.16 
We will focus on the two indicators presented above – the overall HDI and 
per capita income. 
Welfare gaps and migration: mapping global and regional Rio 
Grandes 
Our mapping of welfare gaps will be based on the idea of what we would 
like to describe as relative welfare gaps existing in limited geographical 
space. This links in with our focus on welfare gaps as an incentive to migrate 
and on the use of various survival and adaptation strategies in this migration 
and welfare context. We seek to identify areas where the existing – or only 
perceived – welfare gaps motivate people to migrate or use other survival 
strategies in order to level the gaps. 
The Rio Grande River separating the USA from Mexico has become a 
synonym for a border separating two areas with huge economic differences. 
This river – in fact known to Latin Americans as Rio Bravo del Norte – has 
become a practical challenge to all those Mexican and other Latin American 
                                                     
15 The 20: Afghanistan, Andorra, Cook Islands, Holy See, Iraq, Kiribati, Democratic Repub-
lic of Korea, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, Micronesian Federation, Monaco, 
Nauru, Niue, Palau, San Marino, Serbia and Montenegro, Somalia, Tonga and Tuvalu. 
16 For a more detailed description see HDR 2001 p.14. 
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migrants who try to enter the USA illegally in order to improve their lives. 
Each year hundreds of people die in attempting to cross the US–Mexican 
border.17 The most obvious reason why people are willing to take such high 
risks is their perception of the other side of the border as a better place to 
live. They believe that by taking this risk they can improve their personal 
situation and establish themselves in the USA, a country that functions in 
their popular discourse as a paradise on earth. They are aware that they may 
risk not only death when crossing the border but also deportation and exclu-
sion if they manage to overcome this first physical obstacle. Their main driv-
ing force remains the determination to improve their lives by doing some-
thing about what they perceive as a welfare gap, and they are willing to pay 
the highest price for solving their welfare gap dilemma.  
The US–Mexican border is only one of several areas where there exist 
obvious welfare and income gaps. Not all those borders, however, have 
turned into an arena of a sort of guerrilla war between the US and Mexican 
authorities on the one side and human smugglers and individuals who are 
willing to challenge the existing legal order and border regime on the other. 
In order to understand what makes people willing to take such enormous 
risks, we need to put the USA and Mexico into the human development and 
income gap context, and then examine other areas where we can find similar 
conditions. The characteristic traits in the US/Mexican neighbourhood are 
huge welfare and income divides. The USA is ranked 7th among all countries 
of the world in the UNDP Human Development Report 2003, with an HDI at 
0.937, whereas Mexico is the last country among the countries with high 
HDI (55th place in the 2003 ranking and HDI at 0.800). There is a visible 
income gap between the USA and Mexico, whether measured in terms of the 
dollar exchange rate or when the purchasing power parity rate is used. The 
dollar exchange rate gap between the USA and Mexico is approx. 5.68 to 1, 
and the PPP gap some 4.07:1, both in Mexico’s disfavour. Similar gaps can 
be observed when we compare estimated earned incomes at PPP in the two 
countries (3.44:1 for male workers and 5.69:1 for female workers) – espe-
cially differences between expected female incomes in the USA and Mexico 
are deep, adding a gender dimension to the welfare gap.   
 
Table 1. The ‘Original’ Rio Grande: Mexico and the USA – welfare and 
economic gaps 
 
Country HDI rank 2003 HDI 2001 
GDP/cap $US, 
2001 
 GDP/cap 
PPP, 2001 
EEI 2001  
femalea 
EEI 2001  
maleb 
Mexico 55  0.800   6,214   8,430   4,637 12,358 
USA 7 0.937 35,277 34,320 26,389 42,540 
 
a Estimated earned income 2001 at PPP $US, female 
b Estimated earned income 2001 at PPP $US, male 
 
                                                     
17 See also Eschbach, Hagan and Rodriguez 2001.. According to data provided by the US 
Border Patrol, an average of 340 persons died each year between 2000 and 2003 in attempting 
to cross the US – Mexican border.  
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The US–Mexican border is an archetypical example of what the welfare gaps 
do with the migratory choices of people wanting to improve their lives by 
crossing – legally or illegally – this border.18  
Where can we find similar migratory patterns, with people risking their 
lives in hopes of improving their welfare situation? Where do we find simi-
lar disparities, and how do they influence migratory choices? The answers to 
these questions are central to our further analysis of the emergence of the 
new migratory pattern in relations between Central/Eastern Europe and 
Norway.  
‘Fortress Europe’, welfare gaps and migration 
The notion of ‘Fortress Europe’ recurs frequently in the discourse on migra-
tion in the context of EU integration and enlargement. According to an inde-
pendent NGO from the Netherlands, almost four thousand people died when 
trying to enter ‘Fortress Europe’ between 1993 and 2003.19 The average 
yearly death toll on the EU borders seems similar to that on the US–Mexican 
border; reasons why people are willing to pay the highest price are likewise 
similar. Most deaths occurred along the EU’s external terrestrial borders or 
in sea areas between the EU and its poorer neighbours.  
The existence of deep welfare gaps between the EU and the surrounding 
areas can help to explain why people take such high risks to reach ‘Fortress 
Europe’. Table 2 clearly shows how deep is the welfare and income gap – 
especially in the areas often mentioned in the media when tragic accidents 
involving potential illegal migrants are reported. 
 
Table 2. The EU and its neighbours: Welfare gaps20  
 
Gap area  GNI/cap  at exchange rate 
GNI/cap  
at PPP rate 
The Otranto Gap: Italy–Albania 14.45 6.70 
The Gibraltar Gap: Spain–Morocco 12.06 5.60 
Finland–Russia Gap 10.88 3.44 
The Oder-Neisse Gap: Germany–Poland 4.92 2.68 
 
This table and available data on migrant deaths in connection with illegal 
border crossings indicate a pattern – only three Polish and four Russian citi-
zens can be found on the most detailed list of those who died in connection 
with illegal border crossings between 1993 and 2003. This may mean one of 
two things: either that the people of Poland and Russia do not perceive their 
situation as so difficult and are not willing to take such high risks in order to 
                                                     
18 On the policy of countries that want to address this issue see the comparative study of US 
and European policies by Andreas and Snyder 2001. 
19 This list of deaths prepared by UNITED, with most of the documented cases of deaths re-
lated to migration in Europe, can be found at: http://www.united.non-profit.nl/pdfs/ listof-
deaths.pdf 
20 The figures in the table show the gap as measured by dividing GNI per capita of the coun-
try that has the higher GNI by the GNI per capita of the country with the lower GNI per cap-
ita. 
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improve their lives; or that they may have chosen different strategies for 
dealing with what they perceive as a welfare gap, strategies that can either be 
realised within their homelands, or that can be realised through other chan-
nels then illegal migration.  
To explain why Poles and Russians – and more generally, East Europeans 
– are less represented among the fatal victims of the rush to ‘Fortress 
Europe’, we must examine conditions in the region. We need to place the re-
gion in a broader welfare gap context and see what strategies its people have 
applied to cope with what they perceive as their welfare dilemmas.  
Interregional and regional welfare gaps  
The UNDP classifies eight countries of the region – the Czech Republic, Po-
land, Hungary, Slovakia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Belarus – as belong-
ing to the top group of countries with the highest development, where Nor-
way currently ranks as number one in the world. All other countries of the 
region belong to the second group, countries with medium human develop-
ment. There are, however, huge differences as to rank and level of human 
development as measured by the HDI. The Czech Republic ranks as number 
32 in the world, with an HDI of 0.861, while Moldova ranks as number 108 
and has an HDI of 0.700. One way to measure welfare gap is thus to exam-
ine the ‘rank distance’ between Norway and the other countries in focus 
here, and look at the differences in the level of human development as ex-
pressed by HDI over time.  
Figure 3 tells a story of turbulent transition. For most countries of the re-
gion the transition was a real human development roller-coaster. For in-
stance, Russia, Ukraine and Moldova experienced steep downturns in the 
early and mid-1990s. Whereas in 1991 the Soviet Union of which they were 
a part was ranked 31, by 1998 Russia was ranked 62, Ukraine 102 and 
Moldova 113 in the world. By 1999, Russia and Romania had HDIs lower 
than in 1980, Bulgaria and Latvia lower than in 1985, while Belarus, Lithua-
nia, Moldova and Ukraine had in  HDIs lower than in 1990. (Figures from 
Human Development Report 2001)  
That the human development index in these countries plummeted was 
due largely to the economic and structural crisis the whole region experi-
enced in the early 1990s. While much of the world experienced sustained 
economic growth in the 1990s, 54 countries suffered average income de-
clines. Of these, 17 were countries in Eastern Europe and the Common-
wealth of Independent States (CIS), 6 in Latin America and the Caribbean, 6 
in East Asia and the Pacific, and 5 among the Arab States. Only Sub-Saharan 
Africa had a worse record of economic development in the 1990s than East-
ern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, as 20 countries on this list were 
located south of the Sahara. 
The economic effects of the transition differed in the countries of the re-
gion. While Poland experienced uninterrupted growth from 1992, Russia had 
to wait until 1999 to see much growth, and only in the beginning of the new 
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century did the country begin to recover more rapidly.21 The economic crisis 
has also had a direct impact on indicators describing the economic welfare of 
the population of the region. According to HDR 2003, GDP per capita grew 
on average 4.4% each year in Poland between 1990 and 2001. The average 
for the region was, however, a 1.6% decline in GDP per capita throughout 
the period from 1990 to 2001. Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia and Russia ex-
perienced the deepest drops in GDP per capita over the whole period, with 
minus 8.2, 7.4, 5.5 and 3.5% respectively.  
 
Figure 3. HDI scale: Transition countries, 1991–2003 
 
 
The immediate result of the economic transition was that countries that had 
had comparable per capita incomes at the start of transition are today classi-
fied as either low income economies (Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova) or 
as lower middle income economies (Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Romania, 
Russia and Ukraine) or even as upper middle income economies (Czech Re-
public, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia). (Data 
from Global Economic Prospects 2004 [2003]. 
Although the Human Development Report 2003 argues that that ‘the pur-
pose of development is to improve people’s lives by expanding their 
choices’ (p.27) not just raising national incomes, the question of income 
gaps is central in both debates and migratory choices. According to HDR 
2003 data, the situation in the region is still complicated as far as GDP per 
capita is concerned. The whole region began its transitory journey in 1989–
91 as a part of an autarchic Soviet economic sphere that was economically 
incomparable with the Western economies. By 2003 the countries of the re-
gion were facing some transitional problems, but some of them have tackled 
transition much better then the others. While in the old days there was only 
one important dividing line in the region – the border between the Soviet 
autarchic economic zone and the rest of Europe, where the market economy 
                                                     
21 An interesting analysis of the growth in economies in transition giving a good and detailed 
insight in various aspects can be found in Campos and Coricell 2002. 
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in diverse variants was the name of the economic game – today the region is 
far more heterogeneous. One cluster of countries is about to join the Euro-
pean Union and NATO, whereas others have reached the brink of economic 
and social collapse and are on the verge of becoming economic black holes. 
In addition to the economic cleavage between Western Europe and the ac-
ceding countries, there exist today deep economic and social cleavages be-
tween the countries of the region and even within some of them.  
What is then the economic situation in this complex region? In looking 
into economic development in the migratory context, we must bear in mind 
that various dimensions of economic development will be important to vari-
ous actors in various ways, depending on which migration strategy they see 
as the best way of dealing with their personal welfare security dilemma.  
From the perspective of a potential permanent migrant, income levels in 
the destination country are especially important, because better incomes re-
sult in improved quality of life, and this is seen as the greatest compensation 
for expatriation and the accompanying potential social exclusion and lower-
ing of social status. (Global Economic Prospects 2004 [2003]:157). In order 
to compare incomes in different countries, the figures must be made compa-
rable. Until 1999 the Human Development Report used income measures 
based on exchange rate conversions in assessing global income inequality. In 
the opinion of many experts, however, exchange rate conversions did not 
take into account price differences between countries. As these differences 
are vital when comparing living standards, the UNDP and other international 
financial and political institutions now use purchasing power parity (PPP) 
conversion rates to convert incomes into a common currency in which dif-
ferences in national price levels are taken into consideration.  
Depending on the approach used for comparing income inequality, results 
can vary greatly. In the global context, for instance, the use of exchange rate 
yields a discouraging picture: the ratio of income of the richest one-fifth of 
the population to that of the poorest one-fifth doubled from 1970 to 1997 – 
from 34:1 in 1970 to 70:1 in 1997. The same comparison using PPP, how-
ever, presents a completely different picture. It tells a story of the closing of 
the distance between the richest and the poorest, since, measured by PPP, the 
same ratio fell from 15:1 to 13:1 in the same period.  
If income disparities are placed in a migratory context and viewed as im-
portant push and pull factors, the picture becomes much less clear when the 
decision to use the exchange rate or the PPP is to be taken. However, the 
situation is not so complicated when permanent migration is the preferred 
strategy of a potential migrant. Once a migrant decides to settle in the desti-
nation country, the PPP is the best way to measure that individual’s potential 
economic gain from migration – provided that he or she can manage to es-
tablish him- or herself in the labour market  and receive the same salary as 
the local labour force.22 The migrant’s potential economic gain from perma-
nent migration can be said to be that, with the same work effort, he or she 
would be able to buy x-times more goods and services in the destination 
country than in the sending country. For instance, a bus driver working in 
                                                     
22 See Borjas 1995 for an interesting study on how immigrants perfom in the country of mi-
gration.  
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Moldova, with an average yearly salary that (according to HDR 2003) was at 
the level of 2,626 PPP $, could hope to improve his or her personal eco-
nomic situation by moving to Oslo, Norway, where the same job would net 
an average of 36,043 PPP $ – an increase by a factor of almost 14.  
However, when the preferred strategy is not permanent but temporary or 
even shuttle migration, it seems more appropriate to use the exchange rate to 
measure the potential economic gain. In an ideal situation, when no taxes, 
own costs and travel expenses are taken into consideration, the same bus 
driver from Moldova would earn almost 110 times more, at the exchange 
rate calculated in US$. After only three months in Norway – provided that 
he/she could save all earnings, and receiving in these three months a salary 
on a par with Norwegian colleagues – the bus driver would earn almost 
9,000 Norwegian PPP$. This, in Moldova, would correspond to roughly 3.5 
years’ salary, expressed in Moldovan PPP $. 
This particular example is dramatic because the comparison involves the 
wealthiest and the poorest of the European countries; however, it provides a 
good illustration of various possible approaches to making an assessment of 
potential economic gains from migration. Similar calculations would seem to 
underlie many of individual strategies and migratory moves in areas with 
deep economic and social cleavages. Table 3 below identifies some of these 
areas in Europe and places them in a broader European and global context. 
To illustrate how deep the income gaps are, we rank the areas in descending 
order after having calculated differences according to the PPP and the ex-
change rate methods.  
 
Table 3. Welfare gaps in Europe at PPP and exchange rate  
 
Area of gap: GNI per Capita PPP rate 
Norway–Moldova Gap 13.78
Otranto Gap, Italy–Albania 6.70
Gibraltar Gap, Spain–Morocco 5.60
Bering Gap, USA–Russia 4.83
Greece–Albania Gap 4.74
Pasvik River Gap, Norway–Russia 4.17
Rio Grande Gap, USA–Mexico 4.07
Finland–Russia Gap 3.44
Russia–Moldova Gap 3.30
Baltic Gap, Norway–Poland 3.13
Baltic Gap, Sweden–Latvia  3.13
Romania–Moldova Gap 2.71
Oder–Neisse Gap, Germany–Poland 2.68
Baltic Gap, Sweden–Poland  2.56
Baltic Gap, Finland–Estonia 2.40
Bug Gap Poland–Ukraine 2.17
Norway–Greece Gap 1.70
Kaliningrad Gap, Poland–Russia 1.33
Bug Gap Poland–Belarus 1.24
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Area of gap: GNI per Capita Exchange 
rate 
Norway–Moldova Gap 106.40
Pasvik River Gap, Norway–Russia 17.20
Bering Gap, USA–Russia 16.48
Otranto Gap, Italy–Albania 14.45
Gibraltar Gap, Spain–Morocco 12.06
Finland–Russia Gap 10.88
Greece–Albania Gap 8.51
Baltic Gap, Norway–Poland 8.07
Baltic Gap, Sweden–Latvia  7.37
Russia–Moldova Gap 6.19
Bug Gap Poland–Ukraine 5.95
Baltic Gap, Finland–Estonia 5.75
Rio Grande Gap, USA–Mexico 5.68
Baltic Gap, Sweden–Poland  5.17
Romania–Moldova Gap 4.99
Oder Gap, Germany–Poland 4.92
Bug Gap, Poland–Belarus 3.72
Norway–Greece Gap 3.33
Kaliningrad Gap, Poland–Russia 2.13
 
From the perspective of a person facing a welfare gap dilemma, external mi-
gration – be it permanent or only temporary – seems the most radical option. 
There are also other strategies, ones that can be realised either within the 
borders of the country or by crossing these borders without breaking ties 
with one’s local community and familiar social landscape. A ‘social jour-
ney’, the choice of internal migration to the areas where better social and/or 
pay conditions may be found, or shuttle economic transborder migration are 
often considered, before a decision on more or less permanent external mi-
gration is taken.  
The chances that the choice of the internal strategy may result in a sub-
stantial welfare improvement depend on many factors. Upward social mobil-
ity may lead to considerable improvement, but success will depend largely 
on the social distance to be covered to bring about a fundamental change. 
This approach can be especially difficult in societies with highly uneven di-
vision of wealth, and those where much of the population is living under the 
local poverty line.  
The Gini index is widely used to measure income and wealth inequality. 
It summarises the dispersion of income across the entire income distribution. 
The range is from 0, which indicates absolute equality where everyone re-
ceives an equal amount, to 100, which denotes absolute inequality, where all 
income goes to only one recipient or group of recipients.  
The two symbolic extremes in the discourse on income and social ine-
quality are the Latin American model, with small elites controlling huge 
parts of the national wealth, and the social democratic, Nordic model of so-
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cial development with fairly even distribution of wealth and incomes within 
society. Although the highest Gini index value noted in HDR 2003 was 
found in Namibia (70.7), Russia has been developing in the ‘Latin Ameri-
can’ direction – Russia’s Gini index of 45.6 reveals deep internal wealth and 
welfare gaps. At the opposite end of the transition countries, we find Hun-
gary, with a Gini index value even below the values observed in all Nordic 
countries (24.4 in Hungary, 24.7 in Denmark, 25 in Sweden and 25.8 in 
Norway).   
As to internal geographical diversification, the most recent and detailed 
study of the situation in four countries of the region – the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Russia – concluded that: 
 
 Capital cities and major urban areas are mainly winners, while 
regions further from central cities and further from their richer 
Western neighbours are losers. This has led to rising differences 
between rich and poor regions as well as greater inequality within 
regions. 
 The contribution of intra-regional inequalities to overall inequal-
ity largely outweighs the interregional contribution and, contrary 
to conventional wisdom, the latter is less important in Central 
and Eastern Europe than in some Western EU countries. 
 In the three EU candidate countries included in our analysis, ine-
quality was higher in capital cities than within the country as a 
whole, but the converse was true for the Russian Federation. 
 The urban–rural gap seems to have increased in all countries. 
 Variations in poverty and inequality across and within regions are 
considerably higher in the Russian Federation than in the three 
EU candidate countries. In these three countries, variations are 
only slightly higher than in Western EU countries. 
 With the notable exception of the Czech Republic, regional dis-
parities in poverty rates are lower when a local poverty threshold 
is adopted.  
(from Förster et al. 2003) 
 
The choice of internal strategy for dealing with welfare gap depends not only 
on spatial but on other factors as well. In the case of potential labour migra-
tion – or more generally speaking, migration driven by the wish to do away 
with a perceived welfare gap – two other factors may be decisive when the 
choice between internal and external migration is to be made. These are so-
cial inclusion versus social exclusion and a political dimension: the quality 
of the regional political class and its ability to design and implement effec-
tive, active welfare-improvement policies. As to social inclusion, the situa-
tion on the local labour market and access to labour – and decent salary – are 
crucial factors. With the political dimension, welfare gaps in this area are 
mostly linked to the type of political regime being developed.  
 
Welfare gaps in Europe: access to labour  
The Second Report on Cohesion Policy published by the European Commis-
sion in January 2003 provides good insight into the situation on the Euro-
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pean labour market in the area referred to as EU-27: this includes both the 
existing members of the EU and all candidate countries. The report reveals 
deep welfare disparities in access to labour market. Of the 24 regions with 
highest officially registered unemployment rates of 20% or more, seven are 
located in Poland, five in Bulgaria, three in southern Italy, four are French 
non-European territories, three are in Spain, and two in Slovakia. All in all, 
more than 4,286 million people were without work in the hardest-hit regions 
of the enlarged EU by the end of 2001. Of these, 2.32 million lived in the 
most jobless regions of the acceding countries, and of those 1.42 millions 
were  in the seven regions of Poland where more than 20% of the labour 
force was unemployed. Moreover, on average almost half of these unem-
ployed Poles were long-term unemployed. For many of them neither internal 
nor external migration seem to be a strategic option, due to lack of initial 
capital and social mobility.  
At the opposite end of the scale we find 31 European regions with unem-
ployment rates of 3% or less. Only two of these regions can be found in the 
acceding countries – one area located around the Czech capital Prague (3% 
unemployment), and the Hungarian region of Közép-Magyarország (2% un-
employment).  
However, even within the borders of the hardest-hit country of the region, 
Poland, there are huge regional differences in unemployment. According to 
recently released data, the highest unemployment rate in Poland was regis-
tered in Lobeski county in Zachodniopomorskie voivodship, where 39.3% of 
the active labour force was without work, while the lowest rate registered in 
December 2003 was in Warsaw – 6.1% of the active labour force.23 
Also general data confirm that that unemployment rate varies from place 
to place. The EU-15 had by the end of 2001 an unemployment rate of 7.6% 
of the labour force; unemployment in ten acceding countries reached the 
level of 14.5% in the same period, but was slightly lower when all 12 candi-
date countries were taken all together (13.7 percent). The EU-25 showed an 
unemployment rate of 8.7% by the end of 2001.  
Unemployment rate differences within the EU are already rather high – 
the ratio in the EU-15 is 27.75:1 (French Guadeloupe 33.3%, as against 
Utrecht 1.2%) – or 20.6:1 if we take only ‘purely European regions into con-
sideration (here the extremes are the Italian region of Calabria, and Utrecht). 
The disparities are unlikely to grow any further with the planned EU 
enlargement, but a combination of income gap and unemployment gap can 
result in some pressures on the labour markets, especially in areas where 
those two gaps seem to overlap.  
The map in Figure 4 and Table 4 indicate where these areas of potential 
pressure are located within the enlarging EU. The deepest double gaps lie 
along the Polish–German border, and to a lesser degree along the Czech–
German and the Czech–Austrian and the Slovak–Austrian borders. The fear 
that this pressure could result in some social tensions was probably one rea-
son why the German and Austrian authorities decided to push for the intro-
duction of a period of up to seven years for the protection of their local la-
bour market in connection with the planned EU enlargement.  
                                                     
23 Rzeczpospolita 07 February 2004. 
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Figure 4. Unemployment gaps in European regions EU-2724 
 
 
 
Table 4. Double gaps in Polish-German border regions: GDP per capita 
in € and PPP 1999, unemployment 200125 
 
 GDP/cap. in 
 € 1999 
PPP/cap,% of 
EU average, 
1999 
Unemploy-
ment rate 
2001,% 
Germany 24,024 106.2 7.8 
Berlin 22,494 95.6 12.5 
Brandenburg 15,903 70.2 13.8 
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania 15,745 69.6 15.0 
Saxony 16,068 71.0 14.0 
Poland 3,764 38.9 18.4 
Lower Silesia 3,849 39.8 24.1 
Lubuskie 3,416 35.3 23.6 
Greater Poland 3,961 39.8 19.0 
West Pomerania 3,766 38.9 21.5 
                                                     
24 The Second Progress Report on  Cohesion Policy at: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/official/reports/interim2_en.htm 
25 Data on GDP from Stiller 2003, on unemployment from 2003 report on cohesion policy 
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Welfare gaps in Europe: political dimension 
In the migratory context, the problem of democratisation of the political sys-
tem and how the policies designed and implemented by political elites fit the 
needs of the population are of crucial importance. The way political agendas 
have been set in Europe over the past decade has had a huge impact on mi-
gratory choices of populations, and there is an obvious link between the 
emergence of authoritarian and nationalistic regimes and policies resulting in 
the brutalisation of political sphere.  
For many migrants, the decision to leave is a dramatic though often 
largely rational choice based on a thorough consideration of the pros and 
cons involved. For one group, however, migration may become the only 
available survival strategy: this is the case with forced migration. Such mi-
gration has been an important practical issue all Western European govern-
ments have had to deal with in the wake of the bloody conflicts in the Bal-
kans (Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992– 95 and Kosovo 1998/99), and quite re-
cently in the Caucasus. Migration may appear as the sole rational choice to 
people whose very existence as individuals or a group is threatened by the 
policy choice of those in power. 
For instance, by 2002 and 2003 the victims of the Russian policy in the 
breakaway republic of Chechnya had become the biggest and the fastest 
growing group of asylum-seekers in Europe. Diederik Kramers, spokesman 
for the UNHCR’s EU regional office, gave the following assessment of the 
situation in an interview with RFE/RL in November 2003: ‘We see that in 
the first three-quarters, from January to September 2002, there were 14,107 
asylum applications from Russian citizens. And in the same period of time, 
January to September 2003, it's 23,465. So that looks like a 66% increase.’ 
An important reason why the West found itself faced with growing Chechen 
migration was also the rise of xenophobia in Russia.26 This made the situa-
tion of Chechens difficult not only in Chechnya proper but also in other re-
gions of Russia, prompting Western governments to revise their policies to-
wards this particular group.    
Although the UNHCR does not provide any information on the ethnic 
background of asylum-seekers, most of them were, or claimed to be, from 
Chechnya. Many of them seemed to meet the criteria for receiving protection 
against racially or politically motivated persecution in their country of ori-
gin. In Austria there were nearly 6,000 asylum-seekers from the Russian 
Federation by the end of October 2003, compared to 700 in the whole 2002. 
Some 62% of Russian citizens who stayed for the duration of the legal pro-
cedure ended up with fully-fledged, permanent asylum in Austria – a country 
known for its highly restrictive asylum policy.27 
 
 
                                                     
26 More on the growth of xenophobia in Russia Neterpimost' v Rossii: starye i novye fobii 
1999.  
27 For more details on tht issue see Jeremy Bransten (2003) Russia: Moscow Emerges As 
Leading ’Exporter’ Of Asylum Seekers  at: 
www.rferl.org/features/2003/11/19112003173444.asp 
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Figure 5. Asylum-seekers from Russia in the industrialised countries, 
1993–200228 
 
The growth in the number of asylum-seekers from Russia is directly linked 
with the developments in Russia and in Chechnya, and indirectly with the 
state of democracy and governance quality in that country. The deficiency in 
democracy serves as an important migratory push factor, whereas a function-
ing democracy, especially if combined with better standard of living offered 
to the victims of political persecution, works as an important migratory pull 
factor.  
Measuring the political dimension of welfare is far more difficult than 
measuring its economic or even social dimensions, but some useful instru-
ments and indicators are available. One widely used indicator for measuring 
political developments in the world, with a focus on transition countries, is 
the democratisation index proposed by Freedom House, a non-governmental 
and non-partisan body that since 1972 has published annual assessments of 
the state of freedom in all countries. According to this index, each country is 
assigned a rating for political rights and a rating for civil liberties based on a 
scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest degree of freedom present and 
7 the lowest level of freedom. Those two indicators must be said to be cen-
tral when we discuss the level of ‘political welfare’ and potential political 
welfare gaps as push factors. The map of democratisation and rule of low in 
the region differs slightly from the economic welfare map.  
In its 2003 assessment, Freedom House placed the countries of the East-
ern/Central European region at the levels shown in Table 5, in terms of de-
mocratisation (DEM) and Rule of Law (ROL). 
The countries of the region are divided into five groups for measuring the 
level of democratisation and rule of law. This diversification of the region is 
important for at least three reasons. 
 
                                                     
28 Official UNHCR data for the whole period, for more details on patterns in 1998–2001 pe-
riod see: Migration Trends in Eastern Europe and Central Asia) 2001–2002, (2002), Geneva: 
International Organisation for Migration (IOM), pp. 172–175. 
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Table 5.Nations in Transit Democratisation Score 200329 
 
 DEM 
Score 
ROL Score 
Consolidated democracies 
Norway 1 1 
Poland 1.63 2.00 
Hungary 1.81 2.25 
Slovakia 1.81 2.63 
Lithuania 1.88 2.63 
Estonia 1.94 2.13 
Latvia 1.94 2.88 
Czech Rep. 2.00 3.00 
Democracies (some consolidation) 
Bulgaria 3.13 3.88 
Romania 3.25 4.38 
Transitional governments or hybrid regimes 
Moldova 4.38 5.38 
Ukraine 4.50 5.13 
Armenia 4.69 5.38 
Georgia 4.69 5.13 
Russia 4.88 5.13 
Autocracies 
Azerbaijan 5.31 5.75 
Consolidated autocracies 
Belarus 6.63 6.13 
 
Firstly, we will use the Freedom House indicators to propose a new and 
more comprehensive well-being index to measure the levels of well-being in 
the region in question and compare these levels with the situation in Norway. 
Secondly, the lack of democratisation and rule of law may be in itself an im-
portant push factor impelling people to leave their country of origin. Thirdly, 
the proper level of democratisation and rule of law has now been defined as 
the prerequisite for a country to become ‘eligible’ for joining the Western 
democratic clubs – NATO and the EU. Membership in these has been seen 
as one of the best long-term strategies for improving the level of well-being 
in the transition countries. A functioning democratisation process and the in-
troduction of the rule of law as basic principles of functioning can be seen as 
an important test of these countries’ ability to meet the entry criteria. Their 
ability to meet these criteria has been in turn the most decisive factor in the 
negotiation process on the road towards full EU/NATO membership. Such 
membership will definitely facilitate the fulfilment of their transition from 
the old regime, which was unable to provide its citizens with what they saw 
as a proper level of well-being, to a regime whose main goal remains ex-
panding the European zone of peace, stability and economic and social wel-
fare.  
Transformation of the social and political system in Eastern Europe and 
integration of Europe are the best available strategies of dealing with the 
                                                     
29  Freedom House Nations in Transit 2003 available at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/nattransit.htm 
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challenges that could contribute to an uncontrolled and unwanted wave of 
migration in Europe. The EU is important not only as a positive example to 
be followed: it is also important as regional ‘soft power house’ providing lo-
cal actors with important political, social and economic incentives as well as 
institutional solutions.  
A new well-being index 
In order to measure the welfare gap between Norway and the group of coun-
tries in transition where also the political dimension is taken into account, we 
propose a compound well-being index (CWBI). This index is a combination 
of the UNDP HDI and Freedom House index of democratisation and rule of 
law, as follows: 
 
Year CBWI = {Year (HDI*100) -Year (Average DEM+ROL)} 
   
By using the CBWI we can also cover the political dimension of transition, a 
dimension still relevant to the overall assessment of the outcome of the diffi-
cult transformation process. The declared macro-level goal of transformation 
was the creation of democratic states with functioning market economies; at 
the human, micro-level, the transformation was, however, to result in the 
higher level of well-being for the citizenry. The transformation was also in-
tended to do away with the reasons for forced migration, and to limit the in-
centives for labour migration. In an ideal post-transition – read: Western-like 
– society, people would wish to move only for pleasure. All welfare needs – 
economic, social, political, personal – were to be met in the respective coun-
tries through the implementation of the model of social, political and eco-
nomic development tested successfully in the West.  
Those were the intentions. Some fifteen years after the beginning of tran-
sition and on the eve of the planned EU and NATO enlargement, these goals 
seem still remote, and the continent is facing serious political, social and 
economic challenges that must be solved if the integration project is to sur-
vive. Welfare gaps remain a real challenge, and migration is still seen as a 
viable strategy for coping with individual and group welfare dilemmas.  
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Table 6. Compound well-being index (CWBI): Norway and transition 
countries 
 
Country Dem&ROL average HDI 2003 CWBI 2003 
Norway 1.00 0.944 93.40 
Czech Rep. 2.50 0.861 83.60 
Poland 1.82 0.841 82.29 
Hungary 2.03 0.837 81.67 
Slovakia 2.22 0.836 81.38 
Estonia 2.04 0.833 81.27 
Lithuania 2.26 0.824 80.15 
Latvia 2.41 0.811 78.69 
Bulgaria 3.51 0.795 76.00 
Belarus 6.38 0.804 74.02 
Romania 3.82 0. 773 73.49 
Russia 5.01 0.779 72.90 
Ukraine 4.82 0.766 71.79 
Georgia 4.91 0.746 69.69 
Azerbaijan 5.53 0.744 68.87 
Armenia 5.04 0.729 67.87 
Moldova 4.88 0.7 65.12 
 
This proposed CWBI provides a rather good picture of the multi-
dimensional welfare-related dividing lines on the European continent. It also 
offers a good point of departure for our analysis of the impact that the very 
existence of welfare gaps may have on the development of European secu-
rity in the context of EU enlargement.  
Part 2. Tackling the Welfare Gap  
Challenge 
In order to see how the issue of welfare gaps has been coped with over the 
past decade in Europe we need to identify the most important factors influ-
encing the developments in this area and examine how institutions and indi-
viduals have addressed this problem. As the main goal of this study is to find 
out whether there is a link between the welfare gaps in Europe and migratory 
choices made by individuals, we will focus on the aspects that impact on the 
development of new migration patterns in Europe and the modification of 
existing ones. As this study has limited geographic and historic focus – the 
development of new migratory patterns between Central/Eastern Europe and 
Norway in the post-Soviet period – we will pay most attention to develop-
ments that have been crucial to migratory relations within this limited geo-
graphic space.  
Three macro-factors in particular have contributed greatly to changing the 
European migration landscape:  
 
- the collapse of the Communist system in Eastern Europe and 
the end of the Cold War,   
- the systemic transformation in Eastern Europe,  
- the eastward enlargement of the European Union. 
 
The collapse of the Communist system in Eastern Europe was caused by its 
inability to adapt to quickly changing social, political and economic circum-
stances. This collapse unleashed a chain of events that have brought about 
the complete remaking of the political, economic and social map of Europe. 
Fifteen years after the beginning of the end of the Communist system in 
Europe, symbolised by the forming of the first non-Communist government 
in Poland in August 1989 and by the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 
1989, there is only one country in Europe – Belarus, ruled by the autocratic 
Alexander Lukashenko – that still officially identifies with the old Commu-
nist system. Even in Russia, the very core of the former Communist world, 
the nostalgia for the old days of Communist stability and the Brezhnev era 
has much more to do with a longing for a brilliant ‘imperial past’ than for the 
ineffective rule of the Communist Party that once controlled the entire lives 
of the Soviet citizens.30  
The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 was ultimate proof of the in-
ability of the Communist elite to face the challenges of modernisation. The 
organisers of the failed August 1991 coup wanted to preserve the Soviet sys-
tem and to reverse Gorbachev’s reforms; instead, their action dealt a lethal 
                                                     
30 An interesting study on how Russians tackled the post-Communist challenges can be found 
in Humphrey 2002. 
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blow to the Soviet project. The Soviet monolith was replaced by 15 more or 
less independent states that have chosen various strategies and paths of tran-
sition, away from the Soviet past towards a post-Soviet system to be based 
on democracy and functioning market economy, on some more or less 
clearly defined ‘local traditions’, or on a combination of the two. The Soviet 
republics followed the example of the former Soviet vassals in Eastern 
Europe who had embarked on this policy of political and economic trans-
formation even earlier.  
The collapse of the Communist system in Eastern and Central Europe 
compelled both the local and the Western European elites to find a new po-
litical, institutional and ideological framework for Europe. In purely theo-
retical security terms, there were many possible paths to follow. In the East 
at least five possibilities could be considered potential strategies for adapting 
to the new geo-political reality. The countries of the region could 1) continue 
their close co-operation with Russia; 2) choose the path of Swiss-like neu-
trality and sovereignty; 3) form a regional political, military and economic 
alliance, a Central/East European variant of NATO and the EU, counterbal-
ancing both Russia and the existing Western organisations; 4) opt for 
strengthening existing all-European institutions like the OSCE; or 5) seek 
integration with the existing – and well functioning – Western integration 
projects.  
One thing was clear to most of the local political elites who took power in 
the region in the early 1990s – the Communist ideology as practised under 
the former Soviet regime and the command economy of shortage were no 
longer viable alternatives; the declared official strategic goal was to build 
democratic states with a functioning market economy. What was thus needed 
was a strategy of transition from the old system to the new one, modelled on 
the Western experience. It was therefore not so surprising that most regional 
policy-makers expressed interest in joining what they saw as their ‘role 
model’: the existing and institutionalised Western integration projects, the 
European Union and NATO. 
The decision on what in Eastern and Central Europe is often referred to 
as ‘re-joining Europe’ – ‘re-joining’ to indicate that they had previously be-
longed to a wider Europe before being forcibly transferred to the Soviet 
sphere of influence in 1945 – was of crucial importance for the redrawing of 
political, economic and social map of the region. The second important deci-
sion was the decision on the path and pace of economic reforms.31 The de-
sign of reforms and then their implementation resulted in the division of 
Central and Eastern Europe into two zones: one of relative success, made up 
of the countries that were implementing a policy of painful but needed re-
forms, and a zone of more or less ‘failed reform’, consisting of the countries 
that embarked on an inconsistent policy of reforming their economies.32  
By late 1989, when the Soviet grip on Eastern Europe loosened and the 
Brezhnev doctrine was renounced by Gorbachev, the local elites were al-
                                                     
31 On the choices they faced and their consequences, see Gomulka 2000.. For a good sum-
ming up of the first ten years of transition with focus on various, both economic and political 
outcomes see Transition. The First Ten Years. Analysis and Lessons for Eastern Europe and 
the Former Soviet Union 2002. 
32 However, the social costs of the transition were high; see Ellman 2000. 
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lowed to choose their own ways of coping with political, economic and so-
cial challenges. The Communist ideology and ideology-driven policy were 
rejected by all serious political forces. A new chapter in the history of East-
ern Europe could begin.  
Local policy-makers had a difficult dilemma to solve. On the one hand, 
their potential voters expected to be provided not only with more freedom 
but also with more social security and better chances of improving the qual-
ity of their lives. On the other hand, the policy-makers were confronted with 
the need to change the entire political and economic system in order to make 
their countries better prepared to meet the challenges of modernisation and 
globalisation. The best option would be to find a solution that both the peo-
ple and the state could benefit from.  
In most cases, however, this proved unachievable. Those responsible for 
designing and implementing system reforms had to make difficult choices on 
the scope, depth and speed of the political and economic reforms. They had 
to decide on the role of the market forces, and the regulatory role of the state 
in the transforming economy. Another decision they had to make was the 
decision on the speed and depth of economic reform. Was the reform to be a 
shock therapy, or a gradual transition from command economy towards an 
economy ruled by the invisible hand of the market? Moreover: What sort of 
social cushion were they to provide to their societies? What share of the lim-
ited state resources should go to protecting the most vulnerable groups 
within society?33 
They also had to make long-term strategic decisions on the kind of politi-
cal, economic and social system they wanted to create; and which countries 
– or groups of countries – were to be treated as models and potential partners 
and allies, and which models were to be rejected.  
As far as the last issue was concerned, the most crucial decision con-
cerned the nature of relations with the most important European agenda-
setters, first and foremost the EU and NATO. In most cases, membership in 
the Western European clubs – the EU and NATO – was defined as the main 
long-term objective. Closer cooperation with West was to help the countries 
of this region achieve this ambitious goal. On its side, the West also decided 
to extend a helping hand towards the East, but also formulated a list of 
‘threshold requirements’ to be met by countries wanting to join the Western 
institutions. The creation of the conditions for the development of a democ-
ratic political system, of civil society, of functioning market economy, the 
solving of the social, political, territorial and ethnic conflicts, and the rule of 
law – these were all defined as prerequisites for joining the West. This in 
turn meant that local policy-makers would have to design and implement 
deep and dramatic political, social and economic reforms that were to lay the 
ground for the development of a new type of political, economic and social 
system along Western lines. Some countries, however, decided that other so-
lutions than those proposed by the West were more suitable.34  
                                                     
33 For more on that see Ferge 1997. 
34 On the scope of challenges faced by reformers  and decision-makers in the region and the 
results of their choices see Milanovic 1998, Nelson, Tilly and Walker 1997, Paas 2003, 
Tomer 2002.. 
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The decisions made at the early stage of transformation, but also under 
way, have contributed greatly to changing the political, economic and social 
landscape of Central and Eastern Europe. All the countries of the former So-
viet Bloc had the same point of departure for their systemic transformation. 
They had formed a part of a Soviet empire ruled by the local Communist 
parties obeying orders from Moscow; the development of their command 
economy had been restrained by ideology and the bottom–up initiatives and 
calls for reforms had been effectively jammed by a party apparatus that had 
no desire to allow competing political forces to present their alternative pro-
grammes. And then, when Moscow was no longer willing to use its re-
sources to support its local henchmen, the Communist regimes collapsed one 
after another. Political power was transferred to new elites or in some cases 
retained by former Communists turned nationalists or liberals.  
These elites’ plans and commitment to implement the needed political, 
economic and social reforms have contributed to changing the political, so-
cial and economic map of Central/Eastern Europe in a definitive way. What 
used to be a part of the Soviet Bloc is today a heterogeneous region. After 
the first decade of reforms, the whole region could basically be divided into 
various ‘sub-units’ with specific features. In defining these sub-units we will 
take into consideration such factors as the macro- and microeconomic results 
of the reforms, the social impact of the reforms, the quality of governance in 
these countries and their relations with the European Union, undoubtedly the 
most important European agenda-setter in social welfare and policy.  
In order to categorise and group the various countries, we will employ a 
set of indicators consisting of the items that will be used to measure the ef-
fects of the reforms. The macroeconomic effects of the transformation will 
be measured by comparing GDP in 2000 with GDP in 1989; the microeco-
nomic effects of transformation will be measured by comparing real wages 
in 1999 with real wages in 1989. The social impact of transformation will be 
measured by comparing the most recent available data on poverty levels, by 
looking at the level of registered unemployment and by examining at the im-
pact of the transformation on one specific indicator –male life expectancy. 
This has proven an excellent instrument for measuring the ‘socio-biological’ 
impact of the transition. In order to compare economic welfare before the 
transformation and ten years later, we also will look at the number of per-
sonal cars registered per 1000 inhabitants; this is a good and relatively objec-
tive measure of the overall economic results of reforms. 
The political/governance effects of the reforms will be measured by look-
ing at what type of regime has been created, at the perceived level of corrup-
tion and, finally, these countries’ relations with the European Union. The last 
issue – the nature of relations with the European Union and the prospect of 
joining the EU in the foreseeable future – will be the most important instru-
ment for categorising the countries of the region. In order to have at least the 
slightest prospect to being admitted to the EU, a country must meet a range 
of political and macro- and microeconomic criteria; many of the criteria we 
have chosen for mapping the region and presenting its diversity are consis-
tent with those used by the EU to gauge the preparedness of a country for 
membership.  
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The choices made by policy-makers and the direct and indirect results of 
the still ongoing transformation have had a huge impact on the choices of 
various groups and individuals, and the survival and adaptation strategies of 
‘ordinary people’. In the following we will therefore first look at the diversi-
fication of the post-Communist space in Europe, then at the EU’s strategy 
for coping with the emerging welfare gap dilemma, and finally at the broad 
spectrum of group and individual survival and adaptation strategies devised 
and adopted by citizens who have had to face the challenges of transition in 
their daily lives.35  
Diversification of the post-Communist area: to be EU or not to be? 
The most important dividing line in today’s post-Communist Europe is the 
one separating the countries with prospects of joining the European Union in 
the foreseeable future, from those that will not be able – or willing or inter-
ested – to meet the EU’s formal entry criteria in a middle- and even long 
term perspective. The use of the EU entry criteria as a tool for mapping post-
Communist Europe in the context of the welfare gap problematique seems 
justifiable – the countries that have committed themselves to meeting these 
criteria have also much better prospects of abolishing the welfare gaps, both 
within their borders and within the borders of the enlarged European Union. 
The choice of the national long-term strategy of meeting the EU membership 
criteria is in the longer run closely linked with the choice of national strategy 
for solving the domestic problem of welfare gaps, as expected EU member-
ship seems to be not only a purely political goal but also a practical policy 
instrument for addressing the welfare gap after having achieved full mem-
bership. The EU, as a ‘soft power’ with considerable focus on the social 
situation of the population, has at its disposal various policy instruments that 
can be used for abolishing existing welfare gaps. The EU has been address-
ing issues of social exclusion, poverty, inequality in economic development 
and welfare gaps in a rather comprehensive way.36  
A combination of national policy aimed at meeting the EU entry criteria 
in the preparatory phase and the transfer of economic means to the underde-
veloped regions of the enlarged Europe is probably the most effective ap-
proach to the problem of welfare gaps in today’s Europe. By making an ef-
fort to meet the EU entry criteria, countries are forced to make their eco-
nomic, political and social system more compatible with that of the EU. 
Once these efforts are crowned with success, they will gain access to EU re-
                                                     
35 On the social cost of transition see After the Fall. The Human Impact of Ten Years of 
Transition 1999. and Human Developement Report For Central and Eastern Europe and the 
CIS 1999 1999..  
36 Fehay et al. 2003 p. 36 give the following assessment of this side of the EU policy: ‘The 
concerns of European policy, and in particular the social policy agenda, have expanded and 
deepened in recent years. This has been a response to the challenges posed by sustained high 
unemployment, for example, ageing populations, the increasing importance of knowledge and 
skills, the transformation of traditional family structures and gender economic roles, and envi-
ronmental degradation.’ They also see the following welfare gap related goals as being the 
main driving force behind the EU policy: raising living standards and improving living and 
working conditions, strengthening social cohesion and combating exclusion, promoting equal 
opportunities, and safeguarding sustainability.  
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sources, making the fight against the existing welfare gaps much easier a 
task. On the other hand, those who do not undertake this effort will be forced 
to stay outside the Union, and will not be able to tap the EU for its resources 
in attempts to confront their own welfare gap related challenges. As regards 
the fight against social and economic inequalities, the enlargement of the EU 
will therefore play a decisive role in the coming period of European history 
The citizens of the countries that are going to join the EU will also have far 
more options when it comes to the choice of their own ‘private’ strategies for 
coping with what they may see as welfare gaps. In that sense, the choice of 
the national strategy of seeking or of not seeking rapprochement with the 
EU, a strategy that also must imply the will to meet EU entry criteria, has a 
direct impact on the choices to be made by individuals living in the countries 
in question.37   
From that EU membership-centred perspective, post-Communist Europe 
anno 2004 can be divided into at least four categories of countries. The first 
category are the countries that joined the EU as of 1 May 2004; the second 
group are the countries that are promised EU membership in the foreseeable 
future; the third group consists of the countries that, under given circum-
stances, have at least theoretical chances of applying for EU membership in 
the foreseeable future but whose institutional rapprochement with the EU 
will take more time; and the fourth group consists of those countries whose 
chances of joining the EU are negligible, or who, for various reasons, have 
ruled out full membership but may be interested in developing a constructive 
cooperation with the Union.  
EU insiders 2004: Three reform leaders and one special case: Poland, 
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia 
Four countries of the region – Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Hungary – joined forces and formed the Visegrad Group, a loose political 
organisation intended to facilitate their accession to the Western clubs. The 
four countries have performed rather well in the economic field, but due to 
political turmoil in Slovakia under the Meciar regime, Slovakia was per-
ceived as a Visegrad outsider, and its accession to NATO had to be post-
poned until 2004.  
Of the four Visegrad countries, Poland seemed to be an economic winner 
after the first ten years of reforms.38 By 2000, its GDP had risen to 128% of 
the 1989 level – Poland was in fact the first country of the region to see its 
economy rebound already in 1992. Also real wages almost returned to the 
1989 level after the first decade – 95.6% of the 1989 level was achieved in 
1999 – but the country had to pay a rather high social price39 for the eco-
nomic grand strategy proposed and implemented by the father of the Polish 
economic miracle, Leszek Balcerowicz.40 In 2001, unemployment reached 
16.2% of the active labour force, rising to almost 20% by 2003. Almost one 
                                                     
37 Good insight into enlargement debate is given in Croft, Redmond, Rees and Webber 1999. 
38 On the ideology and technology of the Polish reform see Balcerowicz 1999. 
39 On the social transformation of Polish society see the comprehensive study by Marody 
2000, Marody 2002.  
40 For more on Balcerowicz’s plan and his views on transition see Balcerowicz 1999. 
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fifth of the population (18.4%) has to get by on less than 4.3$/PPP per day.41 
On the other hand, there are also some positive examples of the effects of the 
reform. Male life expectancy increased by more than 3% compared with 
1989 level. Polish society has also become more prosperous, at least in terms 
of the number of motor vehicles in use: from 160/1000 in 1991 to 259/1000 
by 2003. Also on the political level, the country achieved its long-term stra-
tegic goals, becoming a full member of NATO in 1999 and the EU in 2004. 
The building of democracy, despite some minor setbacks, was also a success 
story and an important prerequisite for Poland’s joining the Western institu-
tions. On the other hand, the country is perceived as the most corrupt of the 
group of four leaders of transformation, ending at the 67th position in the 
2004 Transparency International listing, far below all its Visegrad partners, 
as well as below all the Baltic countries and Bulgaria.  
Hungary ranks next in terms of economic performance, although the 
country has also had its own economic and social problems to solve. Due to 
the relaxation of economic control under the Kadar regime, a specific Hun-
garian model of economic policy was developed, later known as Kadar’s 
‘goulash Communism’. This prepared the country better to meet the chal-
lenge of economic transition when the ideological restraints were removed in 
1989. By 2000, Hungary’s GDP had reached 105.3% of the 1989 level. In 
the microeconomic sphere, the country lagged behind its Visegrad neigh-
bours – real wages reached only 81% of the 1989 level in 1999, and 15.4% 
of the population lives below the poverty line. On the other hand, registered 
unemployment was lower than in all other countries of the Visegrad group – 
8% of the labour active population was without work in 2001. The hardships 
of transition took their toll on the population – male life expectancy rose 
only slightly during the first ten years of transformation, by 1.4% compared 
with 1989. On the other hand, more Hungarians could drive their own cars – 
in 1991 there were 195 cars registered per 1000 inhabitants, while by 2003 
the figure had risen to 244. In the political sphere, Hungary managed to 
achieve its long-term goals – a viable democratic system was created on the 
post-Communist ruins, and the country joined NATO in 1999 and the EU in 
2004. As far as the level of perceived corruption, the country is the second 
best among all post-Communist countries – Hungary is ranked 42nd in the 
2004 Transparency International report. Only Estonia scores better on this 
scale.  
In the Czech Republic the government of Vaclav Klaus was more reluc-
tant when it came to implementing deep-going economic and social reforms. 
In 1997 the country experienced economic problems and the course of eco-
nomic and social reforms had to be adjusted. Although Czechs faced a situa-
tion when, almost overnight, their assets were reduced by 10% due to the 
devaluation of the Czech currency in May 1997, the country has never ex-
perienced Poland’s levels of unemployment. The Czech capital, Prague, has 
achieved a level of economic welfare even above the EU average. By 2000, 
the Czech Republic had not yet managed to equal the 1989 GDP level – 
GDP in 2000 represented only 97.4% of the 1989 level. However, the coun-
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2003, Huffman and Johnson 2002.. 
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try’s citizens could reap other fruits of the transformation – in 1999 real 
wages were over 7% higher than in 1989, only 0.8% of the people were liv-
ing on less than 4.3$/PPP, and only 8.5% of the labour force was jobless in 
2001. It seems that stress levels are much lower than in the other countries of 
the region, the result being longer life for Czech men – they can now expect 
to live almost 5% longer than in 1989, and only men in the Georgian Repub-
lic have achieved a better result in the same period – at least according to of-
ficial Georgian statistics. As far as access to consumer durables is concerned, 
Czechs are probably the best-off in the whole region – while in 1991 there 
were 215 motor vehicles registered per 1000 inhabitants, in 2003 there were 
already 343 cars registered per 1000 inhabitants. The Czech leadership also 
managed to achieve the nation’s political goals – to build a democratic sys-
tem and to join NATO (1999) and become a fully-fledged member of the 
European Union (2004). As to the level of perceived corruption, the Czech 
Republic, ranked at 51, lags behind Estonia (31) and Hungary (42), but also 
behind Lithuania (44).   
Slovakia was the last of this group to benefit politically from transition. 
The country had to wait until 2004 before it could join both NATO and the 
EU, largely because of support for the nationalistically inclined elite under 
the Meciar regime. This, however, did not prevent the country from perform-
ing rather well in macroeconomic terms, and by 2000 the GDP of Slovakia 
was 2.4% greater than in 1989. Real wages grew more slowly – by 1999 
they had reached only 86.1% of the 1989 level. Moreover, 8.6% of the popu-
lation – among them most of the Roma families living in the country – lives 
under the poverty line, and registered unemployment was in 2001 even 
higher than in Poland  – 18.6% of active labour force. In terms of material 
wealth, Slovaks have fared slightly worse than their Czech neighbours – the 
number of cars grew from the Czechoslovak level of 215 per 1000 popula-
tion in 1991 to 240 in 2001. The level of perceived corruption as measured 
by Transparency International gives Slovakia  57th place in the global rank-
ing – behind the two Baltic republics (Estonia and Lithuania), Hungary and 
the Czech Republic, but ahead of Poland (67th place in 2004).  
EU insiders 2004: Baltic tigers – three success stories with a bitter af-
tertaste?   
The three Baltic republics faced an even tougher challenge than most of the 
former Soviet vassals in Central Europe. After what they perceived as almost 
five decades of the Soviet occupation, the countries faced not only huge eco-
nomic and political problem, but also social and ethnic ones, as their ethnic 
composition had changed during the decades of forced Russification. All the 
same, these three countries have managed to meet the EU and NATO entry 
criteria, and joined both Western organisations by 2004. That they were al-
lowed to join both NATO and the EU was an ‘institutional’ recognition of 
their efforts on what they themselves often presented as their institutional 
return to Western Europe.42  
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Of the three, Lithuania’s path towards Europe has been perhaps the 
bumpiest one in economic terms. The population suffered heavily as real 
wages were more then halved during the first ten years of transition, reach-
ing only 47.8% of the 1989 level by 1999. More than one fifth of the popula-
tion – 22.5% – have to live on less than 4.3$ per day. The main reason for 
this situation was the collapse of the post-Soviet economy – Lithuania’s 
2000 GDP represented only 63.6% of the 1989 GDP level. Unemployment 
has also been high, in fact the highest among the three Baltic countries 
(12.5% in 2001). As to other socio-economic indicators, male life expec-
tancy was slightly longer in 1999 than in 1989. Moreover, the population 
had more than twice as many cars at their disposal in 2001 than in 1991 
(337:142). In the political sphere, Lithuania has developed a functioning 
democratic system that has managed to solve many problems linked with the 
transformation. The level of perceived corruption was much lower than 
among the country’s direct neighbours: in 2004 Lithuania was ranked as no. 
44 on the Corruption Perception Index, as compared to Poland  (67), Latvia 
(57), Russia (90) and Belarus (74).   
Estonia has been the most successful of the Baltic countries in terms of 
economic performance and social situation. The economy shrank by only 
one fifth after the first ten years of transformation – GDP in 2000 repre-
sented 80.6% of the 1989 level. The microeconomic situation was also much 
better then in the other Baltic countries – although real wages reached only 
66.2% of the 1989 level by 1999 and almost one fifth – 19.3% – of the of the 
population was living under the internationally recognised level of poverty, 
unemployment was relatively low (6.5% in 2001) and the number of cars 
was almost doubled after the first ten years of transition (154 cars per 1000 
in 1991: 299 in 2001). Estonia, like most of the European transition coun-
tries, has experienced negative demographic trends, but male life expectancy 
has not changed dramatically after the first ten years of transition. Estonia 
has been the most successful of all the transition economies in the fight 
against corruption – at least according to the latest findings published by 
Transparency International, which rank Estonia as no. 31 on its Corruption 
Perception Index, making it the least corrupt of the post-Communist coun-
tries. 
In Latvia the results of the transformation have been to a certain degree 
paradoxical. The collapse of the economy was even more severe than in 
Lithuania – by 2000, GDP had regained only 62.2% of the 1989 level. How-
ever, real wages shrank less than the economy in general – by 1999 they had 
regained 65% of the 1989 level. In the area of social exclusion, the record 
has also been mixed – unemployment relatively low (7.8%) in 2001, but 
more than one third of the population – or 34.8% – were living under the 
poverty line. The high level of poverty does not seem to have a direct impact 
on male life expectancy, however; and, paradoxically enough, has not pre-
vented Latvians from purchasing cars, as the number of cars in the country 
more than doubled between 1991 and 2001 (123:249). As far as the per-
ceived level of corruption is concerned, Latvia scores much worse than its 
Baltic neighbours, ranking as no. 57 in the latest overview prepared by 
Transparency International. This place it shares with Slovakia, but performs 
much better than Poland, which is ranked as no. 67.  
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EU insiders 2007: Romania and Bulgaria, or the case of delayed trans-
formation and postponed membership 
The four Visegrad countries represent the most positive pole of the transition 
map, as their transformation was almost completed by the time they joined 
the EU in 2004. The Baltic countries also managed to join the Union, their 
social, political and economic problems notwithstanding. By contrast, the 
two former Soviet vassals in the Balkans, Bulgaria and Romania, have per-
formed rather poorly. Lack of  commitment among the local political class to 
design and implement political, economic and social reforms has resulted in 
a delayed transition. In the sphere of economy and in political development, 
the two countries have experienced many setbacks on their road from Com-
munism to the market economy and democracy: this was the main reason 
why their entry into the European Union had to be postponed until 2007.  
Bulgaria experienced a collapse of its economy – in 2000, GDP was only 
69.6% of the 1989 level; real wages were almost halved in the same period 
(52.2% of the 1989 level in 1999) and 18.2% of the population were living 
under the poverty line (less than 4.3$ in PPP per day). In 2001, almost one 
sixth of the labour force – 17.5% – was without work, and male life expec-
tancy was in 1999 still slightly lower than in 1989. However, the level of 
material welfare as measured by the number of personal cars was much 
higher – in 2001 there were 262 cars registered per 1000 inhabitants, while 
ten years earlier the figure was 151. Although Bulgaria has gone through 
various episodes of political turbulence since the break-up of Zhivkov re-
gime, the country is today described as having a functioning democracy. 
Also the perceived level of corruption is lower than in many other countries 
of the region – according to the latest Corruption Perception Index, Bulgaria 
ranks as no. 54. This means that it is perceived as less corrupt than at least 
three of the countries that joined the EU in 2004 (Poland, Latvia and Slova-
kia). This mixed record notwithstanding, Bulgaria will probably have to wait 
until 2007 to join the European Union. Then, however, it can benefit, as all 
regions of the country will be eligible for EU developmental help.  
Also in the case of Romania, EU membership has been postponed until 
2007. There were many factors contributing to this decision, but the coun-
try’s poor economic and political performance in the post-Communist period 
was the main reason. On the macroeconomic level, Romania has performed 
somewhat better than its closest Balkan neighbour, Bulgaria. Romania’s 
GDP in 2000 represented only 76.8% of its 1989 level, while real wages had 
fallen even more – by 1999 only 62.3% of the 1989 level was reached. On 
the other hand, official statistics showed that only 8.6% of the available la-
bour force was without employment in 2001. Furthermore, the country 
seems to have managed to overcome health-related problems linked with the 
transition, as male life expectancy also regained the 1989 level in the tenth 
year of transition even though 44.5% of the population were living under the 
poverty line. Also as to consumer durables measured in terms of private car 
ownership there has been a remarkable improvement – by the 2001 there 
were almost twice as many cars registered in the country compared with the 
situation ten years earlier (139/1000 in 2001 as against only 61.8/1000 in 
1991). In one area, however, Romania has scored worse than even some of 
the former Soviet republics (all three Baltic republics and Armenia and Bela-
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rus): it is seen as definitely the most corrupt of the countries aspiring for EU 
membership, ranking no. 87 on the 2004 Corruption Perception Index.  
EU wannabies: Ukraine and Moldova, or the story of unfulfilled transi-
tions 
Two of Romania’s eastern neighbours, Ukraine and Moldova, have not yet 
dared to begin to think about future EU membership. Of the many reasons 
why their prospects are so remote, their poor economic and political per-
formance are the most obvious factors explaining why they will have prob-
lems with meeting EU entry criteria and getting the EU to help them solve 
their huge social and economic problems.  
Ukraine, the second largest country of Europe, with a population of al-
most 50 million mostly disappointed former Soviet citizens has become a 
major political and social problem and a huge challenge to European policy-
makers. Only two countries of the European part of the former Soviet Union, 
Moldova and Georgia, have been performing worse than Ukraine in eco-
nomic terms. By 2000, official GDP had reached only 37.6% of the 1989 
level, and real wages were at 48.4% of their 1989 level. 29.4% of the popu-
lation were living under the poverty line – but only 3.7% of the labour force 
was unemployed in 2001. We can therefore describe Ukraine as a country of 
working people whose incomes have been more than halved, and who pro-
duced even less than what they were paid for compared with the 1989 situa-
tion. It is thus not so surprising that the material standard of living has 
changed little compared with 1991 situation, at least if we use private car 
ownership as a measure. In 1991 there were 95.5 motor vehicles registered 
per 1000 inhabitants; in 2001 the figure was 102. The transition has also 
taken its toll on the men – male life expectancy in 1999 was almost 5% 
lower than in 1989 (95.45% of 1989 level). Other negative features are cor-
ruption (Ukraine has been ranked as no. 122 in the latest Corruption Percep-
tion Index) and the development of the corrupt, authoritarian and incompe-
tent regime. 
The situation in Moldova has been even more dramatic than in 
Ukraine.43 Moldova experienced a real economic collapse – in 1999 its offi-
cial GDP fell to 30.6% of the 1989 level; real wages in 1999 were at 35.1% 
of the 1989 level, and 84.6% of population were living below the poverty 
line. However, registered unemployment was very low – 2% in 2001. Male 
life expectancy fell in 1999 to 98% of its 1989 level. In the area of ‘motori-
sation’ of Moldovan society there has been a positive development, as the 
number of registered motor vehicles per 1000 grew from 40 in 1991 to 64 in 
2001. Moldova has experienced considerable political turmoil – the outbreak 
of civil war in 1992 resulted in the division of the country, and the popula-
tion has had obvious problems with finding a suitable political ideology, as 
voter preferences switched from nationalist ideology towards a Communist 
one. These shifts in the political preferences of the population could also be 
interpreted as an expression of despair and dissatisfaction with a ruling elite 
that was not able to provide the citizenry with the basic level of social and 
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economic security. Another reason for the dissatisfaction in Moldova can 
also be the widely shared perception of the country as a corrupt one. In 2003 
Moldova was ranked as no. 114 among the countries listed in the Corruption 
Perception Index – much worse than in Romania (87) but better than in an-
other neighbouring country, Ukraine (122). 
EU wannabies: the Caucasus, or the curse of geopolitics and ethnicity  
The three former Soviet republics located on the outskirts of Europe in the 
Caucasus region have perhaps been more successful than Moldova in meet-
ing the economic challenges of transition, but their chances of joining the 
EU are still rather slim. In addition all of them have been involved in devas-
tating separatist and political local conflicts and have been facing serious po-
litical problems. Only one country in the area – Georgia – has today a re-
gime that could be described as democratic. But this democratisation could 
take place only after a bloody transfer of power in 1992 and a rose revolu-
tion in 2003 that finally removed the corrupt Shevardnadze regime from 
power.  Azerbaijan has become a hereditary autocracy when Heydar Alliev 
was replaced after his death by his son – a  choice was democratically ‘le-
gitimised’ in what was apparently a rigged election. Armenia has a semi-
autocratic regime headed by former leaders of the separatist war in Nagorno-
Karabakh, a regime clearly unable to address the country’s social and eco-
nomic challenges.  
The most visible result of the decade of negligence is the very high level 
of poverty throughout region: 54.2% of the population in Georgia, 64.2% in 
Azerbaijan and an incredible 86.2% of the population in Armenia have less 
than 4.3$ in PPP per day to live on. On the other hand, at least officially, un-
employment has remained very low – 10.4% of the labour force in Armenia, 
5% in Georgia and a rather amazing 1.3% in Azerbaijan. Also in the demo-
graphic sphere there have been strange developments, with male life expec-
tancy increasing in the period between 1989 and 1999 by more than 8% in 
Georgia and by more than 2% both in Armenia and Azerbaijan. In the area 
of material welfare the data are also rather confusing – real wages fell in 
1999 to 35.1% of the 1989 level in Armenia, to 50.2% of the 1989 level in 
Azerbaijan and to 73.2% of the 1989 level in Georgia – and yet, according to 
available sources,44 in 1991 there were 67, 32 and 77  vehicles per 1000 in 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia respectively, whereas data for 2001 show 
that 10 years later there were 70, 42 and 56 vehicles per 1000 in each of 
these countries. This probably has more to do with the reliability of data than 
with the real situation. As to corruption, Armenia, at 82 place in Transpar-
ency International’s Corruption Perception Index, scores better than almost 
all other former non-Baltic Soviet republics (outranked only by Belarus, in 
74 place), while both Georgia (133) and Azerbaijan (140) are found almost 
at the bottom of the list.  
                                                     
44 Data for 1991 are calculated on the basis of data on population and number of motor vehi-
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EU outsiders: Belarus, or sticking to the Soviet way 
Belarus is the only former Soviet republic in Europe where the sitting auto-
cratic regime of Lukashenko has openly expressed interest in managing the 
country in what could be termed ‘the Soviet way’. Politically Belarus is of-
ten described as the last European country to be ruled by a dictator; eco-
nomically the country still has many Soviet features, but many indicators 
show that Belarus has managed to adapt to the new situation without paying 
too high a price, at least if we are to believe the official statistics. The coun-
try’s GDP in 2000 was only 18% lower than in 1989, and real wages had 
fallen even less, to 87.4% of the 1989 level by 1999. Official unemployment 
was also rather low: at 2.3% in 2001, it was almost 7 times lower than in the 
neighbouring Poland (by many seen as the champion of economic reform) 
and five times lower than in Lithuania. Also when it comes to material wel-
fare measured by private car ownership, Belarus has done relatively well 
compared with other transition countries, as the number of registered cars 
almost tripled between 1991 and 2001, from 48/1000 to 147/1000. The Lu-
kashenko regime is also seen as less corrupt than the regimes of all non-
Baltic former Soviet republics – in 2003 Belarus was ranked 74 on the Cor-
ruption Perception Index, outdoing even one of the EU candidates, Romania, 
which occupied 87 position on the list. However, in one area Belarus has 
scored worse than all its neighbours. Although Belarusian men could expect 
to live longer than their Russian counterparts – 62.2 years versus the Rus-
sians’ 59.9 years in 1999 – the relative decrease in male life expectancy in 
Belarus has been even more pronounced than in Russia.  
EU outsiders: Russia - from democratic chaos to an oil-lubricated hybrid 
regime 
Russia occupies a special position among the countries of the former Soviet 
Bloc. Not only is it the biggest – also the scope of the problems facing the 
country’s decision-makers seems enormous. Although Russia inherited more 
than 72% of the area of the former Soviet Bloc, almost 40% of its former 
population, more than 70% of its oil production and between 60 and 70% of 
its armed forces, the country has experienced many tough moments since the 
fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. The collapse of its economy in 1998 was 
the most dramatic economic event; the country has been recovering eco-
nomically since, due not least to high oil prices and the increasing demand 
for domestically produced goods.  
In one area, however, Putin still faces problems comparable to those 
faced by his predecessor – the most dramatic long-term problem the country 
is confronted with is undoubtedly that of demographic collapse. The popula-
tion fell by 1.8 million, from 147 million in 1989 to 145.2 million in 2002; 
had it not been for the net migration from the former Soviet republics (an es-
timated 5.5 million people between 1989 and 2002), the drop would have 
been even more dramatic. According to various estimates, the population of 
Russia may shrink to slightly more than 125 million (UN projection) or 
slightly more than 135 million (census projection) by 2025. Two factors 
have contributed greatly to these negative demographic trends that endanger 
the future of Russia as a viable economic and political actor: the low fertility 
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of Russian women, and what has been described as ‘stubbornly, catastrophi-
cally high mortality’. (Eberstadt 2004:18) This is clearly illustrated by life 
expectancy of Russian men, which decreased from 64.2 years to 59.9 years 
between 1989 and 1999. In fact, the figure had reached 57.6 years in 1994 – 
on a par with that of many developing countries, and a level unheard of not 
only in Western and Eastern Europe, but indeed in the whole post-Soviet 
space. Not even the economic recovery experienced since 1999 has im-
proved the situation here – male life expectancy has continued to fall, down 
to 59 years in 2000 and 2001, and 58.5 in 2002. 
Demographic problems are not the only challenges the leadership has 
been facing since 1991. Economically Russia has not yet recovered – in 
2000 GDP was still at only 60.8% of the 1989 level, and real wages in 1999 
were done to 38.2% of the 1989 level. On the other hand, officially regis-
tered unemployment was low – 1.6% in 2001. Even with many years of un-
interrupted and relatively high economic growth caused by positive terms of 
trade and growing domestic demand, Russia’s GDP in 2003 was still far be-
low the 1989 level (between 70 and 77%, according to various sources). Al-
though Russian authorities have announced that real income has been grow-
ing at an impressive rate since reaching bottom in 1999 (46% of the 1991 
level) and was in 2003 52% higher than in 1999, this was still only 70% of 
the 1991 level. This might explain why, according to the latest available 
data, 50.3% of the population have to live on less than $4.3 in PPP per day.45 
On the other hand, private car ownership has soared – by 2001 there were 
147 cars registered per 1000 population, compared with only 65.5 in 1991.  
The positive economic development in Russia is associated with the sta-
bility of the regime in power since the first president of the Russian Federa-
tion, Boris Yeltsin, decided to step down on the New Years Eve of 1999. 
The new president, Vladimir Putin, promised to put an end to the problems – 
although his record is today rather mixed. He has managed to implement 
some important economic reforms that have revitalised the economy, but in 
political terms his first and the beginning of his second period were more 
controversial. He has been widely accused of building a hybrid semi-
autocratic regime, where democratic procedures are seemingly followed but 
the real political decisions are taken in non-democratically elected fora and 
individual freedoms are in many respects narrowed. Especially Putin’s in-
ability to solve problems in the Caucasus, resulting in the wave of terror 
haunting Russia, and his handling of the touchy problem of the outcome of 
privatisation in Russia, have led many to doubt his capabilities as leader of 
the country. Nor has Putin been able to change the image of Russia as a 
country of corrupt bureaucrats – Russia scores poorly on the latest list of 
most corrupt countries, ending as no. 90.46  
Although Russian policy-makers reiterated that Russia should not be 
treated as a candidate for EU membership, Russia has made efforts to make 
its laws comply with EU standards. Both Russia and the EU have expressed 
                                                     
45 For more on poverty and marginalisation in Russia see Klugman 1997, Marginal'nost' v 
sovremennoi Rossii 2000, The Social Crisis in the Russian Federation 2001. Also Yemtsov 
2003 gives a good understanding of this aspect of Russian transformation on the regional 
level 
46 For more on various aspects of corruption in Russia see Makarychev 2000. 
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interest in creating a common European legal space. The main goal of this 
policy is to encourage economic cooperation between these two important 
economic actors with complementary economies, through a process of legis-
lative approximation. Russia wants access to the European markets, while 
Europe has developed interest in Russia as an important provider of energy 
and other strategic commodities. Russia is therefore treated as a special case 
by EU policy-makers. On the one hand they consider Russia as still too dif-
ferent – and indeed, it defines itself as too different – to join the Union, but 
on the other hand they see Russia as becoming more and more integrated 
with Europe and reaping the positive fruits of this integration. This is true 
not least in the area of economic cooperation, which provides Russia with 
huge profits that the country’s authorities have been employing partly to nar-
row the welfare gaps between Russia and the rest of Europe. In that sense, 
although indirectly, the EU has also a role to play in Russia in addressing the 
problem of welfare gaps. 
 
  
Personal cars  
(per 1000) 
Country GDP 
2000/1989 
% 
Real 
wages 
1999/1989 
% 
Population 
in pov-
erty47 
% 
Unem-
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Perception 
Index (Rank) 
200450 
Re-
gime 
type 
2003 
Czech R. 97.4 107.1 0.8 8.5 104.85 215 343 2004 4.2(51) D 
Slovakia 102.4 86.1 8.6 18.2 103.29 215 240 2004 4.0(57) D 
Poland 128.0 95.8 18.4 16.2 103.15 160 259 2004 3.5(67) D 
Hungary 105.3 81.0 15.4 8.0 101.38 195 244 2004 4.8(42) D 
Estonia 80.6 66.2 19.3 6.5 99.54 154 299 2004 6.0(31) D 
Latvia 62.2 65.0 34.8 7.8 99.39 123 249 2004 4.0(57) D 
Lithuania 63.6 47.8 22.5 12.5 100.30 142 337 2004 4.6(44) D 
Bulgaria 69.6 52.2 18.2 17.5 98.98 151 262 2007? 4.1(54) D 
Romania 76.8 62.3 44.5 8.6 99.40 61.8 139 2007? 2.9(87) D 
Belarus 82.0 87.4 10.4 2.3 93.11 48 147 - 3.3(74) A 
Moldova  30.6 35.1 84.6 2.0 98.02 40.2 64 - 2.3(114) D/A 
Russia 60.8 38.2 50.3 1.6 93.30 65.5 147 - 2.8(90) D/A 
Ukraine 37.6 48.4 29.4 3.7 95.45 95.9 102 - 2.2(122) D/A 
Armenia  57.6 35.1 86.2 10.4 102.46 67 70 - 3.1(82) D/A 
Azerbai-
jan 50.3 50.2 
64.2 1.3 
102.25 
32 42 - 1.9(140) A 
Georgia 34.7 73.2 54.2 5.0 108.3 77 56 - 2..0(133) D 
                                                     
47 Poverty in Eastern Europe and the CIS in Economic Survey of Europe, 2004 No. 1 p.169 defines as ‘poor’ those who have to subsist on less than 4.30 $ in PPP per day.  
48 Data from TransMONEE Database 2003.  
49 Original data from TransMONEE Database 2003 Edition. 
50 Based on Corruption Perception Index 2004 by Transparency International. CPI Score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people and country 
analysts; it ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). 
51 Data for 1991 from Rocznik Statystyki Miedzynarodwej, Warsaw: GUS, p.433.  
52 http://www.unece.org/stats/trends/ch8/8.1.xls 
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Institutional strategies: the EU enlargement context 
The very existence of welfare gaps is one of the most important push and 
pull factors influencing people’s decision to move. As early as in 1991, Jean 
Claude Chesnais identified a unique combination of ‘push factors’ on So-
viet-dominated territory that were to play a central role in the migration 
choices taken since by the population of the area. The factors listed by 
Chesnais were: economic backwardness, lack of functioning democracy, na-
tionalistic uprisings and inter-ethnic conflicts.53  
Today, more than a decade after Chesnais’ original diagnosis, the situa-
tion in the area seems to be even more complex. The relative liberalisation of 
travel restrictions, the deep economic crisis that has haunted this region for 
the past decade and political processes in Europe, first of all European inte-
gration and the EU enlargement, have made the target area in the West an 
even more attractive and more easily accessible area of actual and potential 
migration. In addition, there are in the West various pull factors that make it 
an attractive choice for those seeking better opportunities: the proximity of 
the area, the existence of local ethnic networks making permanent or tempo-
rary migration easier, a growing demand for labour in certain sectors of the 
Western economy, and not least the possibility of finding temporary work on 
the black labour market and the transfer of earnings in the form of remit-
tances to the low-cost country of origin.54 
This new set of challenges and responses has put European migration in a 
new political context. Myron Weiner, who has written extensively on the re-
lationship between migration and security,55 identifies five central aspects of 
what he describes as ‘the global migration crisis’: the problem of control 
over entry, problem of absorption, the impact migration has on international 
relations, the relationship between migration and international regimes and 
institutions, and not least how migration is seen as a moral problem. (Weiner 
1995:9–20)  The way individuals or groups try to surmount welfare gap by 
migration or by choosing other strategies seems to challenge all these five 
points. The realisation that Europe cannot remain divided into a zone of rela-
tive welfare in the West and a zone of insecurity and lack of basic welfare in 
the East has been a major factor influencing European integration policies. 
NATO and EU enlargement have been perceived as the most efficient ways 
of improving the security of the continent, as they were expected to result in 
a lessening of the welfare gap.56 The list of requirements to be met by candi-
dates to these two European clubs is largely a set of preconditions for build-
ing a system with smaller welfare gaps than those existing today between the 
East and the West and within many of the countries in Eastern and Central 
Europe. 
                                                     
53 Quoted in Brochmann 1996, p.41. 
54 For more on the recent trends in Central and Eastern European migration in the context of 
EU enlargement see Migration Policies and EU Enlargement: the Case of Central and Eastern 
Europe 2001.  
55 Weiner 1993; Weiner 1995. 
56 On the social goals and targets of this policy see Atkinson, Marlier and Nolan 2004.. Also 
the conclusion that higher level of social inclusion and protection may have some long-term 
positive impact on economic performance was probably one reason why the EU formulated 
these targets. For more on this link see Arjona, Ladaique and Pearson 2003.   
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The political and social instruments used first of all by the enlarging EU 
will change both the welfare and the migration landscape in Europe in a very 
definite way.57 On the one hand, EU enlargement will result in the inclusion 
of states with relatively weak economies and great social problems, further 
deepening the welfare gap within the Union. This development will confront 
the EU with an ‘absorption dilemma’ – the new, poorer members will have 
to be absorbed in the same way as the real immigrants. This also could mean 
that many individuals and groups may decide to migrate within the EU and 
the EEA in order to improve their lives, as their movement would no longer 
be restricted by strong bureaucratic barriers.  
On the other hand, those left outside will perceive the enlarged EU area 
as a potential provider of welfare and may try to get in, legally or illegally, 
challenging the enlarged EU’s ability to control entry. This may force the 
enlarged EU to create new regime and institutions, or change the existing 
ones, thereby contributing indirectly to the modification of the existing re-
gional ‘migration regime’.58 The need to absorb the new, poorer members 
and to address the issue of permanent or temporary outsiders has already re-
sulted in the emergence of political and social challenges. The issue of the 
broadly understood welfare gap and the social, political and economic con-
sequences linked to its very existence has become politicised and then even 
partially securitised in the European political debate.  
The West has found itself confronted with an acute political dilemma – it 
could continue integration efforts and work for a deeper integration of the 
existing Western community, or it could open its doors to the East and em-
bark on a project of building a broader, united Europe, facing new political, 
economic and social challenges stemming from the enlargement of the zone 
of responsibility and stability. It was felt that the new situation had to be ad-
dressed in a comprehensive manner. Europe was no longer haunted by the 
spectre of Communism; rather ‘the spectre of uncontrolled mass migration 
from Eastern Europe became a public issue in the West’(Castles and Miller 
2003:10). The main incentive for migration westward was that the West was 
perceived as a better place to live than the countries going through a painful 
systemic transition. The EU risked an uncontrolled inflow of legal and ille-
gal migrants from the former Soviet Inner and Outer Empire.59  
This challenge could be addressed in at least two ways. The first option 
was the reintroduction, this time by the Western democratic governments 
and not by the local authoritarian regimes, of travel restrictions for the citi-
zens of Central and Eastern Europe who, naturally enough, wanted to make 
use of their newly won freedom of movement. The second option was to 
give them hope that their situation could be gradually improved in their 
home-places, as a consequence of an ambitious plan of enlarging the West-
ern zone of stability and welfare to Eastern and Central Europe. The first op-
tion could be described as building an exclusive Western club, keeping at 
distance the poorer Europeans and risking their outrage, uncontrolled growth 
                                                     
57 Even on the eve of enlargement the EU provided the candidate countries with support – for 
more on this phase of the process see Bailey and De Propris 2004. 
58 On EU efforts to work out a common migration policy see Furuseth 2003. 
59 For more on the early phase of this migration debate see The New Europe and International 
Migration; Special Issue 1992. 
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of populism and nationalism and, in the mid-term, a conflict between the 
Western club and the outsiders. This approach would perhaps be tempting 
from the purely economic point of view, but would contradict the very prin-
ciple underlying the whole European integration project – the principle of 
solidarity and cooperation as the way of preventing international conflict.  
The EU is basically a peace project. Its main original purpose was to link 
together former wartime foes by building a net of economic interdependence 
and cooperation. This would make any military conflict between them un-
thinkable and impossible, because by going to war against each other they 
would in fact be going to war against themselves. This original spirit of the 
EU was perhaps not so visible in the first years after the dissolution of the 
Soviet empire. The very thought of enlargement at that stage was a challeng-
ing concept, due not least to the enormous economic, social and political dif-
ferences between the western and eastern parts of the continent. However, 
the EU finally decided to respond to this new challenge through a policy that 
could be labelled ‘institutional migration’. Instead of exposing itself to un-
controlled movement of people from the East, the EU sent a clear message: 
‘Do not come to us; we will come to you and help you resolve your prob-
lems and improve your situation. However, if you want us to come and help, 
you will have to meet some basic requirements.’   
In 1993 the EU, and in 1995 NATO, made public their ‘entry criteria’ for 
those aspiring to join the Western integration projects. Since that point, re-
forming the economic and political sphere has become much easier for those 
countries that decided to seek full integration with the existing Western insti-
tutions – they were provided with a clear set of rules to be implemented, and 
goals to be met in order to make them ‘eligible’ for full membership.60 
The successful implementation of this policy of meeting entry criteria 
was to open the EU doors to the new seekers. This would secure them access 
to EU resources, which would in turn help them change their own economic 
and social landscapes to such a degree that mass migration would no longer 
seem a desirable option. By promising substantial assistance in return for 
meeting the EU criteria, the Union could help the countries of the region to 
embark on a policy that in the longer run would result in greater equality in 
levels of economic and social well-being.  
The recent history of European migration shows two main driving forces 
behind the largest migration waves. In peacetime, economic and opportunity 
gaps are the main driving forces, with both migratory push and pull factors. 
However, it is in situations of violent conflict and political instability that the 
most dramatic and massive migration occurs. Preventing conflict and politi-
cal instability by promising membership – and economic benefits – has be-
come the basic policy line of the two big Western clubs. There has also been 
a sort of division of labour between NATO and the EU – NATO was to help 
the countries of the region solve their basic security dilemma by providing 
them with what was seen as a ‘hard security’ guarantee; the EU was to ad-
dress problems stemming from the other parts of the broadly understood ‘se-
curity spectrum’. When the political elites of the region decided to seek 
closer ties and membership in the two Western clubs, this was obviously dic-
                                                     
60 For more on that see Wallace 2000. 
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tated by the hope that full membership would result in a substantial im-
provement in welfare and well-being in the societies they were to lead on the 
bumpy road to the West. Membership in NATO and the EU was expected to 
give the societies the chance to meet their needs on almost all levels. NATO 
membership would ensure physical safety and security in an instable interna-
tional environment (the Balkan wars, political instability and violent con-
flicts in the FSU); EU membership would facilitate the realisation of social 
and individual needs by providing the resources needed to improve their so-
cial, political and economic well-being.  
Once the decision on enlargement was made, the West – and first and 
foremost the EU – had to address at least five immediate and long-term chal-
lenges: 
 
1. How to organise the enlargement process?  
2. How to reform its own structures that were to encompass the new mem-
bers so they could function smoothly also after the planned enlargement? 
3. How to finance the enlargement and the enlarged EU?  
4. How to adapt to the new situation with the gap between the rich and the 
poor growing deeper in the enlarged Union?  
5. Where to draw the external borders of the enlarged EU, and how to build 
relations with immediate neighbours outside the enlarged Union? 
 
Organising the enlargement was perhaps the easiest part of the exercise. as 
the EU had already gone through similar processes in connection with earlier 
rounds of enlargement. The EU was definitely the stronger of the two parties 
in this process: indeed, the candidate countries had to accept the basic condi-
tions for joining even before the negotiation process could start – the stage 
for negotiations was in a way preset. It was agreed what would be the goal of 
the negotiations – the acquis communautaire were largely predefined – and 
it was clear from the outset that the candidate countries would have to adopt 
the set of rules proposed by the EU, and that at this stage their influence on 
the final shape of the Union would be limited. Debate on the future shape of 
the Union intensified when the negotiation process seemed to be nearing an 
end. What was often described as a ‘rotten compromise’ was reached at the 
EU summit held in December 2000 in Nice, where the decision was made on 
the future balance of political power among the Union’s old and new mem-
bers. This decision was to survive for only about three years, however. An 
alternative proposal on post-enlargement decision-making was put forward 
by the former French president Valery Giscard d’Estaigne, who proposed the 
adoption the EU Constitution. The heated debate on the changes in future 
political decision-making in the Union resulted in deep disagreement. The 
December 2003 Rome summit was a fiasco.  
In fact, the existing and perceived welfare gaps in Europe were at the root 
of almost all problems confronting both the West and the East in the pains-
taking negotiation process and then in the debate on the future shape of the 
enlarged EU. The coming enlargement was to be the most asymmetric one in 
EU, in terms of economic and social potentials. Moreover, the welfare gaps 
between the existing member states and the candidate countries were huge. It 
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was clear that the enlargement would be a costly affair for the old members 
of the EU.  
The EU budget was already on the brink of collapse due to huge transfers 
to underdeveloped areas within the Union itself and to its ‘rural community’ 
(CAP). The EU badly needed reform of its own public finances. The realisa-
tion that it would be impossible to apply existing EU rules to the new mem-
bers because that would result in the economic collapse of the whole integra-
tion project prompted policy-makers to work out a new set of rules for the 
division of the EU’s ‘financial cake’.  A balance would have to be found be-
tween the financial capabilities of the old members and their willingness to 
finance the enlargement, and the perhaps unrealistic expectations of the fu-
ture members. It was also important to avoid the impression that the enlarged 
Union would be divided into an old ‘core’ with full rights, and the new pe-
ripheries with formal full membership but in practice treated as ‘second 
class’ members. 
The hot debate on the eve of enlargement on how the new Union was to 
be managed, and especially what many interpreted as the fiasco of negotia-
tions in Rome in December 2003, triggered discussion on the dangerous fu-
ture of the European integration project. The heart of the matter seemed to 
be  the relationship between economic and political power in the enlarged 
Union. In an insightful article, the French scholar Nicolas-Jean Brehon 
(Brehon 2004) has presented a set of data illustrating the main bone of con-
tention. According to the Treaty of Nice, the existing members’ share of po-
litical power would be 68.7% in the enlarged Union; at the same time they 
were expected to contribute 94.4% of the budget. By contrast, the new mem-
bers were to be given 31.3% share in the policy-making body, while their 
contribution to the Union’s common budget was to be limited to 5.6%. The 
main contributors to the common budget – Germany and France, which were 
to contribute respectively 22 and 16.6% to the new 2009 budget – apparently 
felt that this lack of balance between financial contribution and influence on 
political decisions was unacceptable.  
There were many other reasons for the row that emerged between some 
old and some coming EU members just before enlargement. A basic issue 
was the question of solidarity in solving the economic and social problems 
that had been caused by the candidate countries’ rather unwilling earlier par-
ticipation in the ‘Soviet project’.  
The welfare gaps in today’s Europe originate largely from the circum-
stance that the eastern part of the continent was forced to take part in the de-
structive Soviet political, economic and social experiment between 1945 and 
1991. In the interwar period, Czechoslovakia had been counted among the 
wealthiest countries of Europe, with a standard of living similar to that in the 
Nordic countries. Poland had had levels of social and economic development 
similar to those of Spain in the same period. The difference in the social and 
economic development between the two parts of Germany on the eve of uni-
fication is perhaps the clearest illustration of the ‘welfare price’ the countries 
of the region had to pay for their forced participation in the Communist pro-
ject of building a paradise on earth.  
The candidate countries have still to struggle with the social, political and 
economic legacy of Communism. Deep disagreement on how to make deci-
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sions, and on who is to finance the process of levelling out the welfare gaps, 
may well derail the whole process of the pan-European integration, by fuel-
ling mistrust between the old and the new members and by making them re-
assess their policy choices. In that sense the very existence of welfare gaps 
has already become a serious political problem. The issue has become visi-
bly, although indirectly, politicised in the European debate on the future of 
the institutional, political and economic shape of the enlarged Union and the 
emergence of new migratory trends.61  
Another issue that has become politicised – even partly securitised – is 
the question of opening the EU labour market to workers from the new 
member countries. The deep welfare gap may have a direct impact on migra-
tory choices, prompting people living under difficult conditions to seek im-
provement by moving to the western and northern parts of the Union, in a 
situation with no formal restrictions due to the common policy on free 
movement of labour within the enlarged Union.  
The economic gaps within the EU are best measured by comparing GDP 
per capita measured in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) at the regional level. 
A quick look at Table 7 shows that after the 2004 enlargement the economic 
gap between the richest and the poorest region within the union will double. 
In 1999 the difference between the wealthiest and the poorest regions in the 
union –Inner London in the UK (242% of EU average) and Ipeiros region of 
Greece (51%)  – was 4.7:1. By 2007, we can expect the gap to have grown to 
13.4:1, with Inner London at the top and Romania’s North-East Region at 
the bottom (not shown in the table).62 
 
Table 7. GDP per capita in the EU and in the acceding countries 2002 
(% of EU-25 average) 
 
The ten highest The ten lowest 
1 Inner London (UK) 315 1 Lubelskie (PL) 32 
2 Bruxelles-Capitale (BE) 234 2 Podkarpackie (PL) 33 
3 Luxembourg 213 3 Warmińsko-Mazurskie (PL) 34 
4 Hamburg (DE) 188 4 Podlaskie (PL) 35 
5 Île de France (FR) 176 5 Świętokrzyskie (PL) 36 
6 Vienna (AT) 174 6 Észak Magyaroszág (HU) 37 
7 Berkshire, Buckinghamshire & Oxfordshire (UK) 162 7 Opolskie (PL) 37 
8 Provincia Autonoma Bolzano (IT) 160 8 Eszag-Alföld (HU) 38 
9 Stockholm (SE) 158 9 Východné Slovensko (SK) 39 
10 Oberbayern (DE) 158 10 Latvia 39 
 
This comparison dramatically illustrates the scope of challenges facing EU 
decision-makers. In a situation where the peace is seemingly secured in 
Europe and work on opening up borders in much of Europe will be more or 
less concluded by 2007, economic motivation is likely to become the most 
important push- and pull factor influencing migratory choices in the enlarged 
EU. Studies of the expected impact of opening up the Western European la-
                                                     
61 For a discussion of the new pattern of migration in Central and Eastern Europe see 
Romaniszyn 1997.. On the securitisation of the debate on migration see Huysmans 2000.  
62 For details on the differences within the existing and the enlarged European Union see for 
instance a study A new partnership for cohesion, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/ 
regional_policy/sources/docoffic/official/reports/cohesion3/cohesion3_en.htm  
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bour market to the workforce of Central and Eastern Europe have become a 
thriving ‘industry’. These studies form part of the broader process of prepar-
ing for the crucial changes that will take place in connection with the 
enlargement. They are also a part of the learning and adaptation process in-
tended to make policy- and decision-makers better prepared to meet this new 
‘human challenge’.  
The EU has at its disposal a range of instruments for addressing the wel-
fare gap, aimed at reducing this problem’s importance in the new emerging 
European security landscape and influencing migratory choices. The most 
powerful of these instruments are the EU’s cohesion policy63 and economic 
help to the underdeveloped areas within the Union,64 the EU common so-
cial65 and migration policy,66 and, finally, the EU’s policy towards countries 
remaining outside the Union.67 As shown by the example of Spain, Portugal 
and Ireland, and to a lesser degree Greece, application of these instruments 
has been successful in preventing mass and uncontrolled migration and 
equalising welfare levels within EU borders.68 Developments in relations be-
tween the EU and the candidate/acceding countries from Central and Eastern 
Europe have also shown that the Union has managed to retain control over 
migratory flows and, to a certain extent, guide developments also in areas 
outside its jurisdiction.  
Of all the decisions taken by the EU over the past ten years the most im-
portant is the decision on enlargement.69 This will change the political and 
social map of the continent in a decisive way.70 It will also have a direct im-
pact on the migratory choices and plans of millions of people in Central and 
Eastern Europe. For potential migrants, three issues are of crucial impor-
tance: 
 
- the possibility to travel without restrictions  
- the possibility to find legal or illegal source of income  
- the possibility to settle more or less permanently in the coun-
try of one’s own choosing.  
 
EU enlargement will have a direct bearing on all three, as it will mean the 
extension of the principle of free movement of persons and free movement 
of workers to all citizens of the new European Union.  
Although formally part of the Justice and Home Affairs area of EU pol-
icy, the policy of free movement of persons and workers overlaps with other 
                                                     
63 For more information on cohesion policy and the Cohesion Fund see: http://europa.eu.int/ 
scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l60018.htm 
64 For more detailed information on the regional dimension of the European Union’s policy 
see: http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/s24000.htm 
65 Basic information on EU social and employment policy can be found at: http://europa. 
eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/s02000.htm 
66 For an overview of EU policy on free movement of people see: http://europa.eu.int/ scad-
plus/leg/en/s17000.htm 
67 Basic information on the EU’s external relations and its instruments in this field can be 
found at: http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/s05000.htm 
68 For more on that in the enlargement context, see Martin, Velazquez and Funck 2001. 
69 On how difficult and challenging this decision was, see Schimmelfennig 2001. 
70 On this dimension of the EU policy see Schmähl 2004. 
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central areas of common European policy-making. In the enlargement con-
text this issue was directly linked with external relations policy: in fact, the 
whole issue of enlargement was originally a purely external policy issue. 
The main goal of the EU in the first stage of cooperation with countries 
seeking membership was to identify those who, due to their commitment to 
meeting EU entry criteria, would become ‘eligible’. Thereafter, negotiations 
could begin. One of the main ‘prizes’ at the end of this process was to be the 
opening of the common labour market to citizens from the new member 
states and the extension of the principle of free movement of persons and 
workers to all new citizens. What began in the early 1990s as an external 
policy issue had by 2004 become an issue pertaining to common policy in 
the area of free movement of persons and workers. The answer to the ques-
tion ‘Who is eligible for full EU membership?’ has thus become an answer 
to the question ‘Citizens of which new countries, former EU-outsiders, are to 
be given access to the EU labour market?’ 
The decision on the enlargement and the application of the principle of 
free movement of people and workers have also had a direct bearing on both 
common EU and national migration policy. With enlargement, new groups 
of European citizens who previously had restricted possibilities to move 
freely between their countries and the EU, and within the EU, will gain al-
most unlimited possibilities to settle in the countries of their own choosing – 
provided that they can secure employment there. 
Another policy area affected by the decision on enlargement and the 
planned application of the rule of free movement of people and workers is 
the common European and national welfare policy. Since enlargement could 
be expected to result in deeper welfare gaps within the enlarged EU, and 
since application of the principle of the free movement of people and work-
ers would open the borders of the old EU countries to millions of potential 
job-seekers from the poorer parts of the continent, many began asking how 
enlargement would affect the welfare situation in their countries, and to what 
extent ‘welfare shopping’ might create problems for both national and su-
pranational bodies shaping European welfare policy.  
There was also the realisation that enlargement and the application of the 
rule of free movement of persons and workers would impact on common and 
national social policy. Two issues were intensely discussed: the fear of social 
dumping in the more prosperous EU countries; and the problem of potential 
brain drain from the new member countries.  
The debate has also had impact on matters involving the common re-
gional and cohesion policy of the enlarged Union. How could the available 
cohesion and regional policy instruments best be used to change the migra-
tory push and pull balance sheet of the enlarged Union? By changing this 
pull and push migratory balance sheet through applying financial tools pro-
vided by the EU, policy-makers hoped to prevent uncontrolled and uncon-
trollable migratory movements.  
However, these financial levelling instruments could be used only if the 
old members of the EU – and especially the main  contributors, i.e. Ger-
many, the UK, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, Luxembourg, Austria and 
Belgium – were willing to provide the necessary financial support for apply-
ing the cohesion and regional policy tools also after the planned enlarge-
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ment. Moreover, how would the current major beneficiaries of the cohesion 
and regional policy – first and foremost Spain, Portugal and Greece – react 
to this new cohesion challenge from Eastern Europe? The common Euro-
pean cohesion policy is an important expenditure post – approximately 1/3 
of the new EU budget for the period 2007–2013 (€ 345 billion or ‘only’ 60 
billion less than the most costly Common Agricultural Policy) is to be spent 
on this policy post, according to the February 2004 budget proposal. The 
tug-of-war for these resources is expected to lead to the creation of new and 
or altered intra-EU coalitions and to a sharper tone in discussions between 
EU’s net contributors and those who are to benefit from the regional and co-
hesion policy related transfers.  
The combination of all these factors and considerations has resulted in 
the creation of a Europe with varying degrees of freedom of movement of 
persons and workers. With the May 2004 enlargement, the EU has become 
divided into two ‘formal’ blocs and into various ‘freedom of movement of 
persons and workers’ subgroups. 
These two ‘formal’ blocs are the EU insiders and the EU outsiders. The 
first group consists of the countries that are formally full EU members: the 
15 old EU members, the 10 new members and then the 2 future EU mem-
bers, Romania and Bulgaria, due to join in 2007. The second group is made 
up of those countries that are not EU members nor are likely to be so in the 
foreseeable future. This group is far more heterogeneous than the first one: 
within it we find some countries that have no problems in meeting the formal 
membership criteria and have been offered EU membership but have de-
cided against this (Norway and Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland), as 
well as countries which for various reasons are not yet eligible for EU mem-
bership (Belarus is not ‘willing’ to accept the EU entry criteria; Russia has 
been rejecting EU membership also for other reasons), and countries that 
could currently be described as ‘EU wannabies’ – i.e. those that want to join 
but whose way to membership is long, as they still have problems in meeting 
even the most basic EU entry criteria.  
As to the application of the principle of free movement of persons and 
workers, the situation today is highly complex. Among the EU insiders, four 
subgroups can be identified. There are the old EU members, whose citizens 
have unrestricted access to the EU common labour market; the second one, 
the new members, is internally divided into two subgroups, one with Malta 
and Cyprus, whose citizens have had the same rights as the old EU members 
from the first day of membership, and another one consisting of the 8 new 
members from Eastern Europe. Their citizens have limited access to the 
common labour market; the old EU countries have imposed the ‘2+3+2’ 
transitional arrangements (see below), limiting access to their domestic la-
bour markets for up to 7 years. In addition there is a fourth group – Romania 
and Bulgaria. They will formally become EU members in 2007, but their re-
lationship to the policy area labelled ‘freedom of movement of persons and 
workers’ is as yet undefined. In theory, they could end up in the 
Malta/Cyprus subgroup, with unrestricted access to the EU labour market 
from the first day of membership (rather unrealistic), or they will have to fol-
low the ‘restricted access path’ imposed on the 8 new members from Eastern 
Europe.  
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Among the EU outsiders we also find various subgroups in terms of ac-
cess to EU labour market. Although Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein have 
opted to stay outside the EU, they have become a part of the European Eco-
nomic Area (EEA). This has enabled almost unrestricted access of job-
seekers from the whole EEA area to the whole EEA labour market, which is 
made up of the old EU, the new EU and the three EFTA countries. Switzer-
land has chosen to stay outside both the EU and the EEA, but has signed a 
special bilateral Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons between Swit-
zerland and the 15 previous EU member states; this entered into force on 1 
June 2002. According to this agreement, each year up till 15,000 citizens of 
the old EU countries can settle in Switzerland in connection with work. 
Since 1 June 2004, Swiss nationals who want to live and work in one of the 
old EU countries are granted the same treatment in the 15 old EU countries 
as EU nationals with regard to entry and residence provisions and access to 
the labour market and no longer require work permits.71 These four countries 
– Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland – can therefore be de-
scribed as formal EU outsiders but de facto and de jure insiders as far as the 
access of their citizens to the EU common labour market is concerned. The 
same cannot be said about the citizens of the other countries outside the EU 
fold – neither citizens of wannabies or the ‘non-eligible-for-the-time-being’ 
countries have unrestricted access to EU common labour market, although 
they can use – and have been using – other migratory gates to get into this 
attractive labour market. 
 
Table 8. Freedom of movement of workers in Europe – various catego-
ries 
 
 Subgroup Access to EU labour market through the free movement of labour principle 
15 Old EU Unrestricted 
8 New EU EE Restricted, 2+3+2 rule may apply 
2 New EU  Unrestricted EU insiders 
2 Future EU Probably restricted from 2007  
EEA Unrestricted 
Switzerland Unrestricted from 2004 
Wannabies No EU outsiders 
Not-eligible No 
 
For a potential migrant worker, the crucial question is whether he or she will 
be granted the same rights as local employees. The main stated goal of the 
principle of the free movement of workers is the elimination of any dis-
crimination based on nationality as regards employment, remuneration and 
other working conditions, access to accommodation and the worker's right to 
be joined by his or her family.72 This at least nominal equality of all citizens 
                                                     
71 For more details on that agreement see:  
http://www.swissemigration.ch/elias/en/schweizeu/index.html 
72 The policy of free movement of workers is based on the following set of regulations: 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 of 15 October 1968 on the free movement of workers 
within the Community, Council Regulation (EEC) No 312/76 of 9 February 1976 amending 
the provisions relating to the trade union rights of workers contained in Regulation (EEC) No 
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of the enlarged EU – and the EEA area and Switzerland – may become the 
main legal and institutional incentive for those willing to try a migratory ad-
aptation and survival strategy in order to improve their quality of life and the 
level of welfare.  
The realisation that this new opportunity could be exploited by many of 
the new EU citizens has contributed to the flourishing of not always so inde-
pendent expertise on post-enlargement labour migration in Europe. Tens, if 
not hundreds, of reports have seen the light of day, aimed at providing inter-
est groups and political actors with arguments in favour or against opening 
the EU labour market to the new members.73 These studies have had a big 
impact on decision-making in the area of common and national policy of 
opening – or rather of not opening – of the EU common labour market. The 
most visible consequence has been the introduction of transitional arrange-
ments, at the request of countries fearing that the inflow of job-seekers from 
Eastern Europe could have a destructive effect on their domestic labour mar-
ket and their system of welfare and social protection. According to this prin-
ciple the most exposed countries – Germany74 and Austria are held to be 
most vulnerable due to their geographical proximity to source countries – 
can delay the decision on the opening of their labour markets for up till 7 
years (the 2+3+2 rule). Originally intended as an extraordinary policy tool 
for the most exposed countries, this has become more a rule than an excep-
tion – of the old 15 EU members, only three – the UK, Ireland and Sweden – 
have decided that an open door policy was to be introduced on the day of 
enlargement. All other 12 member countries have introduced various transi-
tional arrangements. Some, like Germany and Austria, have almost closed 
their labour markets to job-seekers from the new member countries; others 
have introduced restrictions or bureaucratic procedures to provide better con-
trol over the expected migratory flows.  
 
                                                     
1612/68 on freedom of movement for workers within the Community and Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 2434/92 of 27 July 1992 amending Part II of Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 on 
freedom of movement for workers within the Community. 
73 A central study is Boeri and Brücker 2000,. the full text of which is available at:  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/empl_esf/enlargement_en.htm. One of the last 
contributions on the eve of enlargement was Alvarez-Plata, Brücker and Siliverstovs 2003. 
The Polish researcher J. Oczki (2002) has compared the findings of various studies on poten-
tial labour migration from Central and Eastern Europe. His summing up shows that predicting 
on a complex social issue like migration is difficult, no matter what methods are chosen. 
74 On the German understanding of the impact of enlargement on the local labour market see 
for instance Bauer 1998. 
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Table 9. Migration potential from Central/Eastern Europe – various 
studies75  
 
Author and year Migration to EU  Emigration from  
Korcelli (1992) 40,000–70,000  Poland 
Franzmeyer (1997) 590,000–1,180,000  All candidate countries  
Huber and Pichelmann 
(1998) 140,000–200,000  Eastern/Central Europe  
Walterskirchen (WIFO)  
and Dietz (1998) 160,000, falling to 110,000
 8 countries from Central/ 
Eastern Europe  
Bauer and Zimmermann 
(IZA) (1999) 200,000 
 Czech Republic, Poland, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Hun-
gary, Romania, Bulgaria  
Salt (1999) 140,000  8 countries of Central/ Eastern Europe  
Orłowski and Zienkowski 
(1999) 
380,000–1,500,000 in the 
next 10–12 years  Poland 
Brűcker (DIW) and Boeri 
(2000) (labour migrants) 70,000, falling to 30,000 
 8 countries of Central/ 
Eastern Europe  
Brűcker (DIW) and Boeri 
(2000) (all migrants)  200,000, falling to 85,000
 8 countries of Cen-
tral/Eastern Europe 
Hille and Straubhaar (2000) 270,000–790,000  10 countries of Central/ Eastern Europe 
Sinn (IFO) (2001) 240,000–125,000  8 countries of Central/ Eastern Europe 
 
Although Norway is not a member of the EU, decisions taken by the EU 
have also had direct bearing on the potential migratory choices of people 
wanting to go there. On the one hand Norway as an EEA member is obliged 
to follow EU policy concerning migration and free movement of persons and 
workers; on the other hand, potential migrants seem opt for similar migra-
tory strategies with respect to Norway as with the EU area.  
As this study seeks to analyse how the political, social and economic 
processes underway in Europe over the past 15 years have contributed to 
modifying the migration patterns from Central and Eastern Europe to Nor-
way and how the strategies applied by individuals and groups from this re-
gion have resulted in changes in these patterns, in the following we will ana-
lyse these various strategies. The focus is on Central/Eastern Europe and 
Norway, but we will also look into the broader European framework that 
forms a natural part of the Norwegian migratory environment.  
Individual and group survival and adaptation strategies under 
transition  
In the introductory section of this report, ‘survival and adaptation strategies’ 
were defined as coping measures taken in response to the new challenges 
linked with the post-Communist transition in Central and Eastern Europe.76 
                                                     
75 Based on Oczki 2002. 
76 This definition does not differ greatly from that proposed by Russian socilogist T. 
Zaslavskaya, who in her fundamental work on the social transformation of Russia defined 
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Individuals and groups were faced with a deterioration of their social and 
economic position and had to tackle a new social and economic reality in or-
der to counter the negative developments and retain – and if possible im-
prove – their own position. 
In order to understand what impact these strategies have had on the 
emergence of the new patterns of migration in Europe – and between Cen-
tral/ Eastern Europe (CEE) and Norway – we need to shed light on the 
broader social context of transformation and see how people in this part of 
Europe responded to the new challenges.  
When the social, political and economic transition began in the CEE 
countries in the late 1980s, it was not the first time the local population was 
confronted with challenges. In fact, the whole Communist period of the his-
tory of the region was one of more or less acute permanent economic crisis, 
forcing the population to devise survival strategies for coping with what the 
Hungarian economist J. Kornayi aptly labelled an economy of shortage. 
Economic survival under the old Communist regime was a major point on 
the individual, family and group agenda of people living in the Soviet Bloc. 
Not only had they to live under a regime that restricted their political and in-
dividual freedoms; that same regime proved incapable of supplying even the 
most basic goods. Instead, a whole net of state-driven social security net-
works was established that provided the population with relatively low-
priced basic commodities, such as housing, public transport and a partially 
functional health care system. The result was a situation where people had to 
relate innovatively to a non-functioning market and to the networks that pro-
vided them with an illusion of social security – which in fact they themselves 
were financing, as the state took the lion’s share of their incomes. The popu-
lation became used to living in a state of a permanent shortage of goods and 
distrust towards the state structures and policies.  
Several studies conducted in the period of decline of the Communist 
power in Poland clearly showed the ways of life and strategies chosen by 
various groups in Polish society during what were to prove the final years of 
Communist rule in Poland. Although the studies referred to here describe 
Poland, the situation was similar elsewhere on the brink of collapse of the 
Communist system.  
R. Milic-Czerniak found that there were six main strategies of coping 
with the economic crisis (Milic-Czerniak 1989). She labelled them: con-
sumption stabilisation, innovation, ‘consumption under the protective um-
brella’, consumption objection, ritualism, and helpless discontent. To map 
the relations between these, Milic-Czerniak focused on the following set of 
variables: attitude to life, level, form and means of consumption, consump-
tion need and aspirations and socio-demographic features. 
This work was a part of a broader study of the strategies of adaptation to 
economic crisis in Poland in the early 1980s (Beskid 1989). The findings of 
this study are important for understanding survival strategies related to the 
economic, social and political transition of the 1990s, as the initial stage of 
transition had many features similar to the crisis of the early 1980s.  
                                                     
what she labelled ‘adaptive behaviour’ in the transforming society as the ‘search for new 
ways of social behaviour in response to the changing circumstances and rules of game’ 
(Zaslavskaya 2003, 451.   
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These ‘common features’ are described by the Beskid study as consider-
able fall in real income, disorientation of the purchasing power of income 
received, and change in the system of state-regulated sale. Moreover, access 
to consumer goods on the market changed, during the crisis and the transi-
tion – in the case of crisis, access was limited by the shortage of goods on 
the market, during the transition access was made easier due to the abun-
dance of goods on the market but was limited by lack of economic means. 
This contributed greatly to changing the behaviour of consumers, forcing 
them to devise new survival strategies or to adopt the strategies already in 
use concerning the emerging and quickly changing circumstances. 
Also a study of lifestyles in Polish cities on the verge of crisis edited by 
A. Sicinski has proven useful for our analysis of survival and adaptation 
strategies in the transition period (Sicinski 1988). Sicinski defines ‘lifestyle’ 
as a ‘set of everyday forms of behaviour specific to a given population or to 
an individual’ (Ibid., 383–4). His typology is partly based on Mitchell’s find-
ings from the USA (Mitchell 1983). Mitchell identified three main lifestyles 
in American society, with various ‘strategies’ for coping with life resulting 
from these three. The way a person chooses to behave in daily life – the life-
style adopted – is driven either by needs or by an interest in inner or in outer 
life; there is also a style in which these approaches are integrated. The result 
is a four-part classification of lifestyles: 
  
- Needs-driven:  Sustainers and Survivors 
- Inner-directed: Societally Conscious; Experientials; I-Am-Me 
- Outer-directed: Emulators; Belongers; Achievers; 
- Integrated 
 
This classification was an important source of inspiration for Sicinski, who 
proposed the concept of homo eligens, or the human being making choices 
(Sicinski 1988, 384–85.) He identified six main lifestyles, as well as many 
mixed styles in Poland on the verge of the crisis in the 1980s: 
 
 
1. Lifestyle in a situation of drastically limited choice opportunities 
2. Lifestyle consisting in avoidance of making choices. 
3. Lifestyle as a quest of a way of life. 
4. Lifestyle oriented to action as goal in itself. 
5. Lifestyle oriented towards conserving the results of one’s actions.  
6. Lifestyle oriented towards actions leading to change.  
(Ibid., 51–122.)  
  
The combination of Sicinski’s concept of homo eligens in his study of Polish 
society on the verge of crisis, Mitchell’s typology of lifestyles in a developed 
‘capitalist society’ (which was to some extent a model for the designers of 
transition in CEE) and Milic-Czerniak’s classification of survival and adap-
tation strategies in a time of drastic economic change will serve as point of 
departure for our general classification of the survival strategies devised and 
implemented in the transition period. Beskid and Sicinski describe and ana-
lyse the situation on the eve of transition, Mitchell’s analysis focuses on the 
situation in a model Western society – my aim here is to see what paths lead-
ing from the Communist period to the post-Communist period have been 
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chosen by groups and individuals faced with making a choice in a com-
pletely new situation. With the collapse of the Communist regime and the 
formal introduction of the rules of the free market and individual and group 
freedom of choice, homo eligens was confronted with a totally new situation 
– one in which choices could be made without risking confrontation with 
state, indeed now a liberal state that invited citizens to take their fate in their 
own hands. 
Although Sicinski’s conclusion in 1988 was that ‘Polish society stub-
bornly opposes the change of styles and ways of life’ (Sicinski 1988, 388), 
the dramatic shift in the political situation in the wake of the 4 June 1989 
election and the ensuing change in the economic and political system of Po-
land gave a boost to social and individual initiatives, changing not only the 
country but also many previously dominant styles and ways of life. Polish 
society was forced to devise new set of survival strategies for coping with 
the new challenges, and was also given more freedom to choose how to 
adapt to the new circumstances. Poland has been a ‘change leader’ in many 
respects, but similar responses to similar challenges can be found throughout 
Central and Eastern Europe.77 
Old and new survival strategies: General overview 
Survival and adaptation strategies are complex social phenomena. In her 
study on the transformation of Russian society, T. Zaslavakaya lists the vari-
ous strategies available to those who had to adapt to the quickly changing 
circumstances. Among these strategies we find: improving one’s qualifica-
tions by taking additional education, general improvement of professional 
qualifications to help one adapt to the new situation and find a new place in 
the new transformation context; changing of profession to meet the new 
challenge; taking additional/new jobs in addition to one’s main employment 
in order to improve one’s economic situation; organising own activity by es-
tablishing one’s own company or small business; revision of family eco-
nomic strategy by reducing expenses; resigning from services that must be 
paid for; greater focus on one’s own ability to produce food on family plots 
or weekend homes in the countryside (dachas); developing new family net-
works to facilitate adaptation to new circumstances, etc.78 Zaslavskaya also 
lists a number of factors that created the new context and could induce peo-
ple to choose new ways of coping: 
 
- The possibility to exploit the weakness of state structures and 
law enforcement agencies for illegal personal enrichment or ap-
propriation of economic assets (for instance, previously state-
owned companies);  
- Social resignation and withdrawal in confrontation with new 
problems, resulting in economic and social marginalisation and 
exclusion and even in direct physical degradation; 
                                                     
77 For more on the Russian case see for instance Zaslavskaya 2003, 164–165. 
78 A similar list of survival strategies can be found in Johnson, Kaufman and Ustenko 1997. 
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- The defence of the old system and opposition to the new emerg-
ing system, including economic sabotage, refusal to pay taxes 
etc; 
- Support for political opposition and attempts to reverse the 
course of reforms by protest actions and confrontation with new 
power structures that are seen as illegitimate by supporters of the 
old regime;  
- The loss of social status and identity, lumpen-proletarisation, al-
coholism other social problems, deviant behaviour etc; 
- Directly criminal behaviour.  
    
In order to map the strategies devised and used during the transition we need 
to take into consideration various aspects of strategy making. We have to 
ask: What is the main focus of the strategy? What is its main purpose? What 
is its social and geographical dimension, and its temporal scope? Are we 
dealing with a single act, or with something that is regularly repeated? Also 
the dominant pattern of the strategy should be taken into account – to what 
extent a strategy used by a given person is one freely and deliberately chosen 
by that person, or is imposed; to what extent a strategy involving more than 
one person is a win-win strategy – i.e. one that can yield positive results for 
all parties involved – and to what extent the strategy is a zero-sum game, 
where one’s win is another’s loss. Also the legal aspects should be explored 
– to what extent a chosen strategy is in compliance with existing legal regu-
lations, to what extent what is done falls with the ‘grey’ or ‘black’ legal 
zone, or is even a completely illegal action.  
My classification of strategies is based on the matrix below. I start with 
an overview of various components of strategies and showing how together 
they may result in specific social practices and actions. Then I present some 
predominant specific strategies of many transition societies and show how 
these can impact on the emergence of new patterns of migration. 
 
Figure 6. Strategy building blocks 
 
Dimensions of strategies 
As to the focus of the strategy applied, a survival and adaptation strategy is 
always chosen as a response to one or many challenges. When embarking on 
a strategy one chooses to address some crucial issues. Strategies are used for 
dealing with various aspects of daily life and when one decides to apply a 
Focus Social dimension Spatial Temporal Frequency Pattern 1 Pattern 2 Legal di-
mension 
Material assets Individual Local Hours Hourly 
Knowledge Family Region Days Daily 
Geographical space Local community Country Weeks Weekly 
Chosen Win-win Legal 
Social space Nation Sub-region Months Monthly 
Security Europe Europe Years Yearly 
 Global Global Lifetime Once in life 
Forced Zero-sum Illegal 
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strategy, it is with the expectation that one’s overall situation will improve or 
at least not deteriorate.  
In applying a given strategy the user will make use of the material assets 
available. For instance, an important survival strategy in the former Soviet 
Union and in today’s Russia is the use of dachas and small plots of land to 
ensure the necessary food supply and become less dependent on food from 
the money-driven markets. This dacha strategy is definitely an asset-based 
one, as successful implementation depends on having access to this specific 
material asset –a dacha or a plot of land. This strategy also has another as-
pect – by covering food needs through the use of the dacha, one can also be 
more successful in achieving goals of another asset-focused strategy – what 
is saved by consuming home-grown vegetables and other food also contrib-
utes to making the individual’s asset-accumulation strategy more viable as 
an option. In addition, one can try to sell some of the food produced and 
thereby even increase one’s material assets. The dacha can also be used for 
implementing a strategy of social self-promotion – it can serve as a social 
meeting place whereby one can strengthen ‘membership’ in a social net-
work, which might in turn provide better access to other assets or improve 
the chances of implementing other strategies.79 Or one could move into the 
dacha and rent out the flat in Moscow to foreigners, significantly improving 
the family economic situation. This extra income could be spent on private 
consumption, but it could also be reinvested in a new property, enabling the 
accumulating of even more assets.   
Asset-accumulation strategy is among the most important asset-centred 
strategies available. Accumulating material assets helps to provide protection 
against future economic threats. It may in the longer run be applied towards 
changing one’s social status, as the accumulated assets may help to ‘buy’ a 
new status, thereby serving as tool for climbing the social ladder.80 How one 
decides to accumulate material assets will be linked with the choice of strat-
egy. For instance, an individual may be employed in a private or a state-
owned company, but perhaps that person feels that his asset-accumulation 
strategy will be more successful if he changes status and starts his own com-
pany… or opts for the less-legal path of asset accumulation in the shadow or 
informal economy, or through completely illegal ways of money making. 
Strategy may also have a strong spatial component. Labour migration – 
both domestic and international – is a good example of a strategy that com-
bines asset-accumulation strategy – people choose to migrate because they 
are given a better opportunity to accumulate more assets – and a strategy 
with focus on movement in space. Also other migration-related strategies 
have, by their very nature, strong spatial components.  
Migratory strategies have much to do not only with spatial mobility but 
also with social mobility. When people migrate permanently, this means 
leaving their society, no longer being part of an accustomed social structure. 
In moving to another place, they must become part of a new social structure. 
                                                     
79 On the role of dacha in Russia see Lovell 2003.. 
80 This strategy may be successfully applied not only by those at the lower end of the social 
ladder in transition countries. We can for instance treat the Russian oligarch’s Roman 
Abramovich investment in Chelsea FC as a most obvious, clear and vulgar example of this 
strategy of using your material assets as a way of ‘buying’ your social status.   
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Their social situation is changed in a very definite way – there is great 
chance that the migrants may have a lower social status in the target country 
than in their ‘own’ society – although it may also prove possible to achieve 
positive change in status and climb up the social ladder. Or there can be a 
mixture – lower status in the target country, but the material assets accumu-
lated abroad can improve the migrants’ material and social status, should 
they decide to return to their original homeland.  
Knowledge strategies are widely used in transition countries as a way of 
improving chances in a quickly changing reality. In a situation when the 
whole social, economic, political and legal structure is undergoing deep 
transformation, those with an understanding of the emerging system can gain 
a substantial  ‘knowledge rent’ that could drastically improve their material 
and social situation. Familiarity with the Western way of doing business, 
with the principles and practices of the free market economy and a knowl-
edge of Western languages, first and foremost of English – these are impor-
tant assets that have catapulted many to central positions in the new society. 
Moreover, they can use this initial knowledge-based social and economic 
boost to acquire more new skills, making even them better prepared to meet 
challenges and further improve their position.   
The interest in getting a better knowledge basis is especially visible 
among the younger generation of Central and Eastern Europe.81 Throughout 
the region, various more and less serious educational institutions have blos-
somed. Some of these do give their students much better chances to survive 
in and adapt to the new society; others, however, simply represent the appli-
cation of another survival strategy – by those who have realised that the new 
quest for knowledge could give them a golden opportunity to earn extra 
money by offering seekers an often quite illusionary chance to learn more 
and adapt to the new rules. The educational sector has been among the fast-
est growing branches of the economy in many transition countries, and the 
number of persons with higher education has increased drastically despite 
the withdrawal of the state from this arena. Improved skills and qualifica-
tions are seen as major assets for success in the new situation – not least in 
terms of protection against the social and economic exclusion linked with the 
long-term unemployment that has become a major social plague in transition 
societies. In fact, improved professional skills are often a precondition, not 
merely for advancing up the ladder, but indeed of remaining employed.  
Employment and knowledge go hand in hand in the strategy of self-
employment. With the removal of ideologically justified restrictions on the 
private ownership of enterprises, and with the privatisation of much of the 
formerly state owned economy, this option has become increasingly rele-
vant. All the countries of the former Soviet Bloc have seen a blossoming of 
‘private initiative’ – a term previously synonymous with a rather suspect 
type of economic activity not fully controlled by the state.  
                                                     
81 In 1988, 6.5% of the population of Poland had tertiary or university level education; by 
2002 this figure had risen to 10.2%. There has been a similar increase in secondary and post-
secondary education as well – in 1988, 24.7% had completed secondary /post-secondary 
level; for 2002 the corresponding figure was 32.6% (GUS 2003). See Blöndal, Field and 
Girouard 2002 .on how education can contribute to improving chances in society.  
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In some countries, like Russia or Ukraine, this process has resulted in the 
creation of a new oligarchic economic and political system, with the clear 
underdevelopment of small and medium-sized business sector. Many of 
those who opted for the strategy of appropriating the formerly state-owned 
assets today top the lists of the wealthiest persons, not only in the former So-
viet Bloc, but also in their new countries of residence.82 This strategy of as-
set-accumulation, which combines a special type of knowledge with specific 
personal skills and the ability to establish the right political contacts, has 
proven rather successful – at least for those who are still in control of the as-
sets they grabbed so successfully during the heyday of Russian privatisation.  
In general, however, the strategy of self-employment has played a largely 
positive role. Millions of people chose to engage in independent economic 
activity when this possibility was opened to them, and this has contributed 
greatly to changing the economic and social landscape of Eastern and Cen-
tral Europe. The strategy has been mostly successful, despite the rather high 
turnover. According to a study on the creation of new businesses in Poland 
(Chmiel 1998), three periods could be distinguished in the early phase of 
transformation: 1991–92 saw a high rate of enterprise creation (35%–40%) 
and failure (20%–25%); then, between 1993 and 1994, the increase was rela-
tively lower and the failure rate reached 17%; and in the post-1995 period 
(until 1998) a new wave of business establishment rolled over the country 
(40% increase over the previous period) whereas the failure was very low, 
only 10%.  
Private farming is one area where this strategy became an option. During 
the Communist period, it was ideologically forbidden in almost all countries 
of the Soviet Bloc – with the exception of Poland, where almost 80% of ar-
able land was in private hands. Elsewhere, the creation of the state- and col-
lective-run system of kolkhozy and sovkhozy changed not only the social but 
also the cultural landscape of much of Europe.  
During the transition period, the remnants of this system have posed con-
siderable challenges to reformers, who have had to restructure the ineffective 
state-run farms while also coping with the grave social and economic prob-
lems  caused by the liquidation of this sector of the former Communist econ-
omy. The re-privatisation of agriculture has opened possibilities for self-
employment for those interested in returning to the countryside or in going 
from state-run farms to private ones. The strategy of self-employment in 
agriculture became thus a new approach available to those seeking to adapt 
to the new circumstances.83       
                                                     
82 In 2004, Roman Abramovich, one of the wealthiest Russian oligarchs, was declared the 
wealthiest person in the whole UK. Also other Russian tycoons occupy relatively high posi-
tions on the annual Forbes list of the 500 wealthiest persons of the world. For some of them, 
however, the coming to power of President Putin put an end to their new status – two of them, 
Boris Berezovskiy and Vladimir Gusinkiy were forced to leave Russia, while others, like 
Mikhail Khodorkovskiy and Platon Lebedev from Yukos, were accused of economic crimes 
and put behind bars.   
83 For an interesting account of this strategy see Majerová 1997.. In the early 1990s, less than 
0.5% of the Czech agricultural workforce were private farmers who had persisted through the 
period of forced collectivisation. Privatisation of the Czech economy after 1989 resulted in 
the restitution of land to the original owners, and by 1997 private farmers comprised about 
20% of the agricultural workforce. The return to private farming meant a major change in 
lifestyle for farming families – they gained more freedom, personal independence, and deci-
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Application of the strategy of self-employment is linked to the state-
driven employment policy. For instance, in Poland, where the additional cost 
of employment soared in the 1990s, self-employment was in way imposed 
on those who simply wanted to have a job – they were encouraged to create 
their own one-man businesses so both they and their employer could avoid 
the extra economic burden imposed by state. Confronted with the choice of 
getting work by creating their own firms or going jobless, many have opted 
for the first approach. It offers less social security, but can give financial 
compensation in the form of higher net income. 
The strategy of self-employment has made Poland a special case. Accord-
ing to a recent study on working conditions in the EU candidate countries, 
Poland had the highest level of self-employed workforce – 26% were self-
employed without employees and 7% were employed with employees. The 
average for all 12 candidate countries was 17% and 5%, while for the EU-15 
it was 11% and 5% respectively (Paoli and Parent-Thirion 2003, 18.). 
Another form of survival strategy based partly on self-help and self-
employment is the strategy of having a second job. According to the 
above-mentioned study (ibid., 20–21) this strategy is widely used in the tran-
sition countries: 10% of respondents in the 12 candidate countries reported 
that they had a second job (4% regular, 4% occasional and 1% seasonal) as 
against only 6% of respondents in the EU. The highest figures for second 
employment were found in Romania (12%), Estonia, Latvia and Poland 
(11% each). By contrast, 95% of the Bulgarian respondents said that they 
had no second job. 
Also the extension of working time may be used as a survival and adap-
tation strategy. Working longer yields higher pay, and the employer may see 
it as sign of loyalty to the firm, especially in critical periods. There is thus a 
higher economic reward as well as extra job security to be gained. The find-
ings of the Paoli and Parent-Thirion study seem to indicate that longer work 
is a widely used survival and adaptation strategy, especially in transition 
countries:  
 
An examination of the various aspects of working time in the acced-
ing and candidate countries leads to three main findings. Firstly, the 
results show that working hours are considerably longer than in the 
EU: workers in the acceding and candidate countries, particularly 
women, have longer working days and weeks. Secondly, part-time 
work is less widespread in the acceding and candidate countries 
than in the EU and is distributed equally between men and women. 
Finally, ‘atypical’ forms of work such as night work or shift work 
are more widespread. (Ibid., 46.) 
 
Although the main goal of survival and adaptation strategies is to achieve 
satisfactory economic security, we should look at other aspects as well when 
discussing how the various strategies have been devised and used. Because 
the transition also led to a transformation of the social structures in transition 
societies, it has been important for people to retain or improve their social 
                                                     
sion-making responsibility, but at the same time faced the harsh rules of the free market and 
had work hard at adapting to these new circumstances. 
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status. The material component of the strategy chosen – to obtain a satisfac-
tory level of economic security – has at times been seen only as in instru-
ment for achieving the social goals involved.  
In other instances, economic survival has been seen as the primary con-
cern. One example can be found in Poland’s Silesia and Zaglebie, where the 
restructuring of the coal industry led to a dramatic rise in unemployment and 
change in the social status of miners, who during the Communist period 
were often depicted as the elite of the working class. Although the state in-
vested huge sums in various restructuring programmes intended to help the 
local community, many families suffered financially. In this situation, many 
women found they had to take more active part in their families’ attempts to 
survive. One unexpected consequence was the blossoming of the local por-
nography industry in these parts of the country. According to a recent article 
in the leading Polish magazine Wprost,84 95% of all websites with erotic 
content were produced in the Siesian city of Dabrowa Górnicza by a Polish 
Of.pl company whose manager said that they had managed to undertake the 
most successful restructuring in Poland – they had replaced the old ineffec-
tive coal mining industry with a state-of-the-art erotic industry and given 
new job opportunities to a new, rather special group of job-seekers. As one 
of the women working in this new branch of the Silesian economy explained 
– ‘I began with this [live sex shows] because I cannot survive on the 600 
zloty I earned in the local supermarket’. 
Another way to cope with economic problems could be termed the strat-
egy of withdrawal and retirement. An individual faced with losing his job 
may be tempted to withdraw from the labour market, especially if the state – 
or more or less corrupt state employees – offers an alternative source of in-
come. A lower income can seem acceptable in return for more long-term so-
cial security and retention of social status. Especially in a country like Po-
land, where there is a dramatic shortage of labour and almost permanent high 
unemployment, this strategy of trading labour for social pensions seems 
to have attracted many. A very high proportion of people of labour-active 
age are living on state budget-financed retirement pensions, social pensions 
and social benefits. In 2003 there were 25.9 million persons in productive 
age living in Poland – 13.3 million of them were employed or self-
employed, 9.3 were inactive, 3.3 million were unemployed and 4.7 million 
were receiving retirement benefits. A mere 51.3% of population of labour-
active age (16–65 years) were active on the labour market (only Turkey and 
Bulgaria had lower levels of labour activity in Europe), while 35.8% of 
population of normal working age were inactive – 40% of these received ei-
ther pensions resulting from work disability or early retirement benefits. 
Some 3 million persons – or 12% of the population of working age – re-
ceived pensions resulting from inability to work; this cost the budget almost 
5% of the country’s GDP. Poland had in 2003 almost twice as many recipi-
ents of health-related pensions than the OECD average (132 per 1000 of 
working age in Poland as against 63 per 1000 in the OECD). For 4.5 million 
Poles, various types of social transfers (pensions resulting from work disabil-
ity, pre-retirement benefits) were the sole official source of income. 
                                                     
84 ‘Różowe zagłębie’, Wprost, Nr 1114 (04 April  2004). 
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 The strategy of withdrawal from the labour market seems to be success-
ful – in 1990 there were 7.1 million retirees and pensioners in Poland; by 
2000 their number had grown to 9.4 million, falling slightly to 9.3 million in 
2001. Many analysts feel that this development is mainly due to a rather lib-
eral, and partly corrupt, system of decision-making as to who ‘deserves’ 
state support during the period of transition. Certainly, from the viewpoint of 
those who are interested in this type of strategy, the flexibility of the state 
system has been a positive feature.  
Another important question in connection with strategy options is to what 
extent adopting a strategy is a purely individual decision. Many strategies 
will have an impact on the nuclear and the extended family, indeed even the 
entire local community – as with the strategy of chain migration.85 The 
choice of strategy by the few may also influence the situation of the whole 
nation – the fact that some Russian young businessmen decided to take part 
in a rather dubious privatisation process and then supported President Yel-
tsin’s bid for a second term is said to have put an effective end to the Com-
munists’ dream of rebuilding the USSR. When thousands or even millions of 
individual Polish small business-owners in the early 1990s decided to en-
gage in the market economy, this created conditions for the bitter success of 
Polish economic reforms. In an historical perspective, some survival strate-
gies – like the earlier strategy of mass migration from poverty-torn Europe to 
the New World – have had wide-ranging effects, as the emergence of a USA 
‘built’ by those 19th and 20th-century migrants changed the political map of 
the whole world.  
Strategies have also a clear spatial dimension. A strategy may be imple-
mented with one’s local community, or it may have a much broader geo-
graphical scope. If, for example, you happen to live in Kaliningrad and are 
offered a job with better pay in Khabarovsk, that will mean moving eastward 
over 11 time zones, but you will stay within the borders of the same country, 
Russia. If you, however, live in Murmansk and are offered a job in the Nor-
wegian fishing industry in neighbouring Finnmark county, that will mean 
moving some 200 km – but it will involve crossing an international border, 
so you will have to apply to the Norwegian authorities for a special work 
permit issued to Russian citizens living in the Barents region. Or, if you are a 
Ukrainian professor of mathematics and your colleagues in Norway inform 
you that there is position available at one of Norway’s educational institu-
tions, you may decide to leave your country and move to another part of 
Europe, whether for a limited period or permanently. This strategy will in-
volve crossing many state borders in a legal way, and legal employment in 
the target country. If you, however, are a Ukrainian carpenter who wants to 
earn some money during a summer ‘visit’ to Norway, you may decide to 
cross those same borders legally, but the work done in Norway will be clas-
sified as illegal, unless you have managed to get from the Norwegian au-
thorities a special work permit for ‘foreign specialists’.   
Especially during the early phase of transition, many chose the strategy of 
building direct economic contacts in the countries that offered goods not 
                                                     
85 On such migration strategies, see for example Jazwinska and Okólski 1996, Osipowicz 
2002.  
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available in the former Communist realm. Stories abound of, for instance, 
Polish trade tourists who went to India to sell Polish-produced goods; in re-
turn they bought Indian-made textiles which they could sell with some profit 
in Poland. Others went to Singapore in the late 1980s and early 1990s to buy 
computer hard disks and other components; these were then assembled in 
Poland and sold as computers at a rather high profit. Many of those who par-
ticipated in this primitive trade and established direct contacts with Asian 
partners later embarked on a more efficient strategy of creating their own 
trading companies, or even big Polish computer firms.  
Strategies can have two temporal dimensions. Realisation of some strate-
gies may take only some hours or days, or months, but a decision on perma-
nent migration to another country or taking a job in other company may have 
consequences that will last for years or even for the rest a lifetime. A further 
temporal aspect of strategies is the degree of frequency or repetition. Some 
strategies can be applied only once – like a traditional nuptial strategy, 
where the expectation is a life-long arrangement; or the strategy of selling 
body parts, where physical limitations mean no possibility to repeat the 
strategy. Other strategies may involve a high degree of frequency, as with 
having a second job, or smuggling small amounts of goods across the border 
– which may even be repeated many times a day.  
For a drug smuggler who employs a criminal survival strategy, involv-
ing border crossing, the whole ‘action’ may take some days to complete, but 
the tensest time centres on the few minutes when the smuggler has to cross 
the border, and it is paramount to avoid control and detection.86 In the case 
of a Russian woman using a strategy of body selling who visits Northern 
Norway to sell sex on a regular basis, perhaps every month, there are two 
temporal components. First there is the trip from Murmansk to Skipagurra, 
Tana, Vardø, Vadsø, Kirkenes, Lakselv, Alta – all of these being Norwegian 
localities where the sex traffic from Russia had become a social and political 
problem in the late 1990s. This takes some hours. Then she stays for a while 
in Norway and returns to Murmansk with small amount of money that will 
help her survive until the next trip. This can be described as strategy that 
lasts for some days but has a certain pattern of repetitiveness.87  
                                                     
86 For more on how this strategy is used in Poland see ‘Kurierzy białej śmierci’, Wprost Nr 
1041 (10 November 2002). According to this article more than 20,000 Polish citizens are in-
volved in drug smuggling and trafficking on the global basis. In 2003 there were 334 Polish 
citizens imprisoned in connection with drug-related crimes – 55 of them were behind bars in 
Latin America alone. Poles are believed to cooperate with all major international narco-
syndicates, including the Colombian drug producers, Peruvian producers of cocaine, Nigerian 
mobsters and South-East Asian criminal organisations.  
87 The issue of trans-border prostitution was a hectic topic in Norway, especially in the late 
1990s, when many local organisations tried to put an end to this practice. Between 1992 and 
2003, 150 articles on the issue of prostitution from Murmansk were published in the major 
Norwegian newspapers and magazines, showing the scope of the problem. A typical presenta-
tion of this problem can be found at www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/article471363.ece. 
However, the strategy of body selling as a response to challenges of transition is definitely not 
limited to the Norwegian–Russian neighbourhood. The blossoming of various forms of sex 
industry and prostitution, including child prostitution, in the transition countries and in border 
areas indicates the widespread use of this strategy for overcoming economic and welfare gaps. 
The case of the Czech border town of Cheb is one example of a situation out of control. A 
simple Google search on ‘Cheb’ and ‘prostitution’ returns more than 7,000 entries. 
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For a Polish seasonal worker who spends 5 or 6 months in Norway every 
year and helps a Norwegian farm owner, who also has a second job, to run 
his farm, the strategy has also a very special temporal pattern. He is away 
from his family for 5 or 6 months at a time and this pattern is repeated every 
year during the agricultural season.  
A Polish or a Russian woman who plans to marry a Norwegian man (and 
there have been of them in recent years) expects that this nuptial strategy 
will change her situation for the rest of her life. It is not unlikely that she will 
also intend to go through the whole process only once, making this strategy a 
strategy with the law grade of repetitiveness but with long temporal perspec-
tive. For a women from a transition country who deliberately embarks on 
this nuptial strategy, there is another important time framework: only if she 
stays married to a Norwegian for more than three years will she automati-
cally be allowed to stay in Norway for the rest of her life. Otherwise she may 
be forced to leave the country, or at least undergo a humiliating procedure 
and prove that she was the victim of domestic violence or sexual harassment 
while married to her Norwegian husband.88       
To take another example: A Moldovan man who plans to sell one of his 
kidneys to a rich ‘customer’ in Israel or in the USA in order to earn some 
needed cash knows from the very beginning that there can be no repetition of 
this strategy because he needs the second kidney himself in order to survive. 
This drastic body-part selling strategy89 has an international character and 
a low grade of repetition for the organ donor (although there may be repeti-
tion for those who act as intermediaries, for whom such involvement is a 
criminal survival strategy). Trafficking in human body parts is a horrifying 
example of survival strategies where the individual puts his or her life at 
risk. It is difficult to indicate the size of this market, but many examples 
show that this strategy has been applied by individuals and groups from Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe. Perhaps the best-known example is the case of the 
‘Moldovan mafia’ that operated in the USA and Israel. Application of this 
strategy is facilitated by a set of push and pull factors described by Pratt 
(2004) in the following way: ‘The desperate need for organs, the miracles of 
modern surgery, and the total immorality of the criminal elements, create 
strange bedfellows in our globalized world’ (ibid., 68).  
Pattern is another important aspect of strategy implementation. Some 
strategies are based on a win–win principle, where all parties involved bene-
fit; others have a more predatory character and can be more rightly seen as a 
zero-sum game. A clear example a win–win strategy is a mutually beneficial 
strategy of care-taking involving elderly people and their families in Italy 
or Spain, and illegal labour migrants from Ukraine; while a good example of 
predatory, criminal zero-sum game strategy is the strategy of human traf-
fickers who deceive young women and sell them dreams.  
                                                     
88 A typical journalistic depiction of the nuptial strategy can be found for instance in ‘Betaler 
2000 dollar for en norsk ektemann’, Dagbladet, 05 December 1999. For more on this strategy 
in the broader European context see the findings presented at EUROFOR Annual Conference 
in Berlin in December 2003, where a workshop on Marriage as Immigration Gate was organ-
ised. The text of the summary of the workshop can be found at: http://www.emz-
berlin.de/projekte_e/pj44_pdf/HeiratWorkshopReader.pdf  
89 For more on this see Pratt 2004. 
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The trafficking strategy illustrates another dimension: a strategy may be 
forced on a person by the circumstances. What you believed was a strategy 
of your own choosing, may prove to be a disastrous strategy forced upon 
you. Nothing illustrates this dilemma better then the situation of thousands 
of young East European women who are recruited each year to work in ‘ho-
tels’ and ‘restaurants’ but then – and mostly against their will – fall victims 
to international human trafficking networks and end up as forced labour 
and semi-slave workers in the international sex industry.90   
A strategy can be interpreted in various ways, depending on who is look-
ing at it. Human trafficking and smuggling is a growing business with many 
faces involving two parties, the trafficker or the chain of traffickers (and the 
profiteers) and the trafficked (often the immediate victim, but also in some 
cases the future beneficiary of the post-trafficking situation).91 Human traf-
ficking and smuggling are clearly illegal, criminal activities, but there are 
varying degrees. We see a whole range of trafficking-like activities – from 
smuggling of trafficked women who are forced to work against their will in 
the international sex industry; through the professional smuggling of mi-
grants who are willing to pay criminal networks that specialise in this sort of 
illegal activity in order to get people to what they want to believe is a Prom-
ised Land; to the illegal smuggling of relatives by those who have already 
established themselves in the Promised Land and want their families to join 
them. Trafficking is also an example of a two-sided strategy adopted by both 
those who do the trafficking for profit and those who choose a trafficking 
strategy in order to improve their own lives. In all its forms, trafficking is an 
illegal and criminal activity. This raises another question that must be ad-
dressed in discussing survival strategies: their legality vs. illegality.92 
Due to the changing role of the state and state law-enforcement agencies, 
and the general restructuring of society, lifestyles and value systems, as 
Zaslavskaya (2003) rightly points out, the process of transition may facilitate 
the growth of purely criminal behaviour. Illegal activity may thus become a 
widely used criminal survival and adaptation strategy, especially in 
societies that have experienced a ‘social value earthquake’, with the com-
plete remaking of the socially accepted system of values and norms. There 
are two main forms of the criminalisation of transition society – the growth 
of organised crime, where corrupt state structures may interact or even 
partly overlap with new criminal structures greedily eying high profits; and 
the growth of the mainly needs-driven strategy of petty crime, where 
individuals see the criminal way as their only chance of surviving, or at least 
as the easiest way to realise their own asset-accumulation strategy. The 
growth of criminal networks in Eastern Europe and the export of their 
activities to the West demonstrate the broad appeal of this way of tackling 
transition. Especially in Russia, the growth of organised crime has become a 
                                                     
90 On the various aspects of trafficking see Koser 2000, Pratt 2004, Salt 2000, Salt and Stein 
1997, Thompson 2000, Van Impe 2000. 
91 Poland, located between the main EU countries and the unstable former Soviet Union, has 
become an area through which many migrants are smuggled to the West. On the Polish di-
mension of this smuggling business see Glabicka 1999. and Okólski 1999a.. On the Russian 
dimension of human smuggling see Tyuryukanova and Yerokhina 2002.  
92 Good insight into this topic, with many personal stories of the victims of trafficking, can be 
found in Trafficking in Persons Report 2003. 
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cially in Russia, the growth of organised crime has become a huge social, 
political and even security challenge; the Russian mafia has not only estab-
lished itself as an important player in Russia but has also become involved in 
the global criminal game.93 
Also petty crime strategy may pose challenges to state and international 
bodies. When borders between areas with deep economic welfare gaps are 
practically open and criminals can cross them at will, petty criminals from 
CEE can operate unhindered, from the Atlantic in the west to the Bug River 
in the east. The problem of Polish car thieves in Germany is well known, but 
they form only the tip of a criminal iceberg with roots in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Even a marginal country like Norway can fall victim to their activi-
ties. In Norway Polish criminal gangs specialised in raids against local 
watchmakers – between December 1999 and March 2000 gangsters from the 
Polish city Krosno Odrzanske managed to steal hundreds of many expensive 
watches from various Norwegian shops. According to international police 
sources, similar commando-like raids against watchmakers have been organ-
ised in other European countries by the same group and by another one from 
Koszalin. Danish police sources have estimated the damage done by these 
gangs at $100 million for all Europe.94 According to Norwegian newspapers, 
the raids were organised by unemployed youth from Krosno Odrzanske and 
the Norwegian police managed to put an end to this activity by arresting the 
leading figures from this small criminal milieu. 
It is possible that these petty criminals belonged to the ‘Juma subculture’. 
This specific transition and transborder phenomenon has been analysed by a 
Polish sociologist. In 1990, Jacek Kurzępa from the University in Zielona 
Gora published an interesting book on this topic.95 The Juma subculture de-
veloped on the Polish side of the Polish–German border; its main feature is 
the transborder private and criminal redistribution of goods caused by feel-
ings of material deprivation on the part of young Poles living in areas with 
high welfare gaps. In other words, Polish youth from the Polish part of the 
region developed a subculture where it was not only acceptable but even re-
spectable to organise criminal raids to steal goods from German shops and 
sell them – or give them as presents – on the Polish side of the border. Those 
who were most impudent and most successful in shoplifting enjoyed special 
respect, were seen as local heroes and even developed a kind of professional 
pride. This subculture was a local variant of a survival strategy in conditions 
of material deprivation in areas marked by deep welfare gaps, and is another 
example of a perverted adaptation with a clear international impact and 
criminal pattern.  
When defining survival and adaptation strategies in terms of their legality 
or illegality, we must bear in mind that there is a whole spectrum of strate-
gies. At the one end we find various completely legal strategies implemented 
                                                     
93 For more on the growth of the Russian mob and its activities in Russia and abroad see An 
Analysis of the Russian Emigré Crime in Tri-State Region 1996, Dunn 1996, Humphrey 
2002, Rawlinson 1996, Salt and Stein 1997, Williams 1996.  
94 For details see: http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/article.jhtml?articleID=477874 
95 For details on this phenomenon see http://www.uz.zgora.pl/wydawnictwo/miesiecznik12-
2001/15.pdf and a longer article in Gazeta Wyborcza published on 11 October 2002 and 
available at http://serwisy.gazeta.pl/metroon/1,0,1062359.html.  
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by law-obeying citizens; at the other end of the spectrum are vicious repre-
sentatives of the criminal underworld. And in-between, there are the thou-
sands and millions of individuals who decide to live and act in the grey or 
black legal zone – shadow people, who realise their strategies mostly in the 
shadow, informal and thus illegal sector of the economy also described as 
the ‘non-observed economy’. Hiding in this non-observed economy is a sur-
vival strategy adopted by many, both in their own countries and abroad, for 
instance when they travel to other countries and enter the illegal labour mar-
ket or engage in other illegal activities.  
A recent OECD analysis (Blades and Roberts 2002) gives a good under-
standing of the main features of this social, economic and political pheno-
menon and of its transition dimension. The non-observed economy is multi-
dimensional – the authors define it as having four dimensions: activities car-
ried out clandestinely to avoid paying taxes or social charges or to avoid the 
costs associated with legislation on safe working conditions or protection of 
consumer rights, often referred to as ‘underground’ or ‘hidden’ economy; 
certain kinds of illegal activities, in transition countries mostly production 
and trade in narcotics, prostitution, production and trade in counterfeit goods 
(audio/video products, fashion goods and watches)  and fencing of stolen 
vehicles, which may represent as much as 1% of the country’s GDP; the pro-
duction of goods for own use, usually perfectly legal, such as construction 
and maintenance of dwellings or growing one’s own food in transition eco-
nomies where following the collapse of Communism small scale crop pro-
duction became an essential survival strategy and accounted for up to half of 
total agricultural output in some countries [our ‘dacha strategy’]; and finally 
the ‘statistical underground’ (ibid p.4). The study also lists the sectors of the 
economy, such as home repairs, retail trade, taxis, trucking, cafés and restau-
rants, where it is easiest to apply shadowy survival strategies.     
In discussing illegal survival strategies, we should not forget one that is 
perhaps not specifically transitional, but which seems to overshadow devel-
opments in many transition countries. Corruption has become a central is-
sue in the whole region.96 In discussing the differentiation of the transition 
area in previous sections of this report, we indicated that the level of corrup-
tion in transition economies was generally rather high, but with local differ-
ences. Examining corruption as a survival strategy, we should look not only 
at the spread of this negative phenomenon, but also at its social nature. After 
all, corruption can be counted among the survival strategies focusing on as-
set accumulation. J.C. Andvig has provided the following definitions of cor-
ruption and embezzlement: 
  
An act is corrupt if a member of an organisation uses his/her posi-
tion, his/her rights to make decisions, access to information, or some 
other of the resources of the organisation, to the advantage of a 
third party and thereby receives money or other economically valu-
able goods or services in ways that either are illegal or against the 
                                                     
96 For more on corruption in general and in the transition context see Hellman, Jones and 
Kaufmann 2000, Humphrey 2002, Kaminski and Kaminski 2001, Makarychev 2000, Wei 
2001.. Also Andvig 2002, Andvig 2003, Miller, Grødeland and Koshechkina 2001. give inter-
esting analysis of this phenomenon in the transition countries.  
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organisation’s own aims or rules. An act represents embezzlement if 
a member of an organisation uses his/her rights to make decisions, 
access to information or some of the other resources of the organi-
sation to his/her own economic advantage, eventually to the advan-
tage of some other members of the organisation, in ways that are ei-
ther illegal or against the organisation’s own aims or rules.( Andvig 
2003, 7) 
 
That corruption is seen as more widespread in the transition societies than 
under the Communist rule seems clear. A study covering twelve transition 
countries (referred to in Andvig 2002, 9) found that more than half of those 
surveyed felt that corruption had become a more acute problem after the fall 
of Communism (from 52% in Poland to 87% in Ukraine). In a survival strat-
egy context, corruption poses at least two challenges – for the one who is be-
ing corrupted the most important issue is to not be caught; for all others, the 
issue is how to corrupt him or her in order to achieve own goals, how to 
make corruption an effective tool of one’s own survival strategy or how to 
reject corruption – without doing too much damage to one’s own interests.97     
Living in a corrupt state where important decisions impacting on your life 
are taken by often corrupt state functionaries may add to the feeling of inse-
curity, making security-centred survival strategies relevant. How you per-
ceive your security depends on many economic, social and political factors. 
After all, transition and transformation, due to their very nature, change peo-
ple’s economic, social and political environment, and their perception of se-
curity – or insecurity – may change drastically. The demise of Communism 
compelled many to try other ways of dealing with daily challenges. Embark-
ing on a new path, choosing a new strategy of coping with the daily chal-
lenges, changing your lifestyle – all these imply changing the nature of your 
interaction with others, and that you must learn how to interact with new 
emerging institutions and structures. These challenges, attractive as they may 
also be, are also a source of potential insecurity. 
One of the best-known individual cases involving a security-centred 
strategy is the ‘Konanykhin case’. Aleksander Konanykhin built a business 
empire in Russia in the early 1990s. By age 25, he was a multi-millionaire. 
Then, as he relates the story, the former KGB officers whom he had hired to 
help run his businesses decided to muscle him out and take over. In 1992 he 
was forced to leave Russia and arrived, via Hungary, in New York, where he 
applied for political asylum on the grounds that he had been persecuted in 
Russia. He was granted asylum in the USA in 1999, but the court decision 
was later changed when the Russian authorities accused him of embezzle-
ment and demanded his extradition. A new decision was made; when he was 
to be sent back to Russia he decided to flee to Canada and apply for asylum 
there. He and his wife were arrested in trying to cross the US–Canadian bor-
der. Then, on 27 January 2004, the US Department of Justice reversed its 
                                                     
97 For more on how the corruption functions in practice the transition context see Grødeland, 
Koshechkina and Miller 1998, Miller, Grødeland and Koshechkina 2001.. 
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decision to deport him to Russia, and said it would reopen hearings into his 
political asylum case.98  
Strategies, transition and migration 
The Konanykhin case is mentioned here first and foremost because it is a 
well documented and relatively well-known case that clearly demonstrates 
the link between individual and group survival strategies and migration. That 
he decided to leave Russia and apply for asylum in the USA re-established a 
pattern in East–West migration that many had thought was no longer rele-
vant after the collapse of the Communist system in Eastern Europe.  
During the Cold War period the asylum strategy99 was the most effec-
tive of all available migration strategies that could be applied by citizens of 
the then Soviet Bloc who wanted to settle in the West. This was mainly due 
to the ideological competition between the two rival political blocs, as each 
case of an East European citizen seeking asylum in the West was seen as a 
minor ideological victory, especially since there were few political migrants 
moving in the opposite direction.  
During the Communist period those who wanted to leave their countries 
could do it in various ways. Many applied for a passport to go abroad on a 
short tourist trip and then to ‘choose freedom’ – i.e. not to return to the East, 
but stay in the West. As the West was keen to prove its superiority, those 
who voted with their feet for the West were generally welcomed. They were 
allowed to settle in the West and could start a new life there. The strategy of 
seeking asylum thus became a central strategy used by Easterners wanting 
to settle permanently in the West. They were in fact forced to settle perma-
nently in the West by the Communist regime policy that treated their choice 
as an ideological betrayal and punished them if they returned. They were en-
couraged by the Western authorities, who almost automatically granted pro-
tection to this group, if only to underline the superiority of their own politi-
cal system.  
Also other migration strategies were available to those wanting to leave 
the Central and Eastern Europe. The playing of the ethnic card allowed 
millions of Central and East European citizens to settle in the West. Espe-
cially two ethnic groups had access to this strategy. There were the East 
European citizens of Jewish descent and their families who were allowed – 
or forced, as in Poland in 1968 – to leave for Israel or other Western coun-
tries.100 And secondly, there were millions of ethnic Germans – or persons 
defined by the West German authorities as belonging to the German historic 
nation (those born in territories that had belonged to Germany before 1938 
and their descendents, and those who could document that they were persons 
of German descent living in the Soviet Bloc) – who were allowed to migrate 
                                                     
98 For more details on this special and interesting case as it is presented by Konanykhin him-
self  see http://konanykhin.com/. 
99 On the historical dimension of asylum-seeking as a strategy see Hovy 1993.. For more on 
asylum in the EU context, see Havinga and Böcker 1997. 
100  For more on the Jewish migration see Dietz, Lebok and Polian 2002; Stola 2000; and 
Polian 2003. 
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to West Germany.101 Also many thousands of Bulgarian citizens of Turkish 
descent were allowed – or rather forced – to leave Bulgaria for Turkey dur-
ing the Communist period. These two circumstances contributed greatly to 
the establishment of Central and Eastern European diasporas and communi-
ties in the West.102Also during transition, the ethnic card was played by 
those who wanted to get legal access to the Western – first and foremost 
German – labour market but who were not yet eligible according to EU 
rules. Among other migrants who played this ethnic card were millions of 
Russians returning to Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union.103 Also 
representatives of the Roma community tried to play this card – often in 
combination with the asylum strategy – seeking protection against what was 
presented as ethnically motivated persecution.  
In 1997 the West had to cope with migratory pressures from the Czech 
Roma community. By the end of 1997 more than 1200 Czech Roma had ap-
plied for asylum in Canada, and 800 in the United Kingdom and France. The 
Czech authorities portrayed them as merely economic migrants, but the 
overall situation was very embarrassing for a country that liked to portrait 
itself as the champion of economic and political reforms in the whole region. 
According to some sources, the Roma migration of 1997 was triggered by a 
screening in Czech TV of a Canadian documentary on the favourable situa-
tion of minorities in Canada.  
A similar strategy was also applied by Roma in Slovakia, and this was to 
have consequences for relations between Slovakia, which was at the time 
seeking EU and NATO membership, and some Western countries. The UK, 
Ireland and Finland decided to reintroduce visa requirements for Slovak citi-
zens because of the inflow of Slovak Roma seeking protection against what 
they presented to the Western authorities as persecution in Slovakia. No mat-
ter whether this choice of migratory strategy by Central European Roma was 
triggered by economic or social push factors in the Czech Republic and Slo-
vakia, and/or economic and social pull factors in the West, these two stories 
illustrate how migratory movements can be seen as a survival strategy.104 
The strategy applied by Roma combined elements of the ethnic and the 
asylum-seeking strategy. However, this group was not the only one to try the 
asylum strategy even under the new circumstances. We have already indi-
cated the link between political regime and the increase in asylum-seekers 
from Russia. This was, however, a rather special case, as the outbreak of a 
violent conflict prompted many to seek protection in the West. With the 
                                                     
101 On the German migration from Central and Eastern Europe and its determinants see Dietz 
2002, Nemetskoe naselenie v poststalinskom SSSR, v stranakh SNG i Baltii (1956-2000 gg.): 
Materialy 9-i mezhdunarodnoi nauchnoi konferentsii 2003, Pallaske 2001.. On the German 
concept of nation as an important factor influencing migration policy see Brubaker 1992.. 
102 For a good overview of the main trends in migration between the transition countries and 
the West based on statistics from the sending and receiving countries, see International Migra-
tion from Countries with Economies in Transition: 1980–1999 2002.. On the size of migrant 
communities from transition countries in Europe see Münz and Fassmann 2004.. 
103 On this movement see Heleniak 2004. 
104 For more on the social, political and economic background for Roma migration see 
Avoiding the Dependency Trap – A Human Development Report on the Roma Minority in 
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opening of the borders also other strategies with an asylum component were 
applied by those wanting to settle in the West.  
Statistics on the flows of asylum-seekers from the Central and Eastern 
European countries to Norway in the 1990s (Table 10) indicate a pattern – 
citizens of some countries were seemingly more prone to apply for asylum in 
Norway in a rather selective way when it came to the time schedule for their 
applications.  
 
Table 10. Asylum-seeker flows to Norway: transition countries 1994–
2003 
 
Rapid growth in the number of asylum applications filed by citizens of one 
and the same country in a short period of time – like a single year – and in a 
situation where no visible change can be noted, may indicate a modified asy-
lum strategy. The filing of an asylum application can be thus interpreted not 
as a move meant to secure personal security of the applicant, but rather as an 
attempt to open a migratory gate with the help of what the applicant may be-
lieve is the only migratory strategy available.105 We cannot rule out  that 
such a strategy may have become part of a growing asylum-selling business 
that results in ‘asylum tourism’, where some groups sell ‘asylum packages’ 
to those who want to move to another country.106  
                                                     
105 For an interesting analysis of how information is spread among asylum-seekers see Koser 
and Pinkerton 2002.  
106 Good insight in how these groups may operate is provided by information found on a web 
server in Russia. One of the areas of the activity of the Moscow-based company Advokat 
Servis is namely the selling of the ‘asylum packages’ to various Western countries, including 
Norway. More on this activity and professionalisation of the asylum strategy and the way they 
‘sell’ Norway can be found at http://www.advokat-service.ru/old/no.htm  . The Norwegian 
authorities’ reaction to many cases of what was widely seen as organised asylum traffic – like 
the rapid growth in the number of asylum-seekers from Mongolia in 2001 and 2002, the Bul-
garian asylum-seekers in 2001 and 2002 and the Ukrainian asylum-seekers in 2001 and 2002 
– was to try to find out who organised this traffic. Both Bulgariana and Ukrainian authorities 
Country 1994 95 96 97 98 99 2000 01 02 03 
Armenia 6 4 0 2 31 124 65 175 163 41 
Azerbaijan 0 0 2 2 13 39 35 100 145 142 
Bulgaria 2 6 5 9 14 6 12 950 359 110 
Georgia 4 1 1 5 4 69 70 205 284 177 
Belarus  1 1 1 7 10 75 139 330 395 269 
Lithuania  15 28 7 24 29 58 145 91 42 36 
Moldova 10 4 0 2 8 48 62 68 81 96 
Poland 72 8 209 19 2 2 68 39 51 36 
Romania 46 10 8 19 77 153 712 203 247 206 
Russia 75 69 50 39 141 318 471 1,318 1,718 1,893 
Slovakia 0 3 3 1 1 233 507 187 324 82 
Czech Re-
public  
8 2 1 0 4 13 25 440 186 128 
Ukraine 3 15 8 8 13 34 131 1027 772 92 
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Although travelling to the West was not easy during the Communist pe-
riod, some individuals from the Soviet Bloc countries still managed to get to 
the West and even work there, whether legally or illegally. This was espe-
cially the case of the citizens of these CEE countries that at some stage intro-
duced less restrictive travel regulations, first and foremost Poland and to a 
lesser degree of Hungary. Once the CEE countries got rid of their Commu-
nist systems, the local authorities removed most travel restrictions, declaring 
that they were now building a democratic system. In return, the West gener-
ally welcomed this decision and opened its borders by removing visa re-
quirements, especially in relations with those countries that embarked on the 
policy of quick institutional, economic and political Westernisation.107 The 
immediate consequence of the introduction of democracy was that the perse-
cution of dissidents and various opposition groups working against the old 
regime ceased, thereby rendering the classic asylum strategy irrelevant in the 
migratory exchange between the former Soviet Bloc and the West.108 Also 
the ethnic strategy became less attractive, as many of those who wanted to 
leave had already done so before the fall of Communism; those who were 
still in the East could now hope for a better life there and were less inclined 
to leave for the West.     
However, the political and ideological factors that once prompted people 
to seek better life opportunities and protection in the West have now been 
replaced by a whole spectrum of economic, social and to a certain extent po-
litical challenges that could make them interested in moving to the West.109 
People could decide to leave not because they were politically persecuted 
(though some certainly have been), but because the hardships of transition 
were making life more difficult than under the oppressive political system of 
Communist rule. Especially after de-Stalinisation, politically motivated per-
secution was a measure applied to only small marginal groups, whereas the 
great majority in society could enjoy what even today is referred to as the 
time of ‘small stabilisation’. The system was still oppressive, but in general 
terms there were few who were really persecuted. With the transition almost 
everything changed – and not always to the better. In fact, it was not even 
the direction of the change – to the worse or to the better – that mattered: the 
change itself became the main challenge.  
If the situation becomes unbearable and you feel threatened, you may de-
cide to change your environment totally, to leave your community and try 
your chances somewhere else. A strategy with a migratory component may 
                                                     
promised co-operation in solving this problem, but it seems that no one was legally punished 
for devising and applying this modified asylum strategy.  
107 On the link between transition and migration in Central and Eastern Europe and impact it 
had on the EU policy in this area see International Migration from Countries with Economies 
in Transition: 1980–1999 2002, Migration Policies and EU Enlargement: the Case of Central 
and Eastern Europe 2001, Transformation and Migration in Central and Eastern Europe. Final 
Project Report 2002.. 
108 The success of the asylum strategy hinges on the asylum policy of the receiving countries, 
and this policy has been changed to correspond better with the new circumstances. More on 
various choices of asylum policy see Schuster 2000. 
109 On the early phase of the debate on link between migration and transition see The New 
Europe and International Migration; Special Issue 1992. and International Migration in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States 1995.. 
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appear tempting in a situation when your social, economic and political envi-
ronment undergoes drastic change. If, in addition, the transition makes it eas-
ier to move by removing almost all institutional obstacles and barriers to free 
movement of people, many will try to see for themselves whether the grass 
is really greener on the other side of the fence. Some of those who choose to 
travel may decide that they will have better chances of improving their lives 
by staying ‘out there’ a bit longer than originally planned.  
The new situation opened also new possibilities. During the Communist 
period there were in fact only two migratory choices – to leave your country 
permanently, in a decision that would change your whole life forever, or to 
try a form of circular migration – but under conditions that made this choice 
a rather difficult one. ‘Circular migration’ meant regularly living and work-
ing for a while in the West, then returning to your country of origin with the 
money you had earned abroad. This was difficult in practice because in most 
cases it was necessary to apply for a travel document each time, and the au-
thorities could refuse without further explanation, thereby shutting the door. 
This strategy was also available only to those living in countries with rela-
tively flexible travel policies, and there were not so many of them in the 
former Soviet Bloc.  
After the collapse of Communism, many new strategies with a stronger 
migratory component have become available. The most important new form 
is often referred to as ‘incomplete migration’, but also circular migration110 
became more of an option. Polish demographer and migration specialist 
Marek Okólski claims that incomplete migration has become a strategy used 
by many millions of Central and East European citizens (Okólski 1997, 11). 
According to him the essence of incomplete migration is its quasi-migratory 
character, meaning that the people involved do not strictly (if at all) fulfil the 
preconditions generally set for a migrant. On the other hand, writes Okólski, 
this form of migration more than any others realises the economic function 
of migration. He adds that there are three main features characteristic of a 
migrant of this kind:  
 
- ‘loose’ social and economic status in the country of origin  
- irregularity of stay or work in the host country 
- maintaining close and steady contacts with migrant’s house-
hold in the home country. 
 
An important new survival approach could be termed the strategy of mar-
ket-makers and market-takers. What has become the landmark of the new 
transition economy is the emergence of local open-air markets that mush-
roomed in towns and cities throughout the region in response to local needs 
and as a visible sign of a new survival strategy in the making. Shuttle traders 
– in Russia known as chelnoki – have played an important part in the adapta-
tion of post-Communist masses to the new realities. Shuttle trade has also 
become a practical school of the market economy. Finding the balance be-
tween market demand and supply has become the name of the new transition 
game for millions who have opted to take their fate in their hands instead of 
                                                     
110 For more on that form of migration Kaczmarczyk 2002. 
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waiting for the state to provide them with economic means.111 According to 
Holtom there are three main types of those who decided to apply a market-
oriented survival strategy that was a part of the growing informal and partly 
illegal economy (Holtom 2003, 3–4): 
 
1. ‘Primitive entrepreneurs’ can be divided into two groups – the 
first consists of people who engage in shuttle trading to supple-
ment their incomes, while the second is made up of professional 
traders or ‘ants’ with no other job but small-scale cross-border 
trade; they make a living by crossing the border up to ten times a 
day, carrying small amounts of goods to sell at a profit on the 
other side.  
2. ‘Kontrabandisty’ or smugglers cross the border almost as often 
as the ‘ants’, and like them make their profits from cross-border 
differences in prices and demand; they trade in commodities that 
are cheaper in one country and more expensive in other (alcohol, 
cigarettes, amber, petrol, food etc.) and they profit by not declar-
ing the amounts carried across the border and by not paying the 
duties.  
3. ‘Traffickers’ are often linked to transnational organised crime 
groups; they often engage in trafficking of drugs, weapons, peo-
ple and stolen vehicles.  
 
The political change and the opening of borders facilitated not only the 
emergence of the new strategies but also the implementation of existing sur-
vival strategies, many of which now have a much stronger migratory com-
ponent.  
For instance, knowledge-based strategies have got a new dimension and 
boost – young East Europeans studying in the West, but also the opening of 
CEE educational institutions to students from the West has become a reality 
hardly imaginable earlier. Study abroad has become much more readily 
available as a strategy for improving your chances for a better life –  in your 
home country, but also if you decide to stay abroad, which has also become 
far easier in today’s integrating Europe. Also all other forms of knowledge 
transfer – scientific exchange, various sorts of training and intern schemes, 
paid and unpaid professional practices, transfer of personnel from one 
branch of the company to other one, located abroad – have flourished. 
However, the same can be said about the criminal strategies of those for 
whom the transition has represented a new opportunity. All forms of smug-
gling and trafficking have been thriving, thanks to the relaxation of travel 
restrictions and border control. This has become a main challenge of the in-
tegrating Europe, where borders no longer fulfil their traditional roles as 
physical and legal walls separating countries but are seen as a business op-
                                                     
111 For an interesting study of this new phenomenon see Aidis 2003, Wallace and Sik 1999.. 
For more on shuttlers see Holtom 2003, Iglicka 2001, Vorobyeva 2001. and Iglicka 1999.. 
Also Wallace 1995, Wallace 1999. give interesting insight in new survival strategies linked to 
transition and the emergence of primitive market economy in the first years after the fall of 
Communism.  
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portunity by less scrupulous individuals and groups who eye huge profits 
from the illegal transfer of goods and people across these borders.  
The case of East European – Russian, Polish and Lithuanian – and Israeli 
car smugglers who in August 2002 tried to open a new route through the 
Norwegian–Russian border crossing at Storskog illustrates how criminal 
groups operate under the new conditions. It is believed that the attempt to 
smuggle stolen Audi and Mercedes automobiles through Norway was a re-
sponse to the tightening of border controls on the traditional smuggling 
routes through Poland, where criminal groups could realise their strategies 
more efficiently due to the geographical proximity of supply and demand 
area, as well as the widespread corruption among Polish and Russian, Belo-
rusian and Ukrainian custom officers.112 According to a survey published on 
15 October 2001 in the Polish weekly Wprost, it costs between 500 and 3000 
zloty to persuade a Polish customs officer close his or her eyes for a while so 
that you could cross the border in a car without proper documents – the bet-
ter the car, the more to pay, indicating that also custom officials have learned 
how to adapt to the new market situation. The same source presented data on 
other services to be ‘bought’ on the Polish border – for instance, the passing 
of a truck with a $100,000 load of cigarettes costs between $10,000 and 
$15,000, while the price of smuggling one person across the border ranges 
from $100 to $200. Thus we see that not only market-makers and market-
traders but also evil-doers have been profiting from the transition and the in-
troduction of market rules and the opening of European borders in realising 
their private asset-accumulation strategies.  
A clear example of a predatory, zero-sum game strategy that can thrive in 
a transition area governed by the rule of the market and the despair of those 
who want to improve their situation at any cost is the strategy of con and 
fraud schemes. You can, for instance, decide to make your living by placing 
adds in newspapers where you offer jobs abroad – against a small ‘adminis-
trative’ fee to be transferred to your bank account or sent directly to you in 
an envelope. Once the money has been transferred, you might then send a 
publicly available leaflet with basic information on the general rules of em-
ployment in some countries, or even a false job offer to be ‘realised’ in the 
target country. Your customer may even risk going abroad and investing 
substantial sums, only to discover that the product you sold was worthless.  
Another strategy of this type involves criminal job recruitment 
schemes.113 Someone, say in the Italian province of Calabria, needs cheap 
labour during the olive harvesting season. He organises a network of people 
in Eastern Europe, for instance in Poland, to represent his interests. The re-
gional heads organise a network of representatives and recruiters to hire 
people willing to work in Italy. The conditions offered are attractive – poten-
tial recruits are told that they will earn €30 a day, but that they will have to 
have €250 to cover transport and accommodation in Italy. After a team of 
ten job-seekers has been assembled, the local representative of the organisa-
                                                     
112 For more on this special case of car smuggling and the attempt to open a new ‘Northern 
route’ see http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/article.jhtml?articleID=397188. 
113 An interesting report on this issue was published in the leading Polish newspaper Gazeta 
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tion is contacted; he then organises their transport to Italy after receiving 
€250 from each of them. The recruiter gets 500 zloty per a ‘load’ of ten 
workers, while the ‘representatives’ are paid €50 per head – the rest goes to 
the network’s ‘country manager’ and to the boss. The workers, many of 
whom have had to borrow money in order to cover the initial fees, are sent to 
Italy, where they are confronted with a situation completely different from 
what they had been promised – they are offered a job but have to pay a spe-
cial fee to those who organise the work, and thus end up earning no more 
than €5 or 6 a day for 12–15 hours work. 
Those who choose the strategy of finding a job abroad through what later 
may turn out to be a criminal recruitment scheme may enter the illegal la-
bour market in the target country and become a part of the shadow or black 
economy. In a situation when no visa is required to enter a country – or visas 
have become relatively easily accessible – the development of an interna-
tional informal labour market has become a reality that all European coun-
tries need to recognise, and do something about.114  
In entering the informal labour market, a worker can realise many strate-
gies. Participation in the illegal labour market and economy can be a means 
of realising an asset accumulation strategy – the migrant worker may apply a 
survival strategy based on circular and incomplete migration, making a liv-
ing in economic terms in the target country but living his ‘real’ life in the 
country of origin. On the other hand, participation in the shadow economy of 
the target country may improve the chances for more permanent settlement 
in the target country – if, for example, the local laws are changed and open-
ings made for settlement of the special group to which the worker happens to 
belong, he will be in a privileged position due to his knowledge of the mar-
ket and prior participation in networks that can help legalise his stay. This 
has probably been the case with at least some East European irregular work-
ers who entered the Norwegian labour market illegally, but could legalise 
their status after the more flexible system for employment of specialists was 
introduced on 1 January 2002, and even more successfully after the EU 
enlargement in May 2004.   
Another possibility for changing one’s status from illegal/irregular to le-
gal and regular emerges if the host country can be expected to regularise il-
legal aliens. Especially in Southern Europe, there are rather good chances of 
‘hiding in the shadow’ while waiting for a new round of legalisation and 
regularisation (Apap et al. 2000). Italy had five rounds of regularisation of 
illegal aliens between 1987 and 2002; Spain, five rounds between 1985 and 
2002, while Portugal had three rounds between 1992 and 2001.115  
The latest regularisation of aliens in Portugal reveals how migratory 
flows and the growth of new legal migration communities can be boosted by 
an administrative decision. One of the most interesting and unexpected de-
velopments in the recent history of irregular labour migration in Europe is 
the emergence and the rapid growth of the regularised Ukrainian migrant 
community in Portugal. Until 2001 there were relatively few Ukrainians – or 
East Europeans in general – living and working in Portugal legally, although 
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the local authorities suspected that there were many who were staying and 
working in the country illegally. Then in 2001, Ukrainians became the main 
beneficiaries of the decision adopted by the Portuguese authorities that 
opened for legalisation of the foreign labour force in the country (Decree-
Law no. 4/2001 of 10 January 2001). After this decision, 61 756 Ukrainian 
citizens regularised their stay in Portugal; they by far outnumbered Brazil-
ians, who had traditionally been the most important foreign workers on the 
Portuguese labour market. Today Ukrainians forms the biggest East Euro-
pean community in Portugal and their number is still growing. 
The choice of shadow labour market rather than the legal labour market 
can be dictated by many factors, first and foremost legal and economic ones. 
As far as the possible legal obstacles are concerned, the most important hin-
der may be that the legislation of the given country does not allow CEE to 
take legal work, making the irregular labour market the only option. Or local 
regulations may provide access to legal labour to some categories, but the 
potential migrant worker does not belong to these and therefore has no other 
option than to enter the labour market through the illegal back-door. Also the 
complexity of the process of obtaining a legal work permit may prompt 
some job-seekers to choose the irregular market. In economic terms, the 
choice of the irregular market may be dictated by the worker’s interest in be-
ing cost-competitive and his unwillingness to pay taxes to a country that is, 
at least in the case of irregular and circular migrants, seen as a source of in-
come, but not as a place for long-term future investment.  
This predilection for remaining in the shadows is also linked to attitudes 
towards the law and state in most post-Communist countries. Rooted in the 
old system, this legal – or rather illegal – culture and this attitude towards 
state, seen not as a provider of social goods but more as a semi-predatory in-
stitution willing to take your money but without providing even a basic level 
of security, are expressions of the lack of trust between citizens and state. 
Such an attitude towards state institutions can easily be transferred to the 
new social and political context. The result is a negative impact on the rela-
tionship between migrants and state institutions in the target country, espe-
cially if the migratory move is triggered by negative experiences stemming 
from the relationship between state and citizen – as is the case with those 
forced to leave their country due to the state’s brutal behaviour.   This lack 
of trust – and more generally, the disappointment with the social, economic 
and political results of transition and transformation – may become an im-
portant incentive for permanent emigration.  
In today’s European legal and institutional context there are in fact only 
two strategies available to most of those who want to settle permanently and 
legally in the West but do not have previous family links to the target coun-
try. They can either ask for protection against persecution in their country of 
origin (asylum strategy), or they have to find a job, enter the legal labour 
market and use this migratory gate. The first strategy is available to those 
who come from conflict areas and countries with oppressive regimes and a 
bad record of democracy and human rights. The second one is available to 
the rest of those seeking permanent settlement in the West, but in order to be 
‘eligible’ they have to fulfil certain entry criteria, such as specific qualifica-
tions or skills in demand on the local labour market. Even within the inte-
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grating Europe, a citizen of one EU or EEA country is allowed to settle per-
manently in another EU country only if he or she can find a job there, 
whether as an employee (freedom of movement of workers) or as a service 
provider (freedom of movement of services). 
There are many available survival and adaptation strategies involving le-
gal labour migration, be it permanent legal migration, seasonal labour migra-
tion or shuttle labour migration. And there are many possible combinations 
of social, political and economic push/pull factors that may make people 
willing to move. All the same, it is obvious that wages differences are a cen-
tral factor influencing the decisions of migrants, both regular and irregular. 
Studies conducted among Ukrainian labour migrants reveals the most impor-
tant factors that ‘pushed’ them abroad. The results of a survey conducted in 
Lviv region by the West Ukrainian Centre ‘Women Perspectives’ and quoted 
in the Ukrainian Ombudsmanns’s report on migration from Ukraine show 
that low wages were the most important single factor that forced people to 
seek employment abroad (mentioned by 52.8% of those surveyed); other im-
portant factors were the high unemployment (mentioned by 31.7%) and the 
need to earn money to repay debts (29.7%). According to another survey 
conducted among Ukrainian labour migrants in Italy and quoted by Markov 
(2003) there were the following main reasons for going abroad: low wages 
(52.83%), the need to buy a place to live in Ukraine (33.56%), unemploy-
ment (31.7%), the need to pay back debts (29.7%), high costs of the educa-
tion for children (23.8%) and the domestic violence (5.66%).  
Another recent study quotes the following reasons mentioned by the re-
spondents as the main five factors pushing them abroad: the wish to increase 
the level of welfare (52.8%), unemployment (28.9%), low wages and wage 
arrears (27.3%), the need to pay for education or medical treatment for a 
family member (12.1%) and the desire to see new places (11.8%) (Pirozhkov 
and Khomra 2003, 26). The findings of the 1998 IOM study confirm that 
similar set of social, political and economic push/pull factors plays a major 
part in decisions of potential migrants. In order to shed light on what may be 
purely economic motivations for migrating, we give an overview over 2003 
data on average monthly wage in some transition countries.  (Table 11)  
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Table 11. Average monthly wage (AMW 2003) in some transition coun-
tries and Norway 
 
Country AMW 2003 in € 
Norway 3400
Poland 578
Hungary 518
Czech R. 494
Estonia 407
Lithuania 332
Slovakia 326
Latvia 266
Russia 200 
Romania 170
Bulgaria 152
Belarus 130 
Ukraine 94 
Moldova 80 
Azerbaijan 70 
Armenia 66 
Georgia 50
 
 
According to Coppel, Dumont and Visco (2001:11) ‘on the supply side, the 
relative expected income difference between host and source countries is 
generally thought to be an important factor influencing the incentive to mi-
grate’. This conclusion on the link between level of earnings and migration, 
combined with data from Table 11, will serve as the point of departure for 
two case studies in Part Three. They focus on the emergence of a new pat-
tern of migration between Poland and Russia on the one side and Norway on 
the other.  

 Part 3. Case Studies  
There are many reasons for focusing specifically on developments in Poland 
and Russia and on the emergence of a new pattern of migration between 
these two East European countries and Norway.  
Poland has been chosen because it is located near to Norway and already 
had a strong migratory link established in 1980s Moreover, the country has 
had a mixed record of transition: Poland has been seen as a champion of 
transition in the CEE region, an economic success story – but this success 
has come at a rather high social price. The country has still to struggle with 
high levels of unemployment and the resultant social consequences.  
Russia has been chosen for several reasons. It is Norway’s neighbour, 
with a shared border in the Finnmark/Murmansk area. Especially in recent 
years, the two countries have decided to strengthen their ties in the North in 
various ways. Also, the depth of the social and economic crisis could prompt 
many Russians to seek better opportunities abroad, and Norway would be a 
natural choice. On the other hand,  over the past four-five years Russia has 
seen its economy rebound, and this may have changed the incentives that 
could induce Russian citizens to migrate vs. stay at home. The political sys-
tem in Russia has been evolving towards a more autocratic regime and some 
Russian policies have triggered a wave of forced westward migration. All 
these are factors that made us interested in examining the link between the 
strategies applied to meet the challenges of transition, and the emergence of 
a new pattern of migration between Russia and Norway.  
In some areas, the former East Bloc countries border on regions with a 
very high standard of living and much higher earnings. The situation is espe-
cially challenging along the border between Russia and the Nordic countries 
(Russia and Norway, Russia and Finland), and to a lesser degree along the 
border of the former Soviet Union and the regions now joining the enlarging 
Western economic and political organisations (Belarus and Poland; Belarus 
and the Baltic republics; Ukraine and Poland; Moldova and Romania; Russia 
and Baltic republics; Kaliningrad and Poland; Kaliningrad and Lithuania) 
and to a limited degree along the borders of the existing EU and candidate 
countries (Poland and Germany, Poland and the Nordic countries, the Baltic 
countries and the Nordic countries).  
The need to cope with daily problems in a situation when the old social 
and institutional networks have not been replaced by a new web of relations 
to alleviate the pangs of transition has led to the development of both indi-
vidual and group survival strategies. Many of these strategies – such as la-
bour migration, participation in criminal networks and in the shadow econ-
omy – can have a direct impact on distant areas. This is especially the case 
now that also the poorer citizens have greater mobility due to the elimination 
of many restrictions on the free movement of people, and the absence of visa 
regimes on most borders between the former Soviet republics, between for-
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mer Soviet republics and Central Europe, and between candidate countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe and the EU area.   
The situation can be especially difficult to tackle in border areas where 
awareness of the welfare gap is naturally high. The very existence of an area, 
just across the border, with higher standard of living, much higher incomes 
and a more stable social and political situation is a psychological and eco-
nomic challenge.  
The motivation to do something can be especially high among the popu-
lation trying to subsist on incomes under the local minimum level. Accord-
ing to data from 2000,116 in 1999 almost 20% of the population in Mur-
mansk oblast had incomes lower than the official Russian existential mini-
mum, which in 1999 was defined as 908 roubles per month (approximately 
US$ 30). The situation was even worse in other border regions. In Leningrad 
oblast, the corresponding figure was 51.5%, in St. Petersburg – 33.2%, in 
Pskov – 51.2% and in Kaliningrad 37.4%. Although the situation in Russia, 
also in the border regions, has improved considerably since then, still almost 
one fifth of the population is living under the poverty line. As to incomes, 
there have been two positive developments since the collapse of 1998. The 
first was that by 2002, real wages had not only recovered, but also risen by 
almost 20% compared with their level in 1997, the last pre-crisis year. Sec-
ondly, the problem of wage and pension arrears117 has clearly diminished in 
recent years, and many Russians now perceive their situation as more stable 
and predictable. Indeed, some calculations indicate that the economic situa-
tion in Russia’s border regions is not as dramatic as it is often presented in 
the West.  
 
Table 12. Russian border regions in a broader context – GDP per cap-
ita, adjusted values, times higher or lower (Granberg, Zaitseva 2003)  
 
 
According to Granberg and Zaitseva (2003), the adjusted GDP per capita of 
Murmansk was in fact higher than that in Lithuania and Latvia, only 10% 
lower than in Poland and Estonia and 3 times lower than in Finland and 3.7 
                                                     
116 Sotsialnoye polozheniye i uroven zhiznii naseleniya Rossii, (2000) Moscow: Goskomstat.  
117 On this specific transition phenomenon see Desai and Idson 2000, Maleva 2001. 
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times lower than in Norway. These calculations show that, while there is still 
a huge economic gap, Murmansk has a level of adjusted GDP per capita 
similar to that of most new Eastern European EU members.  
For Poland, it is estimated that almost half of the population have in-
comes under the local social minimum.118 With an average monthly wage at 
$450 in 2001, countries like Germany, Sweden and Norway seem very at-
tractive, especially to those unable to find work on Poland’s domestic labour 
market, where the unemployment rate is almost 20%. Poland can therefore 
be perceived either as a promised land – or a bridge to the West – by those 
living across the Polish eastern border and earning perhaps $40 month; and 
as country with no perspectives, by jobless Poles excluded from the local la-
bour market and by those who feel that the true paradise on earth lies further 
west.   
We can therefore talk about a regional welfare gap paradox, since an area 
perceived by its own inhabitants as an area of welfare failure can be still 
seen by outsiders as a welfare paradise. Some countries, however, are widely 
perceived as true welfare paradises. Especially in recent years, Norway has 
been widely identified as such and is definitely perceived in that way by 
transition-tired Poles and Russians. The two cases presented below will ex-
amine how the strategies adopted by citizens of these two countries have 
contributed to changing the patterns of migration to Norway.  
Case Study 1. Polish workers and Polish nurses in Norway  
Many factors make the study of migration flows from Poland to Norway an 
interesting topic. Firstly, there is a sizeable Polish community in Norway, 
and the very existence of local ethnic networks is often seen as a factor that 
promotes various forms of migration. Secondly, Norway has for many years 
been known in Poland as a country with relatively high wages and a place 
where it is possible to find employment – whether legal or illegal. Thus, a 
link has already been established between the Polish and the Norwegian la-
bour market. Many Poles have established themselves on the Norwegian la-
bour market, especially in two segments already open to non-EEA citizens: 
the seasonal labour market, and the market for foreign specialists. In addi-
tion, of course, comes the Norwegian irregular labour market.119  
Another factor with potential impact on migration is the recent stagnation 
in the Polish economy, and the demographic situation on the labour market 
that has resulted in a substantial rise in unemployment – an estimated 20% 
by late 2002.120 Unemployment is hard on all segments of the population, 
but the most exposed and vulnerable group are the young people. Five of the 
ten regions with the highest level of unemployment in the whole EU – in-
                                                     
118 On various understandings of the impact of transition on welfare in Poland see Huffman 
and Johnson 2002. 
119 A look at wages in Poland and other countries of the region gives a good indication  of 
what could be the main driving force of labour migration. For more on these differences and 
their potential impact on migration see Golinowska 1998, Jacukowicz 2000, Jacukowicz 
2002. 
120 On ways of coping with the challenges of transition in Poland see the interesting study by 
Giza-Poleszczuk, Marody and Rychard 2000. 
Jakub M. Godzimirski 96 
cluding French non-European territories – are Polish voivodships, where un-
employment is between 21.8% and 26%. For youth, the situation is dramatic 
– 42.5% of those between 15 and 24 were unemployed in 2002 and 41.9% in 
2003. Moreover, in Zachodniopomorskie, which is relatively close to the 
Nordic countries, 51.5% of those between 15 and 24 were jobless in 2003. 
Poland is the biggest of the new EU members, and Poland’s 2004 mem-
bership will give its citizens right to work in the EU and the EEA. Poland 
will also become a ‘front state’ of the enlarged EU, attracting many potential 
migrants from outside. This can make it an important transit country and a 
sort of buffer zone121 for those wanting to reach the attractive labour markets 
in the west and north. Or perhaps people from Ukraine, Belarus, Russia and 
other EU ‘outsiders’ will try to find a place in the Polish illegal labour mar-
ket, thereby pushing more Poles to seek employment abroad.122  
The combination of these push/pull factors’ can result in many Poles 
choosing Norway for permanent or seasonal labour migration, although it 
has never been an area of mass Polish migration. In a historical perspective, 
Germany was the main country of migration from Poland. Both Polish and 
German studies confirm that also during the transition period Germany has 
retained its central place on the Polish migration map.123 Kepinska sums up 
the main trends in permanent and registered migration from Poland in 2002: 
 
In 2002, as in previous years, Polish emigrants chose most frequently 
EU-member countries as destination (82.3 per cent). Germany played as 
in previous years a crucial role (72.6 per cent), followed by Austria (2.1 
per cent), France (1.4 per cent), Italy (1.2 per cent), the Netherlands (1.9 
per cent) and the United Kingdom (1.0 per cent). The United States and 
Canada were the two major non-European destinations, accounting for 
10.9 per cent and 4.1 per cent of the total respectively. (Kepinska 2003: 
10.) 
 
According to the same study, Norway played a marginal role in permanent 
migration from and to Poland – in 2002 there were 47 registered migrants 
leaving Poland for Norway and 31 coming from Norway to Poland. Also in 
previous years, the number of Poles moving to Norway has been low – 49 in 
2000 and 71 in 2001. Permanent migration to Norway, as reflected in official 
Polish statistics, has been marginal also in relative terms – between 2000 and 
2002 it never represented more than 0.3% of total registered permanent mi-
gration from Poland, whereas Germany alone stood for between 72.3 and 
75.8% of the total in the same period. 
These low figures can be variously interpreted. Perhaps Norway is not a 
central country on the Polish migration map, the huge economic and welfare 
gaps and relative geographical proximity notwithstanding. Or perhaps offi-
cial Polish statistics do not accurately reflect reality, and we should look at 
the Norwegian migration statistics. Official Norwegian data on recent migra-
                                                     
121 On the pattern of social interaction and migration in EU buffer zone see Wallace 1995. 
122 For more on new patterns of migration to and from Poland see Glabicka 1999, Iglicka 
2000, Okólski 1997, Okólski 1999b, Okólski and Kepinska 2002. 
123 For more on the pattern of migration from Poland see Frejka, Okólski and Sword 1998. 
and the recent study by Kepinska 2003. On earlier patterns of migration see Okólski 1994.  
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tion from Poland to Norway in the period 1999 to 2003 are shown in the 
graph below. They reveal a completely different picture of Polish migration 
to Norway than the Polish one.  
 
Figure 7. Recent migration from Poland to Norway – Norwegian data 
(SSB) 
 
 
We see that migration from Poland has been on the increase not only in gen-
eral, but also in relative terms – in 1999 Poles represented 0.67% of all those 
moving to Norway; in 2000 – 0.79%; in 2001 their share increased to 1.41%; 
it peaked at 1.75% in 2002 and in 2003 decreased to 1.63%. Only once be-
fore in the recent history of Polish migration to Norway had Poles have a 
higher share – between 1986 and 1990 there were on average 485 Poles 
moving to Norway, which corresponded to 1.77% of all migrants to Norway 
in the same period. Even during the turbulent years after the emergence of 
the Solidarity movement and the imposition of martial law in Poland in 
1981, fewer Poles came to Norway. Between 1966 and 1970 the number was 
modest – an average of 89 persons per year. In the next five-year period – 
1971 to 1975 – this grew to 112, between 1976 and 1980 – to 133, then al-
most doubled to 257 between 1981 and 1985, and doubled again to almost 
485 in the next five-year period (1986–1990). Between 1991 and 2000 the 
figure decreased – to 322 per year on average between 1991 and 1995 and to 
268 in the next five-year period (1996-2000). All in all an impressive total of 
8,330 Poles migrated to Norway between 1966 and 2000. If we add to this 
the 1,771 who settled in Norway between 2001 and 2003, we get an even 
more impressive sum: 10,101 Poles moved to Norway between 1966 and 
2003. 
As of 1 January 2004, the size of the Polish community in Norway was 
between 2,741 (if we take only Polish citizens into consideration) and 11,206 
(if we count all those defined by Norwegian statistics as persons of Polish 
background).   
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Figure 8. Poles in Norway 1 January 2004 – various categories124 
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Poles living in Norway formed approximately 2% of the total migrant popu-
lation in the country. In one category – ‘citizens of foreign countries living 
in Norway’ – the share of Poles was much lower: only 1.34% of all persons 
with foreign citizenship living in Norway as of 1 January 2004. This low 
figure has much to do with the recent history of Polish migration and also 
with the policy of the Polish and Norwegian authorities. Since many Poles 
came to Norway in the 1980s as political migrants, they applied for Norwe-
gian citizenship as soon as this was formally possible; as a result, by 1 Janu-
ary 2004 only 24.46% of ‘Poles’ living in Norway still had Polish citizen-
ship. By contrast, migrants from Russia had generally come much later; the 
share of those maintaining their Russian citizenship at that time was almost 
three times higher (69.95%).  
Another special feature of the Polish community in Norway is its uneven 
gender composition. Well over half – some 64% (4,872) – of the persons of 
Polish origin living in Norway as of 1 January 2004 were women. The gen-
der composition of both the Norwegian population in general and of the 
overall migrant population in Norway was more gender-balanced (51/49% 
among migrants and almost 50/50% among the population in general).   
Data on the year of first entry to Norway might provide a more detailed 
picture of the history of the growth of the Polish community in Norway. (See 
Figure 9.) These data indicate a link between developments in Poland, Nor-
way’s policy towards the victims of political persecution in Poland, and the 
steady growth of the Polish community in the 1980s and 1990s.  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
124 Data on various categories from www.ssb.no/emner/02/01/10/innvbef/tab-2004-05-26-
03.html  and from http://www.ssb.no/emner/02/01/10/innvbef/tab-2004-05-26-09.html. 
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Figure 9. Poles in Norway – first year of migration 
 
 
The emergence and growth of Norway’s Polish community are due to a spe-
cific set of political, economic and social push/pull factors. Especially im-
portant here are the political persecution in Poland in the 1980s, and flexible 
migration policy towards this group implemented in Norway in the same pe-
riod; the huge differences in economic development between the two coun-
tries – with the social, economic and political crises of the 1980s in Poland 
and the oil boom in Norway in the same period; the growing demand for a 
qualified labour force in Norway, together with the decision to leave Poland 
taken by many specialists who saw no future under the oppressive regime in 
Poland. Also Polish women who married Norwegian men contributed 
greatly to the growth of this community in Norway. 
We can identify three mostly parallel waves of migration from Poland to 
Norway in the period between the early 1980s and Poland’s EU entry in May 
2004. In the first period, from 1980 to 1989, the strategy of seeking protec-
tion was predominant. Most Polish citizens who applied for protection in 
Norway were granted either asylum or the right to stay for humanitarian rea-
sons. However, also the nuptial strategy was used in this period, as well as 
other strategies, mostly by those who could not meet Norway’s rigid criteria 
for migration of specialists.  
Official Norwegian data on the refugee community in Norway, on the 
ethnic background of this group and duration of residence in Norway con-
firm that many Poles used the asylum strategy in the 1980s – of the 930 
Poles with refugee status living in Norway as of 1 January 2003, there were 
674 who had been living in Norway for between 10 and 19 years, and 241 
for over 20 years. Only 15 had been living in Norway for less than nine 
years. This indicates that those coming after 1992 had to use other strategies 
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than the asylum strategy if they wanted to settle permanently in Norway,125 
as Poles were no longer officially ‘eligible’ for asylum in Norway. In the 
1990s some Poles did try to use this previously so successful strategy – for 
instance in 1996 there were 209 Polish citizens, mostly of Roma origin, who 
filed asylum applications in Norway – but most of them failed.   
The prevalence of women in the Polish community may have much to do 
with a clearly gender-related strategy. According to a recent study on inter-
ethnic marriages in Norway (Lie 2004), 66% of 2,241 married women of 
Polish origin living in Norway in 2002 were married to Norwegian men; in 
1990 only 53% of women with this background were married to Norwe-
gians. Between 1990 and 2001, Polish women never ranked lower than 8 
among foreign brides in Norway; in 1991 and 1992 they even occupied the 
4th place on this list. In these two years, almost 4% of all marriages between 
Norwegian men and women from abroad involved a bride from Poland (Lie 
2004).  
Since the rapid phase in the growth of the Polish community in Norway 
dates back to the 1980s and early 1990s, and most Poles did acquire Norwe-
gian citizenship after seven years in Norway, this meant that a new migration 
gate could be opened for those in Poland who had relatives in Norway and 
wanted to join them. Family reunification is one of the main strategies used 
by Poles seeking permanent residence in Norway. This strategy was widely 
used in the early 1990s where other strategies – such as asylum – were no 
longer available. It is still in use today. 
 
Table 13. Family reunification in Norway: total and Poles, 2001 – 2003  
 
Year Total reunifications Poles Share 
2001 12,142 232 1.91% 
2002 14,607 289 1.98% 
2003 10,469 247 2.36% 
 
Another specific feature of Norway’s Polish community is its relatively high 
level of education. Poles aged 30 to 44 living in Norway are generally well 
educated – 38.5% of them have higher (post-secondary) education (22.4% 
up to 4 years, 16.1% – more than 4 years of higher education). In the top 
category – those with more than 4 years of higher education – Poles belong 
to a small elite club among migrants in Norway. They are beaten only by 
Germans (26.8%), Americans (22%) and Russians (23%). In fact, they outdo 
the host nation, Norwegians, of whom only 6.8% in this age group have 
similar level of tertiary education of more than 4 years’ duration.126 This 
may have much to do with the application of another strategy – coming to 
Norway as specialists and qualified labour force. Until Norway relaxed its 
rules for immigration of skilled labour in January 2002, those wanting to set-
tle in Norway had to have a fairly high level of competence. That many 
Poles have this relatively high level of education may indicate the use of a 
knowledge-based migration strategy – or that many well-qualified Poles de-
                                                     
125 http://www.ssb.no/english/subjects/02/01/10/flyktninger_en/tab-2004-06-24-03-en.html 
126 http://www.ssb.no/emner/04/01/utinnv/tab-2003-02-26-01.html 
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cided that they could realise their long-term goals in Norway better than in 
their homeland. The DUF database confirms this conclusion: between 1989 
and the end of 2003, 1,617 applications were filed by specialists from Po-
land.127  
 
Figure 10. Applications to Norway filed by Polish specialists 
 
While Polish women seem to opt for the nuptial strategy, the specialist strat-
egy is more of a male domain – of 1,617 applications filed, only 258 were 
from women. Figure 10 reveals that, after a period of limited interest, there 
came an explosion of interest in Norway. While in 2000 there were only 54 
Polish specialists registered in DUF, in 2001 their number soared to 241, 
even doubling to 528 in 2002, before decreasing slightly to 438 in 2003. 
This development was linked with administrative decisions taken by the 
Norwegian authorities. On 1 January 2002 a more flexible system for migra-
tion of specialists to Norway, also from non-EEA countries, was introduced. 
A yearly quota of 5,000 skilled workers or persons with special qualifica-
tions was set; moreover, the former requirement that the employer must 
prove that the post could not be filled by an employee either from Norway or 
the EEA was removed, as long as the quota was not filled within one year. 
Furthermore, the threshold for being recognised as specialist or person with 
special skills was lowered. Specialists were now defined as ‘persons who are 
trained in a particular field or have special qualifications needed in Norway’. 
In addition their expertise should be critical for the enterprise seeking to hire 
them. 
Poles, especially those relatively familiar with the Norwegian labour 
market, quickly discovered this new opportunity and began coming in great 
numbers. In fact, as Table 14 shows, they were the largest group in both 
2002 and 2003. 
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Table 14. Polish specialists in Norway after 1 January 2002 
 
Rank 2003 Number Rank  2002 Number 
Quota 5000 Quota 5000 
Total  1127 Total  1676 
1 Poland 331 1 Poland 516 
2 USA 99 2 USA  129 
3 Russia 57 3 Lithuania 111 
Poles’ share of quota 6.62% Poles’ share of quota 10.32% 
Poles’ share of those who came 29.37% Poles’ share of those who came 30.78% 
 
That Poles discovered this new opening indicates that this group was able to 
pick up new signals and adapt to the changed formal circumstances. How-
ever, with implementation of this ‘specialist scheme’ came some new chal-
lenges Norwegian authorities had to address when shaping the country’s mi-
gration policy. Although filling the 5,000 quota had never been a stated goal 
of the policy, the relative lack of interest abroad caused some concern. On 
the one hand, there was a realisation that the needs of Norwegian employers 
could be met by the supply of labour coming from the domestic market, 
which meant that there were still unexploited reserves of labour that could be 
used to cover growing future needs.128 On the other hand, however, it was 
important to identify what factors influenced the choices of potential labour 
migrants and see whether Norway should adopt new measures aimed at at-
tracting migrants with skills and expertise that the local reserves could not 
cover. One case in particular is highly illustrative in this respect, as it shows 
how the interplay between domestic and international developments can im-
pact on the shaping and redefining of policy: this is the case of Polish nurses 
and Norway.  
Polish nurses in Norway 
In one specific segment of the Norwegian labour market and society there 
was especially heated debate on the measures to be taken to solve problems 
with the lack of qualified personnel. By the late 1990s, the Norwegian health 
sector showed signs of  deep crisis. The shortage of qualified nurses and 
physicians plagued Norwegian hospitals and other health institutions, as well 
as creating problems for patients. In Oslo alone, there were over 1,000 va-
cant positions in the health sector;129 in Norway as whole as many as 7,200 
nursing positions were unfilled.130 
                                                     
128 To learn more on where these reserves can be found in Norway see the presentation given 
by Lars Østby at  http://www.udi.no/upload/Seminar/SSB%20Lars%20Østby.pdf 
129 Norwegian newspapers reported a dramatic labour shortage in the country’s health sector. 
Aftenposten wrote for instance on 04 October 2000 that only in Oslo there were approx. 3500 
jobs to be filled, more of 1000 of these in the health sector (nurses and auxiliary nurses).  
130 Økonomisk Rapport 22 November 2001, Internet edition. 
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Discussions centred on two potential strategies.131 According to propo-
nents of the first strategy, the shortage of labour in the health sector, espe-
cially in nursing, could be dealt with by offering new economic incentives 
that would bring back qualified nurses who had left the sector for social and 
economic reasons. The message sent by this ‘camp’ was rather simple – if 
the state poured more money into this sector and provided strong economic 
incentives to those who had decided to seek better opportunities elsewhere, 
the problem would be solved, as many thousands of well-educated Norwe-
gian nurses would go back to their original work.132 
Another strategy came from those who felt that the response should in-
clude increased internationalisation of the sector and the introduction of new 
regulations and economic incentives to induce people with the right qualifi-
cations to move to Norway and fill the gap. In implementing this second 
strategy, one should consider closer cooperation not only with the countries 
that had already supplied personnel with qualifications almost identical to 
those of Norwegians, but also with some new regions – first and foremost 
Central and Eastern Europe, but also such exotics as the Philippines and 
South Korea.133 Due to their geographical proximity, the changes underway 
in Central and Eastern Europe, the clear trend towards integration of this re-
gion into Western institutions and what was probably perceived as a promis-
ing set of push/pull factors that could prompt many to move to Norway, the 
three Baltic republics and Poland were highlighted as the most interesting 
markets for potential recruitment of medical personnel to Norway. 
However, those who were to make a decision on migration had to answer 
a set of questions on pros and contras linked with this migratory move.  The 
International Council of Nurses recommends in its leaflet Career Moves and 
Migration: Critical Questions134 that those considering migration should an-
swer the following set of questions before making a final decision: 
 
• What are the credentials of the recruitment/employment agency? 
• What are the credentials of the employer? 
• What are the conditions of employment? 
• What is the job description? 
• What is the impact of this career move?    
 
According to the same source, the main incentives for nurses to migrate are 
improved learning and practice opportunities, better quality of life, pay and 
working conditions, and personal safety. Table 15 shows the push and pull 
                                                     
131 Two articles published in Økonomisk Rapport (22 November 2001) presented the situa-
tion from two angles – the one dealt with the situation of Polish nurses who had moved to 
Norway, the other one was based on interviews with Norwegian nurses who decided to leave 
the profession. The Polish nurses interviewed were mostly satisfied with their situation, while 
the Norwegian ones said that they should be offered much more in order to return.   
132 According to Bergens Tudende (23 June 2001) there were 18500 qualified Norwegian 
nurses who left nursing and established themselves in other sectors of the Norwegian econ-
omy. 
133 On plans to recruit nurses from South Korea see an Aftenposten article at the following 
address: http://tux1.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/oslo/d213135.htm  
134 http://www.icn.ch/CareerMovesMigangl.pdf 
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factors that another recent study – Buchan, Parkin and Sochalski 2003 – 
identifies as the main factors prompting nurses to migrate. 
 
Table 15. Migration of nurses – push and pull factors  
 
  
Norway seemed to meet all the requirements for being perceived as an at-
tractive country of migration to Polish nurses, and so it was felt that recruit-
ing nurses from Poland would be fairly simple. In order to win the confi-
dence of potential employees, the Norwegian authorities decided to launch 
an information campaign, and on 10 March 2001 the Oslo daily Dagbladet 
wrote about a Norwegian diplomatic offensive aimed at achieving agree-
ments on the recruitment of health personnel from Poland, the three Baltic 
republics and the Czech Republic. These personnel were to replace two 
groups already established in Norway – Norwegian nurses who had  ‘emi-
grated’ to other sectors of the Norwegian economy, and nurses who had been 
recruited earlier from abroad, especially from Germany, Sweden and 
Finland, but now were returning to their home countries. Norwegian authori-
ties were aware that, especially in countries with similar levels of develop-
ment and earnings as Norway,135 recruitment of medical personnel was a dif-
ficult task, and the return migration of those who had come to Norway ear-
lier was an important factor in triggering the new recruitment campaign in 
the CEE area. This was probably one main reason why Norway decided to 
seek the solution in Central and Eastern Europe, where health-sector salaries 
were much lower and the hardships of transition much more severe – these 
local push factors, it was felt, would help Norway fill the more than 7,000 
vacant posts in the country’s health sector.  
Poland was seen as a major area of recruitment. Some 25 million Norwe-
gian kroner were to be spent on the first phase of the project coordinated by 
Aetat – the Norwegian labour market and employment agency. It was to be a 
win–win solution – Norway could cover its needs for personnel, and Polish 
medical personnel would get better chances for realising their own profes-
sional and economic goals. As one of the Polish nurses interviewed by NTB 
said in February 2001 ‘Norway is a light in the end of the tunnel’. The com-
ment made by Piotr Szuca (age 34) made encapsulated the dramatic situation 
of this group in Poland. Especially the very low level of earnings – he men-
tioned that he earned 738 Polish zloty (approximately $ 200) per month  – 
prompted many Polish nurses not only to join but even to lead the wave of 
                                                     
135 Dagbladet 10 March 2001, Internet edition.     
Push factors Pull factors 
Low pay (absolute and/or relative) Higher pay and remittances 
Poor working conditions Better working conditions 
Lack of resources to work effectively Better resourced health systems 
Limited career opportunities Career opportunities 
Limited educational opportunities Provision of post-basic education 
Impact of HIV/AIDS Political stability 
Unstable/dangerous work environment Travel opportunities 
Economic instability  Aid work 
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social protests that rolled over their country in 1999 and 2000. With perspec-
tives of earning as much as 23,000 or even 27,000 Norwegian kroner 
(equivalent to US$ 3,000 – 3,500) per month, it seemed that convincing 
nurses to go to Norway would be an easy task.136   
Thus, it appeared that the Polish nurses would see Norway as the country 
of their dreams; that recruitment would pose no problems, and that Norway 
could fill its needs by simply putting a bit of money into the newly estab-
lished network of recruitment centres in Poland. On paper, the situation 
seemed very promising – although the number of nurses was declining in 
Poland, from the peak 213,000 in 1998 to 186,500 in 2001, the Norwegian 
authorities could still hope that Polish nurses could cover much of the coun-
try’s needs. Perhaps not all 7,000 vacant positions could be filled by these 
newcomers, but the hope was that up to 500 nurses – not only from Poland – 
could be recruited each year. The plan was to recruit not only nurses with 
qualifications on a par with those of Norwegian nurses, but also Polish 
nurses with shorter training, to work as auxiliary nurses and in other posi-
tions where their qualifications could be suitable.   
In July 2001 the first 33 Polish nurses began at a special course in Poland 
to prepare them for working and living in Norway.137 Already in November 
2001 the first of them came to Norway, and there were high expectations 
that many more would follow. Ewa Dylla, Anna Smyt and Teresa Morsbejek 
came to work in Bærum municipality near Oslo; all three had top qualifica-
tions. Norwegian media noted their arrival with interest, pointing out the dif-
ferences in earnings between Poland and Norway. Their arrival was almost 
presented as a ‘liberation’ from the hardships of transition they experienced 
in their home country. Commenting on the recruitment and interest in com-
ing to Norway, two Norwegian representatives who went to Poland to meet 
and accompany the candidates said: ‘They queued for coming to Norway, 
we could easily get twice as many of them to come’. Those who decided to 
come were to sign a two-year contract with their Norwegian employer. They 
would be offered a standard Norwegian nurse’s salary of 250,000 kroner per 
year – almost ten times more than what they could earn in Poland – and a 
smaller sum (40,000 kroner) to help them establish themselves in their new 
place.138   
Despite this promising beginning, the attempt to recruit medical person-
nel from new countries cannot be described as very successful. According to 
information from the reputable daily Aftenposten, in 2002 the Norwegian 
Registration Authority for Health Personnel licensed 1,424 nurses from 
abroad to work in Norway.139 Interestingly, most of them came from the 
countries that had provided Norway with medical personnel before the new 
recruitment policy was launched in 2000 and 2001. There were 659 nurses 
who came from Sweden, 305 from Denmark, 157 from Finland, 132 from 
Germany, 68 from the Philippines – and only 33 from Poland. 
                                                     
136 According to Bergens Tidende, Danish nurses working on contract at Haukeland hospital 
earned more than 27,000 kroner a month, while Norwegian nurses with same qualifications 
working in the same hospital earned 4,000 kroner less (18 June 2001).  
137 Aftenposten, 04 July 2001, Internet edition. 
138 Økonomisk Rapport, 22.11.2001. 
139 Aftenposten, 25 May 2004. 
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All in all, only 190 nurses from Poland received licences to work in Nor-
way between 2000 – when the debate on the shortage of medical personnel 
became acute in Norway – and late 2004. They formed only a small share 
(0.26%) of the 71,389 nurses working in Norway in 2004.   
 
Table 16. Polish nurses receiving licence to work in Norway (HPR Data)   
  
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2000–2004 
Number 3 13 33 75 66 190 
 
The chronological overview in Table 16 shows that recruitment took off in 
2001, after the campaign to recruit was launched in Poland in 2000. How-
ever, only a limited number of nurses actually took the decision to go to 
Norway, and already by 2004 we can note a negative trend, with fewer li-
censed than the previous year.  
The great majority were women – only 9 of the Polish nurses licensed in 
the period were men. Most were relatively young and in the early stage of 
their professional careers. The oldest was born in 1946 and was 57 years old 
when she received her license to work in Norway in 2003; the youngest was 
only 23 (see Figure 11).  
 
Figure 11. Polish nurses in Norway 2000-2004, by year of birth 
 
It seems surprising that so few decided to come to Norway, given that the 
situation of this group in Poland has not improved substantially since the re-
cruitment campaign was launched in 2000, and that there is still the same 
gap between their real wages in Poland and expected wages in Norway.  
One possible explanation is that Norway is competing for nurses from 
Poland with other countries both European and non-European, and, with the 
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stock of highly qualified nurses in Poland limited, the majority of those who 
have the choice, opt for other countries.  
An overview of nominal salaries and the purchasing power of these sala-
ries in countries of potential migration of Polish nurses published recently by 
the main Polish newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza may give a partial answer. 
Norway, although, as an EU outsider, it is not on the list, is perceived as an 
expensive place to live. According to this overview, average pay for nurses 
in Poland was 1300 Polish zloty (1 zloty = 2 Norwegian kroner) and the 
same was the purchasing power of this salary. In Sweden a nurse could earn 
13,200 Polish zloty per month, and with purchasing power in Sweden esti-
mated at 5,600 zloty. In Denmark the salary was 14,400 zloty and purchas-
ing power 6,400.  In the Netherlands, which runs a huge programme for re-
cruitment of Polish nurses, the salaries offered were much higher, also in 
terms of purchasing power. A Polish nurse going to the Netherlands could 
earn as much as 17,500 zloty, with purchasing power of almost 10,000 zloty. 
Also in other European countries, the purchasing power of an average nurs-
ing salary was higher than in the Nordic countries. As Norway tends to be 
even more expensive than either Sweden or Denmark, the level of income 
offered to a qualified nurse, as expressed in purchasing power parity, was 
probably even lower in Norway than in its two Nordic neighbours. More-
over, also the USA and Canada have entered the Polish recruitment market, 
and both these countries can give even stronger incentives for emigrating.  
Another possible explanation is that many perceive migration to Norway 
as difficult due to the complicated and restrictive practice of licensing. Also 
some in Norway are aware of the problem, as was revealed by the exchange 
of views on procedures to be followed for issuing licences to Polish nurses. 
While the director of the Norwegian Registration Authority for Health Per-
sonnel held the view that one should pursue a strict and rigid policy of li-
censing for the sake of the patients, the head of the Norwegian Health Per-
sonnel Board (HPN) was of the opinion that it was time to adopt a more 
flexible approach and to be more open to recognising the quality of educa-
tion and training of job-seekers from Poland.140 
Newcomers and potential candidates could also feel less secure because 
contracts signed between nurses from Poland and Norwegian health institu-
tions were originally of 2 years’ duration; moreover, the working committee 
for evaluating the practice of authorising foreign health-sector specialists 
warned in June 2003 that new measures could be introduced to sharpen con-
trol with medical personnel recruited from abroad.141 As other European 
countries had less restrictive practices and offered either the same or even 
better conditions, Norway was risking marginalisation. 
Also the cultural explanation cannot be completely ruled out. When the 
recruitment of Polish nurses began in 2000 and 2001 many arguments were 
heard, both for and against. Those who were against the decision raised the 
issue of the brain drain – they claimed that by inviting CEE nurses to work 
                                                     
140 For more details on this debate see Aftenposten  11 and 22 August 2003. For more details 
on the authorisation  procedures see: 
http://www.safh.no/english/professions/general_nurse.html  
141 For details of this discussion see Aftenposten 21 June 2003. 
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in Norway, their home country would lose necessary health personnel.142 
The same forces opposed to the recruitment of CEE nurses also advocated 
the introduction of better salaries: this, they maintained, would result in 
many former nurses rejoining the profession. This might even look like a 
sort of a crisis-maximising exercise on the part of Norwegian health person-
nel who wanted to force the employer side to make a better economic offer 
so as to encourage many nurses to return to their profession.143  In that situa-
tion, the decision to recruit abroad could be seen as an element of a strategy 
aimed at forcing them to accept a less beneficial solution. As a result of this 
debate, foreign nurses could be seen as almost strike-breakers whose arrival 
changed the balance of power in the ongoing debate. 
Nurses from CEE could be met in Norway with a certain amount of scep-
ticism also because their Norwegian counterparts might fear that they repre-
sented another ‘health sector culture’ and that their training and education 
was of lower quality. Especially the problem of corruption and implementa-
tion of specific East European strategies of coping with economic challenges 
through the use of private and informal payment schemes in the health sector 
could cast a shadow on relations between Norwegian and Polish employ-
ees.144 In fact it was not that the nurses who were to come to Norway were 
involved in these corrupt social practices –   they were the cream of Po-
land’s, not least due to their long training and documented knowledge of 
languages, and the meticulous selection process undergone before they could 
come to Norway. The problem was more that they were coming from an area 
that was not a part of what had for many decades been Norway’s natural 
frame of reference. Poland and Central/Eastern Europe were seen as some-
thing unknown, belonging neither to the completely developed nor to the 
underdeveloped world. Nurses from CEE were a new element, as well as be-
ing seen as a potential threat to the established ‘health sector order’. This 
was why also arguments on the need to prevent social dumping were heard. 
Social dumping was seen as threat, for at least two reasons. The first in-
volved the concept of social solidarity – Norwegians were against social 
dumping, because those who do the same job as Norwegians do deserve the 
same pay and access to the same social goods. The second reason had much 
more to do with ‘self-interest’ – the fear that the migration of nurses from 
abroad could solve the problem of understaffing in Norway’s health sector 
and thus deprive that group of powerful political leverage that could be 
translated into economic gains for the whole group. 
A final explanation for why there has not been a massive inflow of nurses 
from Poland is based on the idea that the migratory strategy to which they 
had access (through the implementation of Norway’s policy of recruitment) 
did not match their needs. Well-educated nurses – and this group was the 
                                                     
142 See for instance Bente Slåtten’s  comments in Aftenposten 4 July 2001, where she spoke 
out against the recruitment and used namely this argument. Also others used similar argu-
ments  see http://www.dagsavisen.no/innenriks/2004/02/782397.shtml. 
143 When asked what could prompt them to go back to nursing, two of the nurses answered 
quite frankly – Only much, really much money could make us consider going back to our 
original profession (Økonomisk Rapport, 22 November 2002).  
144 For more on the issue of corruption in health sector in Central and Eastern Europe see 
Lerberghe, Conceicao, Damme and Ferrinho 2002, Lewis 2000.. Also Experience with cor-
ruption in the health sector in Poland. gives a good insight in this topic. 
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main target of the Norwegian recruitment effort – could choose other sur-
vival strategies, both in Poland and abroad … and not necessarily in Nor-
way. They could use the same strategy as their Norwegian colleagues who 
were not satisfied with the conditions offered to them in the Norwegian 
health sector and who decided that ‘migration’ to other sectors offering both 
better pay and better working conditions was an appropriate response strat-
egy. For example, work in the fast-growing Polish pharmaceutical industry 
offered much better pay than the public health sector, and this was one op-
tion available.  
They could also opt for nursing employment in other Western countries 
that offered better conditions than Norway. The relatively low purchasing 
power of salaries offered in Norway has been noted. Moreover, nurses were 
offered contracts of only 2 years’ duration; and their families (mostly hus-
bands) could find it difficult to establish themselves on the Norwegian la-
bour market.  
Here is two worst-case scenarios: In the one, a family decides to move to 
Norway, and both spouses give up their jobs in Poland; however, the con-
tract of the one who was offered a job in Norway is not extended, forcing 
them to leave Norway and return to Poland, where all bridges are already 
burned. Or, they could face a situation where both leave their jobs in Poland 
and go to Norway, but only one manages to enter the Norwegian labour 
market. The other has to struggle with the new reality and is not able to real-
ise the economic rent of migration. In such a case, the social costs of migra-
tion may outweigh the financial gains. In both these cases, the migrants may 
be forced to adopt a strategy of return to the country of origin, due to inabil-
ity to achieve the long-term goals of their original migratory strategy.     
These potential perils of migration may prompt another type of migratory 
strategy – as mentioned above, circular and incomplete migration have now 
become more prominent in the CEE migration landscape. A look at the nu-
merical dimension of migration between Poland and Norway in the 1990s 
and early 2000s shows circular migration as the most important strategy 
adopted by Poles.  
Polish seasonal workers and irregulars in Norway 
Until 1 January 2002, when the Norwegian authorities introduced new and 
more flexible rules regulating the immigration of specialists to Norway, the 
specialist strategy was available to only a limited number of Poles – those 
who could document that the Norwegian labour market was short of the 
qualifications they had and that Norwegian employers were willing to hire 
them in order to fill this competence gap. Those who could not use other 
strategies – the nuptial strategy, available only to those who found their 
‘right person’ to marry in Norway; the family reunification strategy, or the 
strategy of asylum-seeking, no longer open to Poles due to the political 
changes in Poland – but wanted to move to Norway, or realise their asset ac-
cumulation strategy in Norway, were left with only two possible strategies. 
The first one was a legal strategy of seasonal work in Norway; the other was 
based on legal entry to Norway, followed by an asset accumulation strategy 
on Norway’s irregular and informal labour market. Naturally enough, some 
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information is available on those who chose the first of these two strategies, 
but we know almost nothing about the second group.145  
According to the database of the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration, 
between 1990 and 2002 this institution dealt with 29,415 applications from 
Polish citizens seeking seasonal employment in Norway. Of these applica-
tions, only 37% were filed by women, and 63% by men. Figure 12 presents 
an overview over the number applications handled each year.  
 
Figure 12. Applications for seasonal work in Norway filed by Polish citi-
zens146  
 
Poles became the most important group among those applying the combined 
strategy of circular migration and asset accumulation in Norway in the 
1990s. An overview over the Poles’ share of those with seasonal work in 
Norway over the past three years reveals this Polish domination with all clar-
ity – for the whole period they formed between almost 60% (in 2003) and 
73% (in 2000) of those employing this approach in Norway. The strategy of 
legal circular labour migration was preferred by those who wanted to earn 
their living in Norway but spend that money in Poland; the economic moti-
vation was definitely central. According to Norwegian regulations those ar-
riving in Norway as seasonal workers have no possibility to apply for per-
manent residence in the country, and their access to Norwegian social wel-
fare goods is also limited. This strategy seems to be preferred by those who 
could not – or did not want – to settle permanently in Norway, but wanted to 
                                                     
145 We do not have any study on Polish irregulars in Norway, but we can more about this 
phenomenon from studies of other Polish illegal diasporas. To learn more about this aspect 
see for instance Düvell 2004, Grzymala-Kazlowska 2001a, Grzymala-Kazlowska 2001b. 
146 ARBDTAKSES – category in DUF database.  
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reap the economic fruits of circular migration without breaking the social 
and economic ties with their homeland.147 
  
Table 17. Number and share of Poles among seasonal workers in Nor-
way148 
 
 
Using the legal gateway for circular migration provided by the Norwegian 
authorities was widely interpreted as the Poles’ response to changing cir-
cumstances. Even by the late 1980s, thousands or even tens of thousands of 
Polish citizens were working in Norway each year, especially during the 
summer months. There were already some legal possibilities of working in 
Norwegian agriculture, and thousands of Poles, many of them with very high 
qualifications, combined this possibility with their ‘normal life’ in Poland.149 
Especially during the years of the economic crisis of what was to be the end 
of the Communist era in Poland, there were strong economic incentives for 
using this circular labour migration strategy. 
Two factors made this strategy appealing in late 1980s and in the 1990s. 
The first was the flat structure of earnings in Norway. Barth and Røed (2003, 
82–83) describe Norway as a country where the return on higher education is 
relatively low – the ‘income gap’ between those with completed tertiary 
education and those with only primary or secondary education is narrow 
compared to other European countries. The purchasing power of what these 
Norwegian researchers define as ‘net income’ of employees with the highest 
education level is also rather low, due to the generally high price levels in 
the country. The top expected income for the upper quarter of those with the 
highest educational level and highest earnings is 7% lower than the average 
for the same category of employees in 12 other countries in the Barth and 
Røed study. This means that the Norwegian authorities may face real chal-
lenges in trying to encourage the labour migration of highly skilled special-
ists, who can find much better economic incentives in almost all other West 
                                                     
147 Although there were many Poles working in Norway, Germany remains the main arena 
fro both legal and illegal, permanent and seasonal migration. An interesting study of  Polish 
seasonal labour migration in Germany is Korczynska 2003.. Also  Kaczmarczyk 2001. gives a 
good insight in the life of Polish diaspora in Germany 
148 Numbers from UDI’s yearly reports. 
149 During the interview with the staff of the Norwegian Embassy in Warsaw, this author was 
told that in the late 1980s, ‘whole departments of Jagellonian University could be met in the 
strawberry fields of Norway. They were not doing field research but simply earning money 
that they needed in order to survive in this time of economic crisis’. In fact, some of the lead-
ing figures of the first democratic government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki, formed in summer 
1989, received their invitations to join the government when they were on their yearly ‘straw-
berry-picking trip’ in Norway. The list of those who have this experience in their CV and 
have made political and economic careers in post-Communist Poland is long and includes 
many prominent names.  
Year Total number Number of Poles  Poles’ share in % 
2000   9,894  7,177 72.54 
2001 11,920  8,006 67.16 
2002 15,721  9,724 61.85 
2003 17,660 10,492 59.41 
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European countries. On the other hand, Norway may seem attractive as an 
alternative for migrants with less formal education – those with primary and 
secondary education can expect a much higher return on their ‘nominal’ 
salaries (47% and 43% higher than the average for 12 countries) and ‘real’ 
salaries (24% and 18%) than in other West European countries. This combi-
nation of social-democratic policy of redistribution of incomes and levelling 
of earnings may backfire on Norway in terms of attracting highly skilled 
specialists, but has resulted in relatively high earnings for less skilled work-
ers. It has also translated into relatively high earnings for those with higher 
education who came to Norway to do simple jobs – the only ones available 
to them – and who made these trips to Norway an important part of their sur-
vival and adaptation strategy in crisis-torn Poland. 
Moreover, the purchasing power of these relatively high earnings re-
ceived for fairly unskilled work by those who treated this as a part of their 
survival strategy was even higher after they returned to their home country. 
Thus we can see how the strategy of seasonal work and circular labour mi-
gration was clearly rational in the economic terms of the late 1980s.150  
As a practical example let us look at the possible calculations of a young 
Polish university lecturer employed ‘normally’ at Cracow’s Jagellonian Uni-
versity in 1987 who decided to work at one of the many Norwegian straw-
berry farms. His monthly salary – in black market US dollar rates – was per-
haps $50. As a university lecturer, he had relatively long summer holidays. If 
he travelled by car together with two colleagues, they could bring along most 
of the food they would need for the whole stay in Norway, making their ac-
tual expenses in Norway very low. After three months in the strawberry 
fields, he could probably save as much as $2,000 (13,000 Norwegian kroner) 
and perhaps even $3,000 (18,000 kroner), if he also took extra jobs, like 
house painting. In other words, during those summer months in Norway he 
could earn and set aside 40 or 60 of his normal Polish monthly wages. This 
money helped him not only to survive until the next year but was also impor-
tant for building human and economic capital that he could later invest in 
improving his situation in a more permanent way.  
The collapse of the Communist system in 1989 changed this calculation 
completely. The structure of earnings is still relatively flat in Norway and 
payment for simple jobs – like strawberry picking – is still rather high com-
pared with other countries. But the other variables have changed drastically. 
One paradoxical result of economic transition, especially in ‘shock therapy’ 
countries like Poland, was the extreme depreciation of the US dollar on the 
domestic markets. According to some calculations, the purchasing power of 
the US dollar in Poland changed at the following pace: In 1985, $1 could 
buy goods and services worth today’s 50 zloty; in 1990, goods and services 
worth only 11 zloty; with the progress of economic reforms purchasing 
power of the US dollar diminished even further – sinking to 5 zloty in 1995 
and to 4 zloty in 2003 and to a mere 3.5 zloty by 2004. Thus, those who 
earned their dollars abroad and wanted to spend them in Poland have lost 
very much of their purchasing power: between 1990 and 2004 their dollars 
have lost 65% of their value. On the other hand, salaries in Poland, espe-
                                                     
150 To learn more on pre-1989 labour migration from Poland see Stola 2001. 
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cially expressed in dollars equivalents, have increased ten-fold in the same 
time – from $50 in the late 1980s to more than $500 in 2003. 
This success of economic reforms in Poland has also contributed to modi-
fying the pattern of migration between Poland and Norway. Although many 
Poles still work in the fields of Norway during the summer, the composition 
of this group seems to have changed drastically. The transformation of the 
Polish economy and society opened new possibilities in Poland to those with 
the higher level of education, so this group has now lost most economic mo-
tivation for coming to Norway as seasonal workers. For those who still 
come, this survival strategy is much less profitable than in the late 1980s: to-
day one would have to work in Norway for 5 or even 6 months in order to 
get by until the next ‘circular trip’. In the late 1980s, seasonal circular migra-
tion between Poland and Norway allowed people not only to survive but also 
to invest in the future; today it has become a pure survival strategy adopted 
by those with no other options. 
As cyclical return to the country of origin is a central element, this strat-
egy can also be described as a strategy of repetitive return, and that opens for 
new interpretative possibilities. According to the widely used theoretical 
framework for interpreting return migration proposed by Cerase (1974) and 
used innovatively by Iglicka (2002) in her study of return migration in Po-
land, there are four types of return migration: connected with conservatism, 
with failure, with innovation and with retirement. The circular strategy of 
seasonal work has features of all four types of classical return migration, al-
though they are put together in a rather surprising manner. As to the element 
of failure, it is rather the failure to adapt fully to the conditions of transition 
– you are forced to commute between your homeland and the country where 
you earn your money partly because you haven’t been able to integrate in the 
new social structure; perhaps you belong to the group of transformation los-
ers. With the element of conservatism, you don’t want to leave your country 
permanently because you still feel that your place is where you were born, so 
you return with your capital to satisfy your – and your relatives’ – needs in 
your homeland. There is also an element of innovation in these repetitive re-
turns, as you are probably prepared to make use of all the means and new 
skills acquired during your migratory experiences. Finally, there is also an 
element of ‘retirement’ in circular migration, as each return to your home-
land is in a sense a temporal ‘retirement’ from your main work, which is lo-
cated abroad.  
The interpretation presented above is especially pertinent in the case of 
those who use this circular strategy of seasonal migration as a permanent 
survival strategy, but it also has more general relevance for this study. In a 
situation when transition is seen as not a permanent state but a process that 
will result in making the systems of the sending countries more compatible 
with those of the receiving countries, the incentives to migrate may become 
less obvious, and return migration may gain momentum. We can already see 
how Polish EU membership may be interpreted as the end of systemic transi-
tion and opening of a new chapter in the country’s history and in the history 
of Polish migration. Polish reforms have made economic incentives to mi-
grate less obvious, but the high level of social exclusion, and especially the 
high unemployment, may impel many to seek new opportunities abroad. 
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However, in the longer run, EU enlargement may change also this equation 
and modify the push/pull factors that have been shaping Polish migratory 
strategies. Enlargement has given Polish citizens better access to the Euro-
pean labour market, and by 2011 this access is to be completely unrestricted. 
However, it may turn out that by then, and due not least to the EU common 
policy aimed at solving the problems that force people to migrate, migration 
will become a strategy of choice and not one of necessity.  
What can we expect as to migration between Poland and Norway in the 
wake of this watershed event that took place on 1 May 2004, when Poland 
became a fully fledged member of the EU? Back in 1999, Stola and Okólski 
presented their opinions on the future of Polish migration – these views are 
also highly relevant for our understanding of the future trends in migration 
between Poland and Norway. They identified the following as the dominant 
features in future Polish migration (Okólski and Stola 1999: 26–27):  
Labour migration to Western Europe, in particular Germany, will remain 
prevalent, and the improvement or worsening of the economic situation in 
Poland will be the main factor influencing migratory trends. The policies of 
individual receiving countries will continue to play a major role, but the re-
moval of restrictions for labour migration within the enlarged EU will have 
major impact on the extent of labour migration. As in the 1990s, migratory 
strategies will be chosen primarily by those with less education and older 
people from areas of inferior economic development, especially areas that 
are peripheral as well as agricultural ones, and where migration networks 
operate. We can also expect greater migration of entrepreneurs and the self-
employed, in the wake of the application of the directive on the free move-
ment of services and workers within the enlarged EU. As previously, family 
migration – and probably family reunification – will remain the main strat-
egy used by those who opt for legal, long-term and settlement migration 
from Poland to the EU. The opening of borders and labour markets may also 
increase the number of those choosing nuptial strategies, but the same devel-
opments may serve to change this trend, as women will no longer be com-
pelled to marry in order to gain access to the labour market and social goods 
in the enlarged EU. We can expect an increase in migration from the EU – 
and Norway – to Poland, due to internationalisation of Polish economy, but 
the return migration of Polish citizens living abroad may emerge as the 
dominant trend.  
In the case of Norway, this could mean the shrinking of Polish commu-
nity, as many of those who arrived in the 1980s may choose the ‘return for 
retirement’ strategy. This seems especially likely if the problem of mutual 
recognition of periods of work as entitling one to retirement benefits can be 
solved within the new European framework.  
There can be no doubt about it: the EU enlargement will change and 
modify the pattern of migration between Poland and Europe. However, be-
cause so many factors influence migratory choices at both the macro- and 
micro-level, it is difficult to offer more detailed predictions. 
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Figure 13. Pattern of migration between Poland and Norway – prior to 
EU enlargement 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case  Study 2: The growth of the Russian community in Norway 
According to official Norwegian statistics, as of 1 January 2001 there were 
4,524 persons classified as ‘Russians’ living in Norway. Since the early 
1990s the Russian community in Norway has been growing, continuously 
and rapidly. Whereas in the period 1986–91 there were on average only 72 
persons a year who moved from the then USSR to Norway, already by 
1992–1995 the number of Russian citizens moving to Norway had grown to 
almost 300 per year. By 1997 it had reached almost 600.  
Official reports of the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration (Utlend-
ingsdirektoratet, UDI) listed a range of ‘push factors’ in Russia – such us 
unemployment, wage and pension arrears, poverty and ethnic tensions – that 
are clearly related to the existence of welfare gaps between Russia and Nor-
way.151 Russian citizens could embark on various migratory strategies to re-
alise their plans of coming to Norway – ranging from asylum-seeking in the 
case of the victims of the Russian policy in the Northern Caucasus to ‘marry-
ing Norwegian’, with many other strategies in between these extremes. 
 This case study deals with the growth of the Russian community in 
Norway in the 1990s. The analysis is based on available Norwegian and to a 
lesser degree Russian statistics and on the available literature. Unless other-
                                                     
151 UDI Årsrapport 2000; on the depth of the social crisis in Russia after 1991 see Brainerd 
1998, Braithwaite 1997, Foley 1997, Klugman 1997, Klugman and Braithwaite 1998, Ri-
mashevskaya 1997.  
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wise indicated, all figures presented here are based on data from the UDI and 
from Statistics Norway (SSB, Norway’s official bureau of statistics). The 
two main sources are UDI’s yearly reports and SSB’s publicly available 
overviews of the ethnic composition of the population of Norway. This in-
formation is supplemented by data from UDI’s DUF database giving good 
insight into long-term migratory trends. Most statistics cover the whole post-
Soviet period, from 1991 to November 2003. 
The UDI divides permanent and temporary migrants to Norway into vari-
ous categories, and this classification can be useful in indicating which mi-
gratory strategies have been preferred by Russians and which have been seen 
as less attractive. By using UDI data we can also see whether these strategies 
were gender-related. In the first part of this case study we focus on the over-
all development of the Russian community in Norway as reflected in official 
Norwegian population statistics; the second part presents an analysis of vari-
ous strategies used by Russians who have found their way to Norway.  
How many Russians live in Norway?  
Migratory exchange between Russia and Norway has been rather limited 
throughout the post-Communist period, with the dominant pattern being 
immigration of Russian citizens to Norway. Between 1991 and 2003 there 
were 7,737 more persons who moved from Russia to Norway than the other 
way (SSB Data). In the first five years after the collapse of the USSR (1991–
95) Norway had a net migration gain of 1,150; in the next five years (1996–
2000) the figure was 2,845, and between 2001 and 2003 this grew to 3,742. 
  
Gain from migration 1991–95 1,150
Gain from migration 1996–2000 2,845
Gain from migration 2001–03 3,742
Gain from migration 1991–2003 7,737
 
 
In 2003, Russia became the main ‘supplier’ of migrants to Norway, with al-
most 1600 more Russian citizens moving to Norway than the reverse direc-
tion. This exceeded arrivals from traditional migration countries like Soma-
lia and Afghanistan. 
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Figure 14. Russia on the Norwegian migration map 2003 (SSB) 
 
According to official Norwegian statistics (SSB) and depending on the cate-
gories used, there were between 6,203 and 8,868 persons with Russian back-
ground living in Norway as of 1 January 2004. The lower figure represents 
the number of Russian citizens living in Norway by that date, the higher fig-
ure represents the number of persons with Russian background.152 We also 
find that 7,465 persons living in Norway were born in Russia; 7,189 persons 
born in Russia with at least one parent born in Russia; and 7,457 with two 
non-Norwegian-born parents. Of course, this numerical confusion has more 
to do with the Norwegian way of classifying migrants than with the actual 
choices made by Russians deciding to move to Norway. 
As of 1 January 2004 more than 3% of all foreign citizens living in Nor-
way were Russian; as to persons ‘with foreign background’ – the most inclu-
sive of all SSB categories – the 7,465 persons with Russian background rep-
resented 2.1% of the total 348,940 persons with foreign background living in 
Norway.153 
Another way to measure the size of the established ethnic community in 
Norway is the look at the pupil population receiving schooling in their 
mother tongue, as provided by Norwegian law. In 2002 there were only reg-
istered 9 pupils receiving education in Ukrainian; in the same year, there 
were 497 pupils receiving education in Russian and 185 in Polish. 
A further aspect should be addressed when discussing data on migration 
from Russia. As Russia is a multi-ethnic country, not all migrants coming 
from Russia to Norway are of Russian ethnic background. The data collected 
and produced by the SSB and UDI are based exclusively on political and not 
ethnic geography. This may give an incorrect picture of the Russian commu-
nity developing in Norway. When we talk about the Russian civic commu-
nity in Norway, a community based on the formal – and from the viewpoint 
                                                     
152 Data from http://www.ssb.no/emner/02/01/10/innvbef/tab-2004-05-26-03.html. 
153 Data on the ethnic composition of the Norwegian society by 1 January 2004 from 
www.ssb.no/emner/02/01/10/innvbef/tab-2004-05-26-09.html 
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of the Norwegian authorities also previous and parental – Russian citizen-
ship, we include not only ethnic Russians but also persons with other ethnic 
background who – or whose parents – formally have – or have had – Russian 
citizenship. However, in speaking about the Russian community based on 
ethnicity, we should realise that many persons with other ethnic back-
grounds, although formally Russian citizens and as such classified as ‘Rus-
sians’ by the Norwegian authorities, do not identify with this group and have 
no wish to be classified as ‘Russians’.  We return to this question when ana-
lysing the situation of the fast-growing number of Russian citizens of mostly 
ethnic Chechen origin who have been applying for protection in Norway: 
they define themselves as ethnic Chechens coming from an independent 
country invaded by Russia, but are defined by the Norwegian authorities as a 
part of the Russian community in Norway.  
Where do they live? 
As shown in Figure 15, there are two areas of concentration of Russians liv-
ing in Norway – Finnmark County and the capital city of Oslo. The concen-
tration of Russians in the northernmost counties of Finnmark, Troms and 
Nordland can be explained by geographical proximity to the Russian border, 
while the growth of the Russian community in Oslo and neighbouring Aker-
shus follows the familiar pattern of concentration of migrant communities in 
central urban areas. This probably also explains the relatively high number 
of Russians in the counties of Hordaland (Bergen) and Rogaland (Sta-
vanger).  
However, the total population of Finnmark was only 73,514, and 
Finnmark was the county with the lowest concentration of persons with for-
eign background in the whole country. Thus, the comparatively high number 
of Russians there has to be deemed a special Russian phenomenon on the 
Norwegian migration map. The 843 Russians living in Finnmark as of 1 
January 2003 represented almost 1.1% of the total population of the county, 
while the 826 Russians living in Oslo represented only 0.15% of the popula-
tion of Oslo.  
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Figure 15. Russians in Norway 2003 – Geographical Distribution (SSB 
Data)  
When did they come? 
A look at the chronology of the Russian migration to Norway reveals a clear 
link between macro-scale political and historical events and micro-scale sur-
vival and adaptation strategies with migratory component. Until the fall of 
the Soviet Union, migration from Russia was rather low: only after the re-
laxation of the travel restrictions by the Soviet and then Russian authorities 
did the West see the arrival of substantial numbers of Russians.  
In his interesting analysis, Russian historian Polian (2003) divides the 
history of the recent migration from Russia into four waves. The first was 
the post-1917 Revolution migration of people belonging to classes that had 
lost the battle against the Bolsheviks and were forced to leave, in order to 
escape persecution and death. Polian estimates that this wave was made up 
of approximately 2 million former Russian subjects who settled permanently 
in the West. The second wave of migration from Russia was directly linked 
with the Second World War and the incorporation of the areas of Eastern 
Europe into the Soviet Union – as a result, between 500,000 and 700,000 
persons, mostly of non-Russian origin, were forced to leave the expanded 
Soviet sphere of influence. The third wave, from 1948 to 1986, resulted in 
the migration of approximately 500,000 of Soviet citizens, most of them of 
non-Russian ethnic origin: 290,000 Soviet Jews, 105,000 Soviet citizens of 
German descent and 52,000 ethnic Armenians, according to Polian. The 
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fourth wave began with the relaxation of political control under Gorbachev 
and is not yet concluded. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has 
seen a huge inflow of migrants from other post-Soviet republics. Migratory-
wise, the Russia of the post-Soviet period has been a country in-between – 
many Russian citizens decided to leave the country, but many others have 
seen the Russian Federation as an attractive country of migration. 
These migratory waves affected Norway in a very limited way. It has 
never become an area of mass migration from Russia, although in the early 
1990s, with the social, political and economic situation in Russia rapidly de-
teriorating, fears were expressed in Norway that the country could face a 
wave of uncontrolled Russian migration, especially in the case of an envi-
ronmental crisis or catastrophe in the neighbouring Russian regions. Contin-
gency plans were prepared by the Norwegian authorities and Norwegian 
media noted these possible dramatic scenarios, but these fears have never 
materialised.  
What Norway has seen is a steady increase in the number of Russian citi-
zens settling more or less permanently in the country. As Table 18 shows, 
there has been a substantial increase, especially after the collapse of the So-
viet Union and the opening of Russia’s borders.  
Table 18. Migration from Russia to Norway, long-term trends – yearly 
averages (for 1966–1990: the whole Soviet Union) (SSB). 
 
1966–70 1971–75 1976–80 1981–85 1986–90 1991–95 1996–2000 
245 43 59 46 72 294 683 
 
Another way of presenting the temporal aspect of migration is to see when 
Russian citizens settled in Norway for the first time (Figure 16). These data 
from the SSB confirm our conclusion that the emergence of the latest wave 
of Russian migrants in Norway is inseparably linked with recent domestic 
political, economic and social developments in Russia. These new political, 
economic and social conditions have created a new set of push/pull factors 
encouraging – or forcing – Russian citizens to embark on a survival strategy 
with a migratory component. On the other hand, although Norway might be 
seen as an attractive country of migration, only a very limited number of 
Russian citizens have actually decided to settle there.  
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Figure 16. Post-1990 Russian migration to Norway, by first year of 
migration (SSB)  
1999–2003 trends 
The number of migrants from Russia to Norway has increased dramatically – 
while in 1999 there were 800 such cases, only four years later the figure had 
more than doubled, to 1,835. To understand this trend we need to analyse the 
strategies used by migrants from Russia and then see whether there is a 
causal link between these strategies and recent domestic developments in 
Russia. (See Figure 17.) 
 
 
Figure 17. Migration from Russia to Norway – 1999–2003 trends  
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Russian survival strategies and Norway, or how and why do they come? 
Although the Russian authorities have lifted almost all practical travel re-
strictions for Russian citizens, a visa is still required to enter most countries 
outside CIS area. Both Russian citizens, who have to queue in the Western 
embassies and consulates each time they want to travel to the West, and the 
Russian authorities, who have politicised this issue in relations with the EU, 
have reiterated how humiliating this situation is for citizens of the former 
superpower.154 However, before travel restrictions on the part of the Western 
governments can be lifted, Russia will have to solve its own problems re-
lated to the use of the Russian territory as a transit area for illegal migration 
to the West, and it will have to sign a number of agreements on readmission 
with the countries that are most affected. As Norway coordinates its visa pol-
icy with other EEA and Schengen countries, those wishing to travel to Nor-
way need a visa. Obtaining a visa to Norway or any of the Schengen coun-
tries is the first practical obstacle Russian potential migrants must consider 
in selecting a migratory strategy, especially if they want to reach the target 
area without the help of predatory networks of human smugglers.  
In 2002, there were 13,376 visa applications filed by Russians in the 
Norwegian consulate in Murmansk; 10,770 in Moscow and 3,864 in St. Pe-
tersburg. Only 437 (3%), 46 (0.4%) and 25 (0.6%) respectively were rejected 
by the Norwegian authorities. 
Knowledge-related strategies: studying and learning in Norway 
Among the least controversial migration strategies is temporary and incom-
plete migration involving the transfer of knowledge, thereby indirectly im-
proving the quality of human capital in the source country. This strategy has 
become widely used by Russian citizens. Many have decided to spend some 
time in Norway in order to widen and deepen their knowledge basis, as they 
can expect this experience to improve their chances of adapting to a new 
situation in Russia – or elsewhere, if they see Norway as a intermediary sta-
tion on the way to other, more attractive, target countries. Since the early 
1990s, the Norwegian authorities have developed many schemes and institu-
tional solutions in order to facilitate contacts between Russia and Norway, so 
the choice of this survival and adaptation strategy seems wise. Also other 
gates for incomplete migration from Russia to Norway have been opened – 
and used by Russians interested in improving their qualifications through 
studies, intern/trainee (praktikant) schemes, or through staying with Norwe-
gian families as au pairs.  
Since 1991, 1,423 Russian citizens have applied for student visas to 
Norway; 250 decided to go au pairs, while 465 applied for praktikant visas 
and 78 wanted to spend some time in Norway as working guests. 
The latest available overview (2003) of the situation of Russian ‘knowl-
edge-seeking’ incomplete migrants in Norway shows which knowledge-
related strategies have been most widely used. In 2003 there were 159 Rus-
sian citizens studying in Norway, 19 Russians at the Norwegian ‘folk col-
                                                     
154 For a good overview of the visa requirements for Russian citizens see: Obukhova Yev-
geniya and Yevgeniy Mazin (2003) ‘Poluchit vizu ne vsegda prosto’, Nezavismiaya Gazeta, 
03 Nov.  
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leges’ and 2 Russian post-doctoral students affiliated with Norwegian educa-
tional institutions. In the same year there were 55 au pairs from Russia, 28 
praktikants and probably 6 working guests. All in all, 269 Russian citizens 
applied for a student or other knowledge-related visa in Norway that year, 
and 247 renewal applications were filed by Russians already studying in 
Norway. 
Russian ‘knowledge-seekers’ have been strongly represented in the 
knowledge-seeking community in Norway: 7.6% of all foreign students 
studying in Norway in 2003, and almost 6% of all au pairs and more than 
5% of all praktikants that year were Russians. That Russians represented 
more than 10% of those who applied for renewal of their student visas in 
2003 indicates that the Russian student community in Norway is well estab-
lished.   
Figure 18. Russians in Norway 2003: knowledge-related strategies  
What may prove to be a specifically Russian – or perhaps more generally 
East European – feature of the ‘au-pair strategy’ is its application as a poten-
tial gate to permanent migration and as a useful ‘opener’ of the Norwegian 
labour market for Russian specialists. According to the Russian-language 
LEAPS website (http://awis.virtualave.net/a_norw.html) the au pair system 
can be used in order to improve one’s chances on the Norwegian labour 
market. The site recommends specialists like physicians, dentists, veterinari-
ans, psychologists, nurses, lawyers etc., to begin by staying as au pair with a 
Norwegian family for at least 2 years in order to improve their language 
skills and get better acquainted with the Norwegian system, before filing a 
job application. The company provides information on conditions in Norway 
and helps to file applications, charging between $70$ and $120 for its ser-
vices. Apparently many of those who chose the au pair solution are in fact 
interested in establishing themselves on the Norwegian labour market 
through entering it in this unconventional way. The same could be probably 
159
19 2 55 28 6
269
247
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Student
Folkeskole
Postdoc
A
u-pair
Praktikant
O
thers
Total
R
enew
als
Jakub M. Godzimirski 124 
said about those who use the praktikant  and working guest schemes. More-
over, there is growing number of Russian graduates from Norwegian educa-
tional institutions who choose not to return to Russia but try – often success-
fully – to establish themselves on the Norwegian or other Western ‘ordinary’ 
labour markets.     
Working in Norway: Russian labour-related strategies 
According to Norwegian regulations there are two legal ways of accessing 
the Norwegian labour market for the citizens of the countries that are not 
parties to the EEA agreement. One of these – the ‘specialist scheme’ modi-
fied on 1 January 2002 – gives foreign employees the right to settle in Nor-
way permanently after an initial period of three years. By contrast, the sea-
sonal work permit provides access to the Norwegian labour market for a lim-
ited period only, and without the right to settle permanently. A special 
arrangement was also put in place for potential job-seekers from the Russian 
part of the Barents region who were interested in working in the Norwegian 
fishery industry in the Far North. Although this special type of work permit 
gives Russian job-seekers right to stay in Norway for up till one year, it does 
not entitle them to settle permanently, and should thus be seen as an ex-
tended seasonal work permit.  
Depending on their main goal and their qualifications, potential migrants 
can get access to the Norwegian labour market either through one of these 
legal migratory gates or by adopting a strategy of illegal entry. As no data 
are available on the number of foreigners working in Norway’s grey or black 
labour market, and estimates vary and are not reliable, we will focus here on 
official Norwegian data on those Russian citizens who have entered the 
Norwegian labour market through legal methods. 
Seasonal workers 
Getting access to the Norwegian labour market for a limited period of time 
may be an attractive solution to those who are not thinking of leaving Russia 
permanently but would rather use a strategy of circular migration. Those 
wanting to reap the economic gains from temporary labour migration may 
prefer this to permanent migration. In a situation when they can get a Nor-
wegian level of earnings (or almost that) while in Norway, and can then re-
turn to Russia to spend the money there, the purchasing parity of their Nor-
wegian earnings is much higher than in the case of permanent migration to 
Norway. This possibility has attracted many Russian citizens.  
During the whole 1991–2003 period, 826 Russian citizens applied for 
seasonal work permits in Norway (UDI data). On the other hand, interest in 
this strategy was much lower in Russia than in many other CEE countries, 
especially Poland and Lithuania.  
Part 3. Case Studies 125 
Figure 19. Seasonal workers from Russia – applications for seasonal 
work permits filed with UDI 
 
Especially in recent years, new groups of Russians seem to be discovering 
Norway as a place where one can earn money legally for at least some 
months of the year. In 2003, 256 Russians received seasonal work permits. 
This was almost the same as in 2002 (264), but compared with the situation 
in 2000 (103) and 2001 (148), it shows that almost twice as many found their 
way to Norway through this legal gate. In general,  however, Russian citi-
zens do not seem to be choosing this strategy, as their share in the total num-
ber of seasonal workers in Norway has been fairly low. (See Table 19.)  
 
Table 19. Russian seasonal workers in Norway, 2000–2003  
 
 
 
Russian specialists in Norway  
According to UDI data, 536 Russian citizens applied for work permits in 
Norway as ‘ordinary specialist’155 in the whole 1991–2003 period. The in-
troduction in January 2002 of a new set of rules offering much easier access 
to the Norwegian labour market to all those wanting to come and able to 
document that they were in possession of some special skills has resulted in 
growing interest from Russians with the higher and middle level of educa-
tion required to qualify as ‘specialists’ under the new rules.  
According to these new rules, work permits may be granted to as many as 
5,000 specialists from non-EU/EEA each year. ‘Specialists’ are defined as 
‘persons who are trained in a particular field or have special qualifications 
                                                     
155 ARBDSPESFAGUTORD – category in DUF database  
Year Total no. Russians Russians’ share 
2000 9,894 103 1% 
2001 11,920 148 1.2% 
2002 15,721 264 1.7% 
2003 17,660 256 1.4% 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
Number 2 16 38 43 36 25 67 54 52 104 138 132 119
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Jakub M. Godzimirski 126 
needed in Norway. Their expertise must be critical for the enterprise seeking 
to hire them.’156 Prior to applying for a work permit as a specialist a person 
must have a concrete offer of employment. Once granted, a specialist work 
permit is connected to a particular job and a particular place of work; the 
wages and work conditions cannot be less favourable then those specified 
under Norway’s collective pay agreement or what is normal within the trade 
or profession in Norway. After three years, a specialist may apply for a resi-
dence permit, and his family members can join him in Norway.  
The introduction of these new regulations meant a definite relaxation of 
the rather restrictive earlier practice that had permitted labour migration only 
of specialists with very specific skills, usually requiring tertiary-level educa-
tion.  
It seems that Russian citizens have discovered this opportunity and many 
have chosen this strategy. The opening of the Norwegian labour market did 
not result in a dramatic inflow of skilled labour – in 2002 only 1,676 applica-
tions were granted (approximately 1/3 of the quota), and in 2003 only 1,127. 
On the other hand, Russians ranked fifth in 2002 and third in 2003 among all 
those who used the ‘specialist strategy’ in order to gain access to the Norwe-
gian labour market as well as the right to settle permanently in the country 
after the initial three-year period. (Table 20)  
Table 20.  Russian specialists in Norway 2002 and 2003 
 
Rank Year 2003 Number Rank  Year 2002 Number 
Quota 5,000 Quota 5,000 
Total  1,127 Total  1,676 
1 Poland 331 1 Poland 516 
2 USA 99 2 USA  129 
3 Russia 57 3 Lithuania 111 
4 Slovakia 57 4 Romania 85 
5 India 47 5 Russia 81 
6 Lithuania 43 6 Estonia 76 
7 Serbia &Montenegro 41 7 Slovakia 71 
8 Romania 38 8 The Philippines 62 
9 Estonia 37 9 Serbia &Montenegro 58 
10 The Philippines 33 10 India 53 
Russian brides and grooms in Norway 
One clearly gender-related survival strategy involves marrying into Norway. 
This seems to be the approach adopted by many Russians who decided to 
leave their country and settle in Norway; it was also one of the few legal 
strategies available. This strategy could be especially successful in areas 
with specific demographic characteristics, such as Finnmark, where every 
fourth marriage in 2000 was said to involve a Russian citizen. 
                                                     
156 http://www.udi.no/upload/Faktaark/Engelsk/Arbeid_engelsk.pdf 
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Between 1989 and November 2003, UDI registered 905 cases of visa ap-
plication for Russian citizens who married either Norwegian citizens or other 
persons living permanently in Norway. In addition there were 44 cases 
where a Russian citizen applied for visa in connection with planned marriage 
to a person residing in Norway. In the vast majority of these cases (849 out 
of 905, or 94%) the bride was Russian. Only in 56 cases (6%) was the groom 
Russian and the bride had a Norwegian background. 
What was the temporal dynamics of this social phenomenon? Figure 20 
shows when cases were registered in the UDI database. 
Figure 20. Brides and grooms from Russia   
 
According to a recent study (Lie 2004:46), as of 1 January 2002 there were 
1,464 Norwegian men married to women from Russia; and a very low, 
statistically insignificant number of Norwegian women married to men from 
Russia. Russian women ranked in 9 place among the 33,090 women with 
foreign background married to Norwegian man at that time.  
All in all, as of 1 January 2002 there were in Norway 1,902 women with 
Russian background who were married, and 376 Russian men who were 
married. Of the Russian women, 79%  were married to ethnic Norwegians, 
while only 13% of the men had ethnic Norwegians as their spouses. 
As only 12 years earlier, in 1990, there had been only 84 Norwegian men 
married to women from the Soviet Union – they were ranked 29 among 
women with foreign background married to Norwegian men – a completely 
new pattern of ‘nuptial migration’ between Russia and Norway seems to 
have developed in recent years. The same study shows, for instance, that in 
the case of marriage involving Polish women and Norwegian men, there has 
been a less dynamic development – although there were almost twice as 
many marriages between Norwegian men and Polish women in 2002 com-
pared with 1990 (1483 and 749), Polish women married to Norwegian men  
ranked 8 among all foreign brides, both in 1990 and in 2002. Table 21 shows 
developments in this field in recent years.  
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Table 21. Norwegian men marrying women from Russia 
 
Year Foreign 
bride: total 
Brides from 
Russia 
Russian 
brides – rank 
Russian brides’ share of all mar-
riages to non-Norwegian women 
1992 1,213 11 12 0.9 
1993 1,305 14 12 1.1 
1994 1,391 23 9 1.7 
1994 1,408 24 10 1.7 
1996 1,408 25 7 1.8 
1997 1,747 46 4 2.6 
1998 1,848 31 5 1.7 
1999 2,339 330 1 14.1 
2000 2,698 384 1 14.2 
2001 2,809 358 2 12.7 
 
In recent years, Russian brides have become increasingly visible in the Nor-
wegian ‘nuptial landscape’ – in 1992 they were ranked 12 among the women 
with foreign background marrying Norwegian men; in 1996 they advanced 
to the 7 place and in 1999 and 2000 they topped the list, only to be demoted 
to the second place by Thai women in 2001( Lie 2004: 64). In 2001 there 
were 403 women with Russian background who married in Norway – 89% 
married an ethnic Norwegian and only 20 of them (a mere 5%) married a 
man with Russian background ( Lie 2004: 71). 
Thus we see that the ‘nuptial strategy’ has been used by Russian woman 
as a most attractive migratory and survival strategy for those wanting to set-
tle permanently in Norway. Also the composition of the community of mar-
ried Russians in Norway shows a strong gender element in this strategy: as 
of 1 January 2002, 1,902 of 2,278 married persons with Russian background 
living in Norway were women. 79% of all Russian married women and 13% 
of all Russian married men were married to ethnic Norwegians. Russians 
married to Norwegians formed a substantial part of the Russian community 
that was in the process of establishing itself by January 2002, as these 1,550 
Russian women and men married to ethnic Norwegians comprised almost 
1/3 of the whole community of 4,442 persons of Russian background regis-
tered as the first-generation migrants.   
Russian asylum-seekers in Norway 1991–2003 
During the first years of the Russian transition, Russian citizens were no 
longer seen as the victims of an oppressive political regime, and most of 
their applications for asylum were flatly rejected by the Western authorities. 
Some did, however, keep trying to use this strategy to get to the West, espe-
cially after the worsening of the situation in the southern part of the Russian 
Federation after the outbreak of the first and then second Chechen war. The 
policy of turning of a blind eye to the abuses of the Russian authorities in 
Chechnya backfired on the West – by the late 1990s, the West found it had 
to deal with a growing inflow of asylum-seekers from Russia, and many 
countries finally had to admit that these applicants had a real need for protec-
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tion against the abuses committed against them by various actors in their na-
tive Chechnya. 
 
Table 22. Number of asylum-seekers from Russia in main European 
countries157 
 
Receiving country 1998 1999 2000 2001 
UK 2,820 4,110 4,275 445 
Germany 867 2,079 2,755 4,543 
Netherlands 519 1,000 1,039 941 
Belgium 277 1,376 3,594 2,451 
Sweden 229 449 590 841 
France 220 464 743 1,753 
Norway 131 318 471 1,320 
Czech Republic 61 244 620 640 
Poland 47 104 1,050 1,513 
Other countries 662 833 2,148 2,418 
Total 5,833 11,441 17,285 16,865 
 
Norway has been no exception in that respect. It is a country with a long tra-
dition of extending protection to the victims of political persecution in its di-
rect neighbourhood, including Russia. For two of the most prominent politi-
cal refugees of the Soviet era – Leo Trotsky and then Alexander Solzhenit-
syn – Norway was the first country to offer them some security against po-
litically motivated persecution after they were allowed to leave the USSR. 
Although neither of them decided to remain in Norway, a special pattern had 
been established. Norway, especially given its self-chosen role as global 
peacemaker, could not afford to ignore the issue of the new victims of perse-
cution in Russia.  
According to official Norwegian data, the number of asylum-seekers 
from Russia grew from 32 in 1992 to 1,718 in 2002 and 1,923 in 2003. In the 
whole period between 1991 and 2003 there were registered more than 4,500 
applications for asylum in Norway by citizens of Russia. Approximately 
one-third of these were filed by women. Most of them, especially after 1999, 
were somehow linked to the deteriorating situation in the Caucasus.  
                                                     
157 Migration Trends in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 2001–2002, Review 2002, 172–
175. 
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Figure 21. Asylum-seekers from Russia 1991–2002 
 
Also in relative terms, asylum-seekers from Russia have become an impor-
tant issue. While in 1998 they comprised only 1.5% of all asylum-seekers in 
Norway, in 2001 they represented almost 9% of the total. Their share con-
tinued to increase – almost 10% in 2002, and over 12% in 2003. 
It also seems that seeking protection in Norway has become more suc-
cessful. In 2000, 93% of all asylum applications were rejected, with only 7% 
of all asylum-seekers from Russia granted either asylum or protection on 
humanitarian grounds. In 2001, however, one-fourth of asylum-seekers from 
Russia were granted protection in Norway (4% received asylum and 21% 
protection on humanitarian grounds).  
In 2002 the situation changed with the introduction of the Dublin Agree-
ment on asylum-seekers. In 2002, 36% of all asylum-seekers from Russia 
(read: Chechnya) were sent back to other European countries in accordance 
with the Dublin rules. Also in 2002, 16% of all asylum-seekers from Russia 
were granted protection in Norway (5% political asylum, 11% on humanitar-
ian grounds). In 5% of the cases, the application for asylum was withdrawn, 
while in 43% of all cases the application was rejected by the Norwegian au-
thorities. The situation changed only slightly in 2003. All in all, 1,653 deci-
sions on asylum were made by the Norwegian authorities in that year. The 
result: 8% of all applicants were granted asylum; 35% were granted the right 
to stay in Norway on humanitarian grounds; 20% were sent back to other 
European countries that were to treat their cases in accordance with the new 
Dublin rules. About one-third – 34% – were rejected and 3% withdrawn by 
applicants themselves. These figures indicate that in 43% of all cases dealt 
with by the Norwegian migration authorities, good enough reasons were 
found for considering Russian citizens the victims of politically motivated 
persecution, and for providing them with protection according to interna-
tionally accepted rules of conduct. 
These high figures bear witness to the dramatic situation in Russia, but 
they also indicate that the Norwegian authorities have begun adopting a 
more nuanced approach. As the head of the Norwegian Directorate of Immi-
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gration (UDI) stated recently,158 the high share of positive decisions was also 
closely linked with the fact that the share of ethnic Chechens among asylum-
seekers from Russia had risen to almost 90% by 2003. With no end to the 
bloody conflict in Chechnya in sight, we can expect the success of this sur-
vival strategy may encourage other members of this vulnerable community 
to follow in their footsteps. 
For many migrants, the choice of migration as the way of solving their 
welfare dilemma is a dramatic but often rational choice based on careful 
consideration of the pros and cons involved. For one group of migrants, 
however, migration may be the only available survival strategy. If we take a 
look at the history of forced migration in Europe over the past ten years – 
and forced migration has been an important practical issue all Western Euro-
pean governments have had to deal with in the wake of the bloody conflicts 
in the Balkans (Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992–95, Kosovo in 1998/99), and 
quite recently in the Caucasus – we can see how migration may appear as the 
only option to those who may feel their very existence as individuals or a 
group threatened by the policy choices of those who wield power. 
The Chechens seem to have realised that the conflict in their native coun-
try is going to drag on due to the lack of the political pressure on Russia to 
find a real political solution to this tragic conflict. They decided to emigrate 
to the West because their situation in Russia has worsened due to Mos-
cow’spolicy of ‘demonisation’ of this whole ethnic group, making it respon-
sible for the latest wave of terrorist attacks on Russian military and civilian 
targets. The situation of the Chechen community in Russia has become un-
bearable – they are persecuted because they belong to a specific ethnic group 
and may believe that they are about to face pogroms similar to those which 
forced Jews to leave Imperial Russia in 19th and 20th centuries.  
The Chechen community – perhaps not without reason, in view of the 
casualties caused by the two Chechen wars – is prone to interpret Moscow’s 
policy towards them as one of genocide. From the Chechen perspective, the 
whole conflict is about the survival of Chechens as a separate ethnic group 
and community. While the first Chechen war was a war of independence, the 
second Chechen war has turned, in the opinion of many Chechens and inde-
pendent observers, into a war of survival and attrition. At stake is no longer 
the survival of Chechnya as a political community, but the survival of Che-
chens as an ethnic entity. In this situation, migration to the West is perhaps 
the most reasonable option available. 
Due to the decisions taken by the Norwegian authorities, 1,129 Russian 
asylum-seekers, the majority of them ethnic Chechens, were granted the 
right to stay in Norway between early 2000 and late 2003. Formally, as the 
Norwegian authorities treat them as ‘migrants with Russian background’, 
they form a large part – 13% (1,129 of 8,868) – of the broadly defined ‘Rus-
sian community’ living in Norway as of 1 January 2004. In reality, however, 
they form a distinct community that has very little to do with, or in common, 
with others formally defined as persons with Russian background.  
These two communities – both defined from the purely practical and sta-
tistical point of view as ‘Russian’ – live more side by side than together. We 
                                                     
158 On 27 May 2004 at NUPI’s conference on migration from Russia.   
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can also expect their integration into Norwegian society to follow different 
paths. The existence of two separate Russian communities in Norway may 
also pose serious conceptual challenges to Norwegian policy makers, not 
least when they have to make practical decisions on opening the other migra-
tory gate to migration from Russia: family reunification.  
Family reunification as a two-stage strategy – Russians in Norway 
Due to the emergence in the 1990s of a new pattern of migration from Rus-
sia to Norway and the growing number of Russian citizens settling perma-
nently in Norway, family reunification has began to play a major part in the 
rather one-sided migratory exchange between the two countries. 
The use of this migratory gate is a two-stage strategy – first, a ‘family 
link’ has to be established between home country and the target country and 
a ‘family bridgehead’ has to be set up abroad. Since there has been a quick 
and steady growth of the Russian community in Norway, and also the nuptial 
strategy can involve family reunification, it should be not surprising that 
Russians are well represented among those entering Norway through this 
migratory gate. Data on Russian entries to Norway through the family reuni-
fication gate are shown in Table 23. 
 
Table 23. Family reunifications in Norway – ‘Russian dimension’ 
 
Year Total Russians Russians’ share in % 
2001 12,142 637 5.25 
2002 14,607 905 6.20 
2003 10,469 797 7.61 
 
There is also a very special case in the migratory exchange between Russia 
and Norway over the past ten years, a case that comes under two headings –
‘family reunification’ and ‘playing of the ethnic card’. This is the case of 
more than 200 ‘Kola-Norwegians’ – persons with Norwegian ethnic back-
ground, generally living in the Far North, who were allowed to return to 
Norway only after the fall of the Soviet Union – and the introduction in 1995 
of a special Norwegian regulation on the return of ethnic Norwegians and 
their descendents from Russia. The history of this small and special Norwe-
gian community has been described in detail by Norwegian journalist 
Morten Jentoft (2001) and their fate after returning to Norway is sometimes 
cited as an example of the lack of coherence in Norwegian migration policy. 
On the one hand, more of 200 of them, with their families, were allowed to 
return to Norway, which was a positive move on the part of the Norwegian 
authorities; on the other hand, however, the Norwegian authorities provided 
scant practical and economic assistance to those who decided to return.159 
Many have to go through what they – and their supporters – describe as hu-
                                                     
159 For more details on this see a circular issued by UDI in which practical information is 
given on how to treat these returnees. The text can be found on. 
http://odin.dep.no/odinarkiv/norsk/dep/nedlagt/kad/1997/publ/036005-994007/dok-
nn.html#Informasjon.  
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miliating procedures in the Norwegian social welfare and assistance bu-
reaucracy.160 
The strategy adopted by this relatively small group is a good illustration 
of the interplay between micro- and macro-structures. Had it not been for the 
fall of the Soviet Union and the Norwegian decision to open for return of 
this group, these potential migrants would have either to adopt another mi-
gration strategy or decide to stay where they were, no matter whether they 
liked it or not. It was only when the outside world changed that they have the 
option – to migrate or not to migrate – and could contemplate whether they 
were interested in establishing themselves in Norway or not. The strategy 
they adopted was a combined strategy of playing the ethnic card and family 
reunification. They could employ this strategy only when the Norwegian au-
thorities decided that the ethnic game could be played at all in relations be-
tween Russia and Norway; only when this decision on the higher level had 
been made was it possible for them to employ the dual strategies of playing 
the ethnic card and reunification with an often nebulous ‘Norwegian family’. 
The Kola-Norwegians case shows how high politics makes it possible for 
various groups to devise new social practices and how these new social prac-
tices contribute to changing the pattern of migration in Europe. Figure 22 
sums up the finding of this case study and clearly shows the complexity of 
issues involved and the multi-faceted pattern of Russian migration to Nor-
way. 
 
Figure 22.  New pattern of migration between Russia and Norway  
 
 
                                                     
160 For a good description of the situation of this special group of migrants see for instance: 
http://www.klassekampen.no/Arkivsamling/Arkiv/2003/April/15/176697 
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 Conclusions 
This study has focused on how recent political, economic and social devel-
opments in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have contributed to 
changing the pattern of migratory exchange between the region and Norway. 
Migration has been treated here as one of the survival and adaptation strate-
gies available to individuals and groups seeking to cope with new chal-
lenges.  
The study has focused on migratory exchange between two CEE coun-
tries – Poland and Russia – and Norway.  Poland was chosen because it was 
about to become a fully-fledged member of the EU, and this membership 
would change the legal framework for migratory exchanges between Poland 
and Norway. Since Poles have been active on both the regular and irregular 
Norwegian labour markets for many years, they could be expected to be-
come even more visible with EU enlargement, especially after the introduc-
tion of a new legal framework for migration of foreign specialists to Norway 
in January 2002. Russia was chosen because Russian citizens in recent years 
have become the most numerous group of new migrants to Norway, and be-
cause this specific group has embarked on a more varied set of strategies in 
order to establish a migratory link to Norway. 
If we treat migration as a survival and adaptation strategy we can gauge 
its success by examining the extent to which implementation of the strategy 
– migration – has solved the dilemma that prompted people to leave their 
country of origin. The general goal of applying a migratory strategy is to im-
prove one’s personal situation. To measure whether migration has served to 
improve the situation, we need to understand the main original goal of the 
strategy and then compare the situation of the migrant before and after the 
migratory move.  
In the case of forced migrants who flee their homeland to avoid persecu-
tion or even loss of life, the absence of persecution and threat to their lives 
can already be deemed a positive result of migration, a pure gain from mi-
gration; everything else, like relative improvement in personal economy, 
shelter, access to education etc. comes as an additional gain from migration. 
Even if such a migrant does not manage to get integrated in the society of the 
target country and feel excluded, this social exclusion is not an existential 
threat to life. In many cases this may mean trading one form of exclusion for 
another one, but the individual survives and can experience a dramatic im-
provement in quality of life, in well-being, in welfare. 
In the case of economic migrants, we would need to compare their eco-
nomic status before migration and afterwards. In most cases, an important 
precondition of economic success is integration into the society of the target 
country and full participation in labour market, or at least filling a specific 
economic niche in order to secure economic advantages. 
There are many obstacles a migrant has to overcome on his way towards 
a ‘strategic success’. If we look at the situation of the two relatively numer-
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ous Central and East European communities that are growing in Norway – 
Poles and Russians – we can conclude that these obstacles vary in nature. 
From the purely legal view, EU enlargement changed the situation of Poles 
in a dramatic way, without influencing the situation of Russians. After EU 
enlargement, Russians face more legal obstacles than Poles, who are given 
de facto free access to the Norwegian labour market, provided they can find 
a job. Both Poles and Russians may, however, face other obstacles that may 
prove more difficult. For instance, the way these two groups are viewed in 
Norway may have a negative impact on their chances of being treated on a 
par not only with Norwegians, but also with Nordic and other Western job-
seekers with whom they have to compete for jobs. 
There is no place here to present an in-depth analysis of how these two 
groups are viewed and represented in the Norwegian popular discourse, or to 
assess how such perceptions may influence their chances of establishing 
themselves on the Norwegian labour market, and thus realising the economic 
and social goals of their migratory survival strategy. The predominant popu-
lar discourses on these two groups differ, but their possible and mostly nega-
tive impact on overall perceptions of those two groups in Norway should not 
be underestimated.  
As far as Poles are concerned, we can find many  representations that ap-
peared in the Norwegian popular and, to a certain degree, official discourse 
in recent years. Poles have often been represented as:  
 
- strawberry pickers: nice people with basic skills, a little 
backward, reliable and hard-working, but perhaps not good 
candidates for more complicated tasks and jobs. 
- underpaid house painters and labourers operating mostly in 
the shadow economy: the job they do is as good as that done 
by overpaid Norwegian craftsmen, but it is not safe to hire 
them for two reasons – you may be caught by Norwegian au-
thorities and fined for employing irregulars; and there is the 
insecurity of not having any possibility to complain if the job 
they do is not good enough.  
- overeducated Polish female house cleaners who work in 
Norway in order to improve their economic situation – they 
give us chance to have our own private variant of develop-
ment assistance, to clean not only our houses but also to salve 
our conscience and feel better by hiring them.  
- nature polluters: they come to Norway, live in their cars at 
Bogstad camping grounds, pollute the countryside, and have 
to be chased away by police who every year have to restore 
social and natural order in the areas of ‘Polish occupation’. 
 
Also other representations can be traced in the Norwegian discourse on 
Poles, especially in the period with more open borders and more social inter-
action between the two groups. In 1990s Poles became associated with  ille-
gal or even criminal strategies: the archetypical Pole was thus a petty crimi-
nal or a drug, vodka or cigarette smuggler. 
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On the eve of EU enlargement new elements in the Norwegian discourse 
on Poles emerged – images of Poles as welfare shoppers, as the potential 
victim of social dumping in Norway and as an underpaid threat to the Nor-
wegian economy and welfare.  
Generally speaking, Poles are viewed either as being below par, nice but 
not as good as ‘we’ are, or, when the consequences of the opening of the la-
bour market are discussed, as a threat to the Norwegian welfare system and 
way of life. Poles are simply different from us Norwegians, and this differ-
ence, this otherness, is a source of concern, especially in a situation where 
we feel that that we are losing control over developments, with external 
forces – the EU – obliging us to open our doors and even transfer money to 
our new, still rather unknown, second-rank European fellows. 
Russians are even in a worse situation then Poles as far as popular images 
and representations are concerned. Especially the situation of Russian 
women who want to integrate into Norwegian society – and they form the 
majority of Russians living in Norway – may be difficult, due to a special set 
of prejudices and mostly negative representations traceable in the Norwegian 
general discourse on Russia and Russians. 
In a historical perspective, Russia has always been seen not only as a 
great neighbour, but also, and especially during the Soviet time, as a source 
of existential threat to Norway (the mighty Russian Bear).  Now Russia is no 
longer seen as an immediate military threat – but it is the source of many 
risks and various social and environmental threats. Images of the polluted 
city of Nikel on the Kola Peninsula, of the nuclear waste in Russian military 
bases located close to Norwegian borders, of starving Russian children in 
Murmansk and Russian women, ‘proud daughters of Russia’, forced to sell 
their bodies abroad in order to survive – these were to become the dominant 
elements in the Norwegian discourse on Russia in the 1990s.161 To many 
Norwegians, Russia has become not only an example of a failed state, but 
the failed state, the failed neighbouring state with a huge destructive poten-
tial and a population driven to despair. 
It was not by chance that the fear of mass migration triggered by an eco-
logical catastrophe was a dominant element of the Norwegian discourse on 
Russia in the early 1990s. Russia was seen as the heir to the Soviet Union, 
and thus still posed a threat to Norway. The Soviet Union and Russia have 
been depicted as the Norwegian ‘Others’ – threatening Others, with a mas-
sive destructive potential … and they are located in the Norwegian 
neighbourhood. This geographical proximity combined with the feeling of 
cultural and mental otherness and perceptions of the Soviet Union/Russia as 
a source of challenge and even threat to Norway – all have coloured the per-
ception of Russians in Norway. While Poles may be seen as a sort of second-
rank Europeans, Russians are still mostly viewed as completely ‘other’, as 
those with whom Norwegians have little in common. The ‘Russian system’ 
and the ‘Norwegian system’ are viewed as two opposite poles of social and 
political organisation, and are therefore incompatible. This image of other-
                                                     
161 For more on Norwegian perceptions of Russia see Hønneland and Jørgensen 2002. Also 
Hønneland’s presentation on the topic at NUPI/UDI seminar on Russian migration to Norway 
held in Oslo gives a good insight in this discussion and shows how these representations have 
relatively little to do with reality.  
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ness and incompatibility may become a main obstacle to the integration of 
Russians in Norway, making it more difficult for them to achieve the goals 
of their adaptation strategy. 
These same  integration challenges may confront the Chechen commu-
nity in Norway. Formally and mentally they are seen as ‘Russians’ – so they 
face similar challenges as Russians themselves. However, Norwegian per-
ceptions of Chechens may be coloured not only by their ‘Russianness’, but 
also by the images of Chechens as Islamic terrorists and members of the in-
ternational terrorist network – views conveyed by the media in recent times. 
This will make them even more ‘other’ than Russians, and in the longer run 
may pose serious challenge to their integration into Norwegian society. On 
the other hand, the Chechens’ survival strategy was in many cases one of a 
sheer survival – so perhaps they may feel that they have achieved their ‘stra-
tegic goals’ by simply escaping the Russian onslaught and finding a safe ha-
ven in Norway. 
Importantly, the emergence of these new patterns of migration linked to 
the transition in Central and Eastern Europe and the choices of survival and 
adaptation strategies by CCE citizens points up the need for serious debate 
on the future of Norwegian migration policy, and here Norway’s decision 
makers will have to give comprehensive and coherent answers. A central is-
sue is the future development of the Norwegian labour market and the need 
for more – or less – labour migration, also from the region in focus in this 
study. Norway, like many other West European countries, will have to solve 
its demographic dilemma, and opening the Norwegian labour market to 
workers from Central and Eastern Europe could be one approach. However, 
the whole region is also undergoing deep demographic, social and economic 
changes, and will probably face similar – if not even worse – demographic 
problems as the rest of Europe. In order to adapt to this new situation of a 
decreasing labour force and increasing international competition for this 
‘shrinking commodity’, Norway will have to adopt a more nuanced and 
long-term migration policy. Of course, such a policy should take into con-
sideration Norwegian needs – but it is also important to learn more about the 
forces and attitudes that drive migration in Europe. Sending out signals that 
it is possible for people to realise the most important goals of survival and 
adaptation strategy in Norway could encourage more to follow in the foot-
steps of those who have already come. If the Norwegian authorities want to 
see more migrants coming to Norway, where they can help the country solve 
its future dilemmas, the authorities will need to make it easier for migrants to 
realise these adaptation strategies, as well as assisting those who have al-
ready come to adapt to the new situation. If, however, the opposite is the 
case, if the authorities should decide that there are other ways of solving 
these dilemmas, and that migration is not a part of the solution but rather a 
part of the problem, then official Norwegian policy should instead focus on 
discouraging potential migrants from coming to Norway.  
This report has been a modest attempt to contribute to this debate by ex-
amining and analysing the linkage between the transitional survival and ad-
aptation strategies and the emergence of new patterns of migration to Nor-
way. 
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